Welfare enhancing regulation exemptions

International Review of Law and Economics

Volumn 31, Issue 4, 2011, Pages 249-255

  Mungan, Murat C ^a  

^a FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

Exemptions; Optimal deterrence; Regulations

Indexed keywords

EID: 82655172469     PISSN: 01448188     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/j.irle.2011.06.002     Document Type: Article

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