Company influence on foreign aid disbursement: Is conditionality credible when donors have mixed motives?

Southern Economic Journal

Volumn 71, Issue 2, 2004, Pages 334-351

  Villanger, Espen ^a  

^a CHR MICHELSEN INSTITUTE   (Norway)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 8344237417     PISSN: 00384038     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.2307/4135295     Document Type: Article

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