Nudge as Fudge

Modern Law Review

Volumn 75, Issue 1, 2012, Pages 122-148

  Yeung, Karen ^a  

^a KING'S COLLEGE LONDON   (United Kingdom)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 84155178191     PISSN: 00267961     EISSN: 14682230     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1111/j.1468-2230.2012.00893.x     Document Type: Review

References (60)

1. P. Ormerod, 'A network is as good as a nudge for a Big Society' Financial Times 15 September 2010.
2. Headed by behavioural economist David Halpern, it has been directed to focus on problems of obesity, diet and alcohol, to work alongside the Health Secretary's Responsibility Deal Behaviour Change group: F. Lawrence, 'First goal of David Cameron's nudge unit is to encourage healthy living' The Guardian 12 November 2010.
3. J. Weisman and J. Bravin, 'Obama's Regulatory Czar Likely to Set a New Tone' Wall Street Journal 8 January 2009.
4. Section 4, titled 'Flexible Approaches' provides that, 'Where relevant, feasible, and consistent with regulatory objectives, and to the extent permitted by law, each agency shall identify and consider regulatory approaches that reduce burdens and maintain flexibility and freedom of choice for the public. These approaches include warnings, appropriate default rules, and disclosure requirements as well as provision of information to the public in a form that is clear and intelligible.' See B. Obama, 'Towards a 21st Century Regulatory System' Wall Street Journal 18 January 2011.
5. M. A. Edwards, 'The FTC and the New Paternalism' (2008) 60 Administrative Law Review 323, 323.
6. O. Amir and O. Lobel, 'Stumble, Predict, Nudge: How Behavioural Economics Informs Law and Policy' (2009) 108 Columbia Law Review 2098; R. Korobkin, 'Libertarian Welfarism' (2009) 97 California Law Review 1651; M. A. Smith and M. S. McPherson, 'Nudging for Equality: Values in Libertarian Paternalism' (2009) 61 Administrative Law Review 323.
7. A. Tversky and D. Kahneman, 'Judgment Under Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases' (1974) 185 Science 1124.
8. Thaler and Sunstein discuss only a small subset of these. For a more extended discussion, see F. H. Buckley, Fair Governance - Paternalism and Perfectionism (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009) ch 3.
9. A. Tversky and D. Kahneman, 'The Framing of Decisions and the Psychology of Choice' (1981) 211 Science 453.
10. See generally F. H. Buckley, Fair Governance - Paternalism and Perfectionism (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009) ch 7.
11. G. Loewenstein, 'Out of Control: Visceral Influences on Behaviour' (1996) 65 Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes 272.
12. F. H. Buckley, Fair Governance - Paternalism and Perfectionism (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009) 38.
13. R. Hollander-Blumoff, 'Law and the Stable Self' (2010) Saint Louis University Law Journal 1173; C. A. Hill, 'The Rationality of Preference Construction (and the Irrationality of Rational Choice)' (2008) 9 Minnesota Journal of Law, Science & Technology 689.
14. This claim is supported by a reference to B. Wansink Mindless Eating: Why We Eat More Than We Think (New York: Bantam, 2006).
15. Nudge 47-50. Thaler and Sunstein's discussion of self-control strategies has its intellectual roots in the work of an earlier generation of economists working within the rational choice tradition who were concerned with understanding the phenomenon whereby an individual may employ various 'precommitment' (or 'self-binding') strategies, restricting their own future freedom in order to protect themselves from succumbing to the temptation to engage in actions that they would prefer to avoid. So, for example, an individual committed to giving up smoking may resolve to avoid keeping cigarettes in the house, knowing that otherwise the urge to give in to his or her desire to smoke will be too difficult to resist. See T. C. Schelling, 'Self-Command in Practice, in Policy, and in a Theory of Rational Choice' in T. C. Schelling, Strategies of Commitment and Other Essays (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2006) 63-81; J. Elster, Ulysses Unbound: Studies in Rationality, Precommitment and Constraints (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000); T. Kuran, Private Truths, Public Lies: The Social Consequences of Preference Falsification (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1995).
16. See F. H. Buckley, Fair Governance - Paternalism and Perfectionism (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009) ch 5.
17. T. Rostain, 'Educating Homo Economicus: Cautionary Notes to the New Behavioral Law and Economics Movement' (1999) 34 Law & Society Review 973, 979.
18. Nudge 3. Although Thaler and Sunstein's policy proposals are directed at the use of choice architecture by state actors as an instrument for implementing public policy, it is important to note that choice architects are not limited to state actors.
19. Thaler and Sunstein's support for mandatory disclosure laws sits somewhat uncomfortably with their expressed dislike of coercive policy instruments from which individuals and firms cannot opt-out: see Nudge 5. Yet they do not elaborate on their vision of the proper role of legal coercion in public policy.
20. G. Dworkin, 'Paternalism' in Stanford Encyclopaedia of Philosophy at (last visited 23 August 2011).
21. D. N. Husak, 'Legal Paternalism' in H. La Follette (ed), The Oxford Handbook of Practical Ethics (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005).
22. Similarly, Ogus claims that 'because the cost of opt out is trivial, such forms of intervention can be regarded as consistent with traditional notions of individual autonomy': A. Ogus, 'The Paradoxes of Legal Paternalism and How to Resolve Them' (2010) 30 Legal Studies 61.
23. See generally J. Raz, The Morality of Freedom (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1986).
24. J. Raz, The Morality of Freedom (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1986) 407.
25. I. Berlin, 'Two Concepts of Liberty' in H. Hardy and R. Hausheer (eds), The Proper Study of Mankind (London: Pimlico, 1998) 233.
26. L. Bovens, 'The Ethics of Nudge ' in T. Grune-Yanooff and S. Hansson (eds), Preference Change: Approaches from Philosophy, Economics and Psychology (Berlin and New York: Springer, 2008).
27. I am indebted to one of the anonymous reviewers for helping to clarifying my thoughts on this issue.
28. D. M. Hausman and B. Welch, 'Debate: To Nudge or Not to Nudge' (2010) 18 Journal of Political Philosophy 123, 134; J. Raz, The Morality of Freedom (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1986) 418; M. D. White, 'Behavioural Law and Economics: The Assault on the Consent, Will and Dignity' in G. Gaus, C. Favour and J. Lamont (eds), New Essays on Philosophy, Politics & Economics: Integration and Common Research Projects (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2010).
29. O. Amir and O. Lobel, 'Stumble, Predict, Nudge: How Behavioural Economics Informs Law and Policy' (2009) 108 Columbia Law Review 2098.
30. L. Bovens, 'The Ethics of Nudge ' in T. Grune-Yanooff and S. Hansson (eds), Preference Change: Approaches from Philosophy, Economics and Psychology (Berlin and New York: Springer, 2008).
31. L. Bovens, 'The Ethics of Nudge ' in T. Grune-Yanooff and S. Hansson (eds), Preference Change: Approaches from Philosophy, Economics and Psychology (Berlin and New York: Springer, 2008). As Hausman and Welsh explain, 'although nudges leave freedom of choice, understood in the sense of the available alternatives, virtually unaffected, the extent to which they have control over their own evaluations is diminished. The policy-maker is attempting to bring about something against the individual's will. To the extent that nudges attempt to undermine the individual's control over her own deliberation, as well as her ability to assess for herself the alternatives, they are prima facie threatening to liberty, broadly understood as overt coercion.' D. M. Hausman and B. Welch, 'Debate: To Nudge or Not to Nudge' (2010) 18 Journal of Political Philosophy 123,
32. Hood poses the question thus: 'Are moral judgments to be applied to instruments themselves, or only to the applications of such instruments?' in C. Hood and H. Margetts, The Tools of Government in the Digital Age (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007) 163. Even if there is agreement that the moral dimensions of a particular instrument can only be evaluated in light of specific social applications, there might nevertheless be disagreement about how the social purpose of the particular instrument is appropriately understood and its implications for legitimacy. Such contestation is particularly pronounced in debates concerning the legitimacy of using medical technologies for the purposes of human 'enhancement' rather than the 'treatment' of disease or illness. See for example E. Parens, 'Is better always good? The enhancement project' in E. Parens (ed), Enhancing Human Traits (Washington: University of Georgetown Press, 1998).
33. The literature is considerable. See for example C. Hood and H. Margetts, The Tools of Government in the Digital Age (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007); L. Salamon, The Tools of Government: A Guide to the New Governance (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002); E. Vedung, 'Policy Instrument: Typologies and Theories' in M.-L. Bemelmans-Videc, R. C. Rist and E. Vedung (eds), Carrots, Sticks and Sermons: Policy Instruments and Their Evaluation (New Brunswick: Transaction Publishers, 1998).
34. Indeed, I have done just that in relation to nudges as a class of policy instrument.
35. D. M. Hausman and B. Welch, 'Debate: To Nudge or Not to Nudge' (2010) 18 Journal of Political Philosophy 134; L. Bovens, 'The Ethics of Nudge ' in T. Grune-Yanooff and S. Hansson (eds), Preference Change: Approaches from Philosophy, Economics and Psychology (Berlin and New York: Springer, 2008).
36. nd ed, 1998) 286-297.
37. R. Dworkin, A Matter of Principle (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1985) ch 3.
38. It reached this conclusion for a variety of reasons, including the real possibility that such a regime might in fact lead to a reduction in the number of organs donated owing to its potential to undermine the concept of donation as a gift, to undermine trust in NHS institutions, to distract attention from the need to improve the essential infrastructure for supporting organ donation and the urgent need to improve public awareness and understanding of organ donation. Most compelling of all, it concluded that 'we found no convincing evidence that it would deliver significant increases in the number of donated organs': Organ Donation Taskforce, 'The Potential Impact of an Opt Out System for Organ Donation in the UK' (London, 2008) 7, 341; cf Thaler and Sunstein claim that, 'careful statistical analyses by the economists Abadie and Gay (2004) find that, holding everything else constant, switching from explicit consent to presumed consent increases the donation rate in a country by roughly 16 per cent. Johnson and Goldstein obtain a slightly smaller but similar effect. Whatever the precise figure, it is clear that the switch would save thousands of lives every year' Nudge 188-189.
39. See also M. B. Gill, 'Presumed Consent, Autonomy, and Organ Donation' (2004) 29 Journal of Medicine and Philosophy 37; C. Cohen, 'The Case for Presumed Consent to Transplant Human Organs After Death' (1992) 24 Transplantation Proceedings 2168; R. M. Veatch and J. B. Pitt, 'The Myth of Presumed Consent: Ethical Problems in Organ Procurement Strategies' (1995) 27 Transplantation Proceedings 1888.
40. D. M. Hausman and B. Welch, 'Debate: To Nudge or Not to Nudge' (2010) 18 Journal of Political Philosophy 132.
41. L. Bovens, 'The Ethics of Nudge ' in T. Grune-Yanooff and S. Hansson (eds), Preference Change: Approaches from Philosophy, Economics and Psychology (Berlin and New York: Springer, 2008).
42. L. Bovens, 'The Ethics of Nudge ' in T. Grune-Yanooff and S. Hansson (eds), Preference Change: Approaches from Philosophy, Economics and Psychology (Berlin and New York: Springer, 2008) 14.
43. Concerns about the difficulties of contesting subtle spatial power in comparison with more overt disciplinary techniques are often expressed by Foucauldian scholars. See R. Jones, J. Pykett and M. Whitehead, 'The Geographies of Soft Paternalism in the UK: The Rise of the Avuncular State and Changing Behaviour after Neoliberalism' (2011) 5 Geography Compass 50, 57.
44. O. Amir and O. Lobel, 'Stumble, Predict, Nudge: How Behavioural Economics Informs Law and Policy' (2009) 108 Columbia Law Review 2098; L. Bovens, 'The Ethics of Nudge ' in T. Grune-Yanooff and S. Hansson (eds), Preference Change: Approaches from Philosophy, Economics and Psychology (Berlin and New York: Springer, 2008); D. M. Hausman and B. Welch, 'Debate: To Nudge or Not to Nudge' (2010) 18 Journal of Political Philosophy 123,
45. J. Klick and G. Mitchell, 'Government Regulation of Irrationality: Moral and Cognitive Hazards' (2005-6) 90 Minnesota Law Review 1620.
46. D. M. Hausman and B. Welch, 'Debate: To Nudge or Not to Nudge' (2010) 18 Journal of Political Philosophy 123,
47. L. Bovens, 'The Ethics of Nudge ' in T. Grune-Yanooff and S. Hansson (eds), Preference Change: Approaches from Philosophy, Economics and Psychology (Berlin and New York: Springer, 2008).
48. Thaler and Sunstein briefly note that one objection to their proposals is based on the 'the right to be wrong' on the basis that it is sometimes helpful for us to make mistakes, since that is how we learn: Nudge 240.
49. F. H. Buckley, Fair Governance - Paternalism and Perfectionism (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009).
50. D. Garland, 'Ideas, Institutions and Situational Crime Prevention' in D. Garland (ed), Ethical and Social Perspectives on Situational Crime Prevention (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2000).
51. R. Duff and S. Marshall, 'Benefits, Burdens and Responsibilities: Some Ethical Dimensions of Situational Crime Prevention' in A. von Hirsch, D. Garland and A. Wakefield (eds), Ethical and Social Perspectives on Situational Crime Prevention (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2000).
52. The literature is enormous. Some well-known discussions include President's Council on Bioethics, Beyond Therapy: Biotechnology and the Pursuit of Happiness (Washington DC, 2003); F. Fukuyama, Our Posthuman Future (London: Profile Books, 2002); J. Habermas, The Future of Human Nature (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2003); M. J. Sandel, The Case Against Perfection (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2007); E. Parens (ed), Enhancing Human Traits (Washington: University of Georgetown Press, 1998).
53. F. H. Buckley, Fair Governance - Paternalism and Perfectionism (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009); See N. Levy, Neuroethics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007) 29-32.
54. F. H. Buckley, Fair Governance - Paternalism and Perfectionism (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009) 37; M. J. Rizzo and D. G. Whitman, 'Little Brother is Watching You: New Paternalism on the Slippery Slopes' (2009) 51 Arizona Law Review 685.
55. F. H. Buckley, Fair Governance - Paternalism and Perfectionism (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009) 48-49.
56. T. Rostain, 'Educating Homo Economicus: Cautionary Notes to the New Behavioral Law and Economics Movement' (1999) 34 Law & Society Review 989.
57. P. Schlag, 'Nudge, Choice Architecture and Libertarian Paternalism' (2010) Michigan Law Review 913.
58. B. Morgan and K. Yeung, An Introduction to Law and Regulation (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007) 140-148.
59. C. Sunstein, 'Behavioural Law and Economics: A Progress Report' (1999) American Law & Economics Review 115, 150-151; F. H. Buckley, Fair Governance - Paternalism and Perfectionism (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009) 48-49.
60. C. A. Hill, 'The Rationality of Preference Construction (and the Irrationality of Rational Choice)' (2008) 9 Minnesota Journal of Law, Science & Technology 689.