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Volumn 105, Issue 3, 2011, Pages 516-529

Deliberation with evidence

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords


EID: 82555175784     PISSN: 00030554     EISSN: 15375943     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1017/S0003055411000244     Document Type: Article
Times cited : (22)

References (23)
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    • Coughlan, P. J. 2000. "In Defense of Unanimous Jury Verdicts: Mistrials, Communication, and Strategic Voting." American Political Science Review 94: 375-93.
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  • 7
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    • Social choice theory and deliberative democracy: A reconciliation
    • DOI 10.1017/S0007123403000012
    • Dryzek, J., and C. List. 2002. "Social Choice Theory andDeliberative Democracy: A Reconciliation." British Journal of Political Science 3 (1): 1-28. (Pubitemid 36195320)
    • (2003) British Journal of Political Science , vol.33 , Issue.1 , pp. 1-28
    • Dryzek, J.S.1    List, C.2
  • 8
    • 0003903245 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • Cambridge: Cambridge University Press
    • Elster, J. 2000. DeliberativeDemocracy. Cambridge: CambridgeUniversity Press.
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    • Elster, J.1
  • 11
    • 34248677105 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • Secrecy, two-sided bias and the value of evidence
    • Giovannoni, F., and D. J. Seidmann. 2007. "Secrecy, Two-sided Bias and the Value of Evidence." Games and Economic Behavior 59: 296-315.
    • (2007) Games and Economic Behavior , vol.59 , pp. 296-315
    • Giovannoni, F.1    Seidmann, D.J.2
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    • Disclosure laws and takeover bids
    • Grossman, S. J., and O.D. Hart. 1980. "Disclosure Laws andTakeover Bids." Journal of Finance 35: 323-34.
    • (1980) Journal of Finance , vol.35 , pp. 323-34
    • Grossman, S.J.1    Hart, O.D.2
  • 13
    • 34547340116 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • Decision making in committees: Transparency, reputation and voting rules
    • Levy, G. 2007. "DecisionMaking in Committees: Transparency, Reputation and Voting Rules." American Economic Review 97 (1): 150-68.
    • (2007) American Economic Review , vol.97 , Issue.1 , pp. 150-68
    • Levy, G.1
  • 14
    • 55649092474 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • Full revelation of information in sender-receiver games of persuasion
    • Mathis, J. 2008. "Full Revelation of Information in Sender-Receiver Games of Persuasion." Journal of Economic Theory 143: 571-84.
    • (2008) Journal of Economic Theory , vol.143 , pp. 571-84
    • Mathis, J.1
  • 15
    • 0002845615 scopus 로고
    • Relying on the information of interested parties
    • Milgrom, P., and J. Roberts. 1986. "Relying on the Information of Interested Parties." Rand Journal of Economics 17: 18-32.
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    • Milgrom, P.1    Roberts, J.2
  • 16
    • 85050254012 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • Designing institutions to aggregate private beliefs and values
    • Meirowitz, A. 2006. "Designing Institutions to Aggregate Private Beliefs and Values." Quarterly Journal of Political Science 1 (4): 373-92.
    • (2006) Quarterly Journal of Political Science , vol.1 , Issue.4 , pp. 373-92
    • Meirowitz, A.1
  • 17
    • 34250193674 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • In defence of exclusionary deliberation: Communicating and voting with private beliefs and values
    • Meirowitz, A. 2007. "InDefence of Exclusionary Deliberation: Communicating and Voting with Private Beliefs and Values." Journal of Theoretical Politics 19: 301-28.
    • (2007) Journal of Theoretical Politics , vol.19 , pp. 301-28
    • Meirowitz, A.1
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    • Good news and bad news: Representation theorems and applications
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  • 19
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    • Information aggregation and preference heterogeneity in committees
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    • Strategic information transmission with verifiable messages
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    • Seidmann, D.J.1    Winter, E.2


* 이 정보는 Elsevier사의 SCOPUS DB에서 KISTI가 분석하여 추출한 것입니다.