Toward an Ecological Theory of the Norms of Practical Deliberation

European Journal of Philosophy

Volumn 19, Issue 4, 2011, Pages 561-584

  Morton, Jennifer M ^a  

^a SWARTHMORE COLLEGE   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 81055157262     PISSN: 09668373     EISSN: 14680378     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1111/j.1468-0378.2010.00400.x     Document Type: Article

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