Distributed strategic learning with application to network security

Proceedings of the American Control Conference

Volumn , Issue , 2011, Pages 4057-4062

  Zhu, Quanyan ^a   Tembine, Hamidou ^b   Başar, Tamer ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF ILLINOIS AT URBANA CHAMPAIGN   (United States)

^b SUPELEC   (France)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

ACTIVE MODE; AMOUNT OF INFORMATION; DISTRIBUTED REINFORCEMENT LEARNING; HYBRID LEARNING; LEARNING SCHEMES; NONZERO-SUM STOCHASTIC GAMES; PAYOFF FUNCTION; RANDOM UPDATES; SLEEP MODE; STOCHASTIC APPROXIMATIONS; UNKNOWN QUANTITY;

APPROXIMATION THEORY; LEARNING ALGORITHMS; ORDINARY DIFFERENTIAL EQUATIONS; REINFORCEMENT LEARNING; STOCHASTIC SYSTEMS;

NETWORK SECURITY;

EID: 80053140894     PISSN: 07431619     EISSN: None     Source Type: Conference Proceeding    
DOI: None     Document Type: Conference Paper

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