The Role of the Shareholder in Internal Corporate Governance: Enabling Shareholders to Make Better-Informed Decisions

European Business Organization Law Review

Volumn 4, Issue 4, 2003, Pages 491-516

  Ferran, Eilís ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF CAMBRIDGE   (United Kingdom)

Author keywords

corporate governance; disclosure; EC company law; High Level Group; shareholder voting

Indexed keywords

EID: 80055012620     PISSN: 15667529     EISSN: 17416205     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1017/S1566752903004919     Document Type: Article

References (70)

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69. Broadly speaking, this is acknowledged in the Final Report of the Expert Group on Cross-Border Voting in Europe. The Group suggests a mandatory European rule whereby the last accountholder in a chain within a securities holding system is designated the 'ultimate accountholder' and, as such, is entitled to exercise voting rights. However, the Group recognises that this person may not be the person with the real economic interest in the shares and suggests a supplementary rule for such situations, whereby the 'ultimate accountholder' may designate its clients in its place, thus entitling these clients to control the voting rights. The HLG's recommendations on cross-border voting were based on the Expert Group's work. In fact, two members of the HLG participated in the Expert Group.
70. Re: Consultative Document on Cross Border Voting in Europe (June 2002), available at: 〈http://www.icsa.org. uk/news/consults/con02-05.php〉.