Spectrum trading in cognitive radio networks with strict transmission power control

European Transactions on Telecommunications

Volumn 22, Issue 6, 2011, Pages 282-295

  Alptekin, Gülfem Işiklar ^a   Bener, Ayşe Başar ^b  

^a GALATASARAY UNIVERSITY   (Turkey)

^b RYERSON UNIVERSITY   (Canada)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

COGNITIVE CAPACITY; COGNITIVE RADIO NETWORK; LOW POWER; NONCOOPERATIVE GAME; POWER MANAGEMENTS; SERVICE PROVIDER; SOCIAL WELFARE; SPECTRUM BANDS; SPECTRUM TRADING; TRANSMISSION POWER; TRANSMISSION POWER CONTROL;

COMPUTER SIMULATION; ENERGY MANAGEMENT; POWER CONTROL; PROFITABILITY; RADIO BROADCASTING; RADIO TRANSMISSION;

PROCESS CONTROL;

EID: 81355147814     PISSN: 1124318X     EISSN: 15418251     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1002/ett.1477     Document Type: Article

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