A mosquito bite against the enactive approach to bodily experiences

Journal of Philosophy

Volumn 108, Issue 4, 2011, Pages 188-204

  De Vignemont, Frédérique ^a  

^a INSTITUT JEAN NICOD   (France)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 80053480477     PISSN: 0022362X     EISSN: 19398549     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.5840/jphil2011108411     Document Type: Article

References (22)

1. This view has been defended by, among others, Susan Hurley in Consciousness in Action (Cambridge: Harvard, 1998)
2. Kevin O'Regan and Alva Noë, "A Sensorimotor Account of Vision and Visual Consciousness," Behavioral and Brain Sciences, xxiv, 5 (October 2001): 939-1031
3. Noë, Action in Perception (Cambridge: MIT, 2004)
4. Evan Thompson, "Sensorimotor Subjectivity and the Enactive Approach to Experience," Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences, iv, 4 (2005): 407-27.
5. For a review of the differences between versions of the enactive theory of vision, see Nivedita Gangopadhyay and Julian Kiverstein, "Enactivism and the Unity of Perception and Action," Topoi, xxviii, 1 (2009): 63-73.
6. Pierre Jacob, "The Scope and Limits of the Enactive Approaches to Visual Experiences," Perception, xxxvii, 3 (February 2008): 446-61.
7. For a detailed account of the notion of bodily know-how, see Charles Siewert, "Attention and Sensorimotor Intentionality," in David Woodruff Smith and Amie L. Thomasson, eds., Phenomenology and Philosophy of Mind (New York: Oxford, 2005), pp. 270-94.
8. "What we perceive is determined by⋯what we know how to do." Noë, Action in Perception, p. 1.
9. For a comprehensive review of the empirical literature that supports the so-called Perception-Action model of vision, see David Milner and Mel Goodale, The Visual Brain in Action (New York: Oxford, 1995)
10. Jacob and Marc Jeannerod, Ways of Seeing: The Scope and Limits of Visual Cognition (New York: Oxford, 2003).
11. Ned Block, "Review of Alva Noë, Action in Perception," this journal, cii, 5 (May 2005): 259-72
12. Andy Clark, Supersizing the Mind (New York: Oxford, 2008).
13. Some hand movements can count as perceptual reports. For instance, it was shown that the underlying processes of scaling the distance between thumb and index finger are very different, depending on whether it is for reporting a perceptual judgment or for the visuomotor task of grasping. Jeannerod, The Cognitive Neuroscience of Action (Cambridge: Blackwell, 1997).
14. For numbsense patients, see Jacques Paillard, Francois Michel, and George Stelmach, "Localization without Content: A Tactile Analogue of 'Blind Sight'," Archives of Neurology, xl, 9 (1983): 548-51
15. as well as Yves Rossetti, Gilles Rode, and Dominique Boisson, "Implicit Processing of Somaesthetic Information: A Dissociation between Where and How?" Neuroreport, vi, 3 (February 1995): 506-10.
16. For a description of KE and JO, see Helen A. Anema et al., "A Double Dissociation between Somatosensory Processing for Perception and Action," Neuropsychologia, xlvii, 6 (May 2009): 1615-20.
17. Maurice Merleau-Ponty, Phénoménologie de la perception (Paris: Gallimard, 1945).
18. For a description of the standard Rubber Hand Illusion, see Matthew Botvinick and Jonathan Cohen, "Rubber Hands 'Feel' Touch that Eyes See," Nature, cccxci (February 19, 1998): 756.
19. For a description of the standard vibrotactile illusion, see James R. Lackner and Paul A. DiZio, "Aspects of Body Self-Calibration," Trends in Cognitive Sciences, iv, 7 ( July 1, 2000): 279-88.
20. The immunity of action to the vibrotactile illusion was shown by M. P. Kammers, I. J. van der Ham, and H. C. Dijkerman, "Dissociating Body Representations in Healthy Individuals: Differential Effects of a Kinaesthetic Illusion on Perception and Action," Neuropsychologia, xliv, 12 (2006): 2430-36.
21. The immunity of action to the Rubber Hand Illusion was shown by Kammers, F. de Vignemont, L. Verhagen, and Dijkerman, "The Rubber Hand Illusion in Action," Neuropsychologia, xlvii, 1 ( January 2009): 204-11.
22. For this line of argument see, for instance, Noë, "Vision without Representation," in Gangopadhyay, Michael Madary, and Finn Spicer, eds., Perception, Action, and Consciousness: Sensorimotor Dynamics and Two Visual Systems (New York: Oxford, 2010), pp. 245-56.