A new and robust subgame perfect equilibrium in a model of triadic power relations

Journal of Development Economics

Volumn 68, Issue 1, 2002, Pages 225-232

  Hatlebakk, Magnus ^a,b,c  

^a UNIVERSITY OF BERGEN   (Norway)

^b Institute for Research in Economics and Business Administration   (Norway)

^c SNF   (Norway)

Author keywords

Infinite games; Power; Rural development

Indexed keywords

ECONOMIC THEORY; GAME THEORY; POWER RELATIONS;

EID: 0036300608     PISSN: 03043878     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/S0304-3878(02)00003-2     Document Type: Article

References (9)

1. On the theory of infinitely repeated games with discounting
2. Acceptable points in general cooperative n-persons games
3. One kind of power
4. Strategic irrationality in extensive games
5. Analytical development economics
6. Prelude to political economy
7. A noncooperative equilibrium for supergames
8. Power, coercion, and the games landlords play