Mechanism design for coalition formation and cost sharing in group-buying markets

Electronic Commerce Research and Applications

Volumn 3, Issue 4, 2004, Pages 341-354

  Li, Cuihong ^a   Chawla, Shuchi ^b   Rajan, Uday ^a   Sycara, Katia ^c  

^a CARNEGIE MELLON UNIVERSITY   (United States)

^b Carnegie Mellon University   (United States)

^c CARNEGIE MELLON UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

Coalition; Group buying; Mechanism design; Surplus sharing

Indexed keywords

ALGORITHMS; BUDGET CONTROL; DECISION MAKING; GAME THEORY; INTEGRATION; ONLINE SYSTEMS; PROBABILITY DISTRIBUTIONS; SET THEORY;

COALITION; GROUP-BUYING; MECHANISM DESIGN; SURPLUS SHARING;

ELECTRONIC COMMERCE;

EID: 8344290302     PISSN: 15674223     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/j.elerap.2004.06.004     Document Type: Conference Paper

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