Is there a trade-off between security and liberty? Executive bias, privacy protections, and terrorism prevention

American Political Science Review

Volumn 105, Issue 1, 2011, Pages 64-78

  Dragu, Tiberiu ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF ILLINOIS AT URBANA CHAMPAIGN   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 82455251050     PISSN: 00030554     EISSN: 15375943     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1017/S0003055410000614     Document Type: Article

References (62)

1. Ackerman, Bruce. 2004. "The Emergency Constitution. " Yale Law Journal 113: 1029-91. (Pubitemid 41031914)
2. Ackerman, Bruce. 2006. Before the Next Attack: Preserving Civil Liberties in theAge of Terrorism. NewHaven, CT:Yale University Press.
3. Alexander, Yonah. 2006. Counterterrorism Strategies: Successes and Failures of Six Nations. Washington, DC: Potomac Books.
4. Becker, Garry. 1968. "Crime and Punishment: An Economic Approach. " Journal of Political Economy 76: 169-217.
5. Bianco, William, Peter Ordeshook, and George Tsebelis. 1990. "Crime and Punishment: Are One-shot, Two Person Games Enough?" American Political Science Review 84: 569-86.
6. Breton, Albert, and Ronald Wintrobe. 1982. The Logic of Bureaucratic Control. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
7. Bueno de Mesquita, Ethan. 2005. "The Quality of Terror. " American Journal of Political Science 49 (3): 515-30.
8. Bueno de Mesquita, Ethan. 2007. "Politics and the Suboptimal Provision of Counterterror. " International Organization 61 (1): 9-36.
9. Bueno de Mesquita, Ethan, and Eric Dickson. 2007. " The Propaganda of the Deed: Terrorism, Counterterrorism, and Mobilization. " American Journal of Political Science 51 (2): 364-81.
10. Commission on the Intelligence Capabilities of the United States Regarding Weapons of Mass Destruction. 2005. "Report of the Commission on the Intelligence Capabilities of the United States RegardingWeapons of Mass Destruction. "Washington, DC:Government Printing Office.
11. Cox, Gary. 1994. "A Note on Crime and Punishment. " Public Choice 78: 115-24.
12. Dershowitz, Alan. 2002. Why Terrorism Works. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press.
13. Donohue, Laura. 2008. The Cost of Counterterrorism: Power, Politics, and Liberty. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
14. Downs, Anthony. 1967. Inside Bureaucracy, A Rand Corporation Research Study. Boston: Little, Brown.
15. Ferejohn, John, and Pasquale Pasquino. 2004. "The Law of the Exception: A Typology of Emergency Powers. " International Journal of Constitutional Law 2 (2): 210-39.
16. Garicano, Luis, and Richard Posner. 2005. "Intelligence Failure: An Organizational Economic Perspective. " Journal of Economic Perspectives 19 (4): 151-70. (Pubitemid 43572709)
17. Gould, Eric, and Guy Stecklov. 2009. "Terror and the Costs of Crime. " Journal of Public Economics 93: 1175-88.
18. Gross, Oren, and Fionnuala N. Aol ain. 2006. Law in Times of Crisis: Emergency Powers in Theory and Practice. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
19. Gunaratna, Rohan. 2004. "The Post-Madrid Face of Al Qaeda. " Washington Quarterly 27: 91-100 (Pubitemid 41670810)
20. Hardin,Russell. 2004. "Civil Liberties in the Era ofMass Terrorism. " Journal of Ethics 8 (1): 77-95.
21. Hewitt, Steve. 2008. The BritishWar on Terror. London: Continuum.
22. Heymann, Philip B. 2003. Terrorism, Freedom, and Security. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
23. Hirshleifer, Jack, and Eric Rasmussen. 1992. "Are Equilibrium Strategies Unaffected by Incentives?" Journal of Theoretical Politics 4: 353-67.
24. Holmes, Stephen. 1995. Passions and Constraint: On the Theory of Liberal Democracy. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
25. Holmes, Stephen. 2007. The Matadors Cape: Americas Reckless Response to Terror. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
26. Holmstrom, Bengt, and Paul Milgrom. 1991. "Multitask Principal-agent Analyses: Incentive Contracts, Asset Ownership, and Job Design. " Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization 7 (Special Issue): 24-52.
27. Home Department. 2004. "Counter-terrorism Powers: Reconciling Security and Liberty in an Open Society: A Discussion Paper. " www. statewatch. org/news/2004/feb/uk-CTdiscussion- paper. pdf (accessed January 6, 2010).
28. Jacobson, Michael. 2006. "The West at War: U. S. and European Counterterrorism Efforts, Post-September 11. " Washington, DC: Washington Institute for Near East Policy.
29. Justice Department. 2004. "Prepared Remarks of Attorney General John Ashcroft Regarding the Indictment of HAMAS" www. justice. gov/archive/ag/speeches/2004 (accessed January 6, 2011).
30. Kydd, Andrew, and BarbaraWalter. 2006. "The Strategies of Terrorism. " International Security 31 (1): 49-79.
31. Manin, Bernard. 2008. "The Emergency Paradigm and the New Terrorism. " In Les Usages de la Sparation des Pouvoirs-The Uses of the Separation of Powers, eds. Sandrine Baume and Biancamaria Fontana. Paris: Michel Houdiard, 135-71.
32. Milgrom, Paul, and John Roberts. 1990. "Bargaining Costs, Influence Costs and the Organization of Economic Activity. " In Perspectives on Positive Political Economy, eds. James E. Alt and Kenneth A. Shepsle. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 57-89.
33. Milgrom, Paul, and John Roberts. 1988. "An Economic Approach to Influence Activities and Organizational Responses. " American Journal of Sociology 94 (2): 154-79.
34. Milgrom, Paul, and John Roberts. 1992. Economics, Organization and Management. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall.
35. Moe, Terry. 1984. "The New Economics of Organization. " American Journal of Political Science 283 (4): 739-77.
36. National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States. 2004. "The 9/11 Commission Report: Final Report of the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States. " Washington, DC: Government Printing Office.
37. Niskanen, William. 1971. Bureaucracy and Representative Government. Chicago: Aldine-Atherton.
38. Pfeffer, Jeffery 1993. ManagingWith Power: Politics and Influence in Organizations. Cambridge, MA: Harvard Business Press.
39. Posner, Eric A., and Adrian Vermeule. 2007. Terror in the Balance: Security, Liberty, and the Courts. New York: Oxford University Press.
40. Posner, Richard. 2005. Preventing Surprise Attacks. New York: Rowman and Littlefield.
41. Posner, Richard. 2006a. Not a Suicide Pact: The Constitution in a Time of National Emergency. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
42. Posner, Richard. 2006b. Uncertain Shield: The U. S. Intelligence System in the Throes of Reform. New York: Rowman and Littlefield.
43. Posner, Richard A. 2006c. "The Reorganized U. S. Intelligence System after One Year. " AEI Outlook Series. www. aei. org/outlook/24213 (accessed January 6, 2011).
44. Powell, Robert. 2007a. "Defending against Terrorist Attacks with Limited Resources. " American Political Science Review 101 (3): 527-41.
45. Powell, Robert. 2007b. "Allocating Defensive Resources with Private Information about Vulnerability. " American Political Science Review 100 (4): 799-809.
46. Przeworski, Adam. 2003. States and Markets: A Primer in Political Economy. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
47. Ramraj, Victor, Michael Hor and Kent Roach, eds. 2005. Global Anti-terrorism Law and Policy. Cambridge: CambridgeUniversity Press.
48. Regan, Priscilla M. 1995. Legislating Privacy: Technology, Social Values, and Public Policy. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press.
49. Rehnquist,William H. 1998. All the Laws But One: Civil Liberties in Wartime. New York: Knopf.
50. Rosendorff, Peter, and Todd Sandler. 2004. "Too Much of a Good Thing? The Proactive Response Dilemma. " Journal of Conflict Resolution 48 (5): 657-71. (Pubitemid 40549689)
51. Rourke, Francis. 1984. Bureaucracy, Politics, and Public Policy. Boston: Little, Brown.
52. Schmid, Alex P. 1993. "Western Responses to Terrorism. " In Terrorism and Political Violence, eds. Alex P. Schmid and Ronald D. Crelinsten. London: Frank Cass, 15-25.
53. Siqueira, Keith, and Todd Sandler. 2006. " Terrorists vs the Security Agency: Strategic Interaction, Support, and Sponsorship. " Journal of Conflict Resolution 50 (6): 878-98. (Pubitemid 44673157)
54. Solove, Daniel. 2008. Understanding Privacy. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
55. Treverton, Gregory. 2008. Reorganizing U. S. Domestic Intelligence: Assessing the Options. Santa Monica, CA: RAND.
56. Tsebelis, George. 1989. "The Abuse of Probability in Political Analysis: The Robinson Crusoe Fallacy. " American Political Science Review 83: 77-91.
57. Tsebelis, George. 1990. "Penalty Has No Impact on Crime: A Game Theoretic Analysis. " Rationality and Society 2: 255-86.
58. Waldron, Jeremy. 2003. "Security and Liberty: The Image of Balance. " Journal of Political Philosophy 11 (2): 191.
59. Walker, Clive. 1992. The Prevention of Terrorism in British Law. 2nd ed. New York: Manchester University Press.
60. White, Jonathan R. 2003. Terrorism: 2002 Update. 4th ed. Belmont, CA: Wadsworth.
61. Wilson, JamesQ. 1989. Bureaucracy:WhatGovernmentAgencies Do and Why They Do It. New York: Basic Books.
62. Zegart, Amy. 2007. Spying Blind: The CIA, the FBI, and the Origins of 9/11. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.