Moral principles as moral dispositions

Philosophical Studies

Volumn 156, Issue 2, 2011, Pages 289-309

  Robinson, Luke ^a  

^a SOUTHERN METHODIST UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

Dispositionalism; Dispositions; Metaethics; Moral dispositionalism; Moral principles; Powers

Indexed keywords

EID: 80053137046     PISSN: 00318116     EISSN: 15730883     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1007/s11098-010-9585-1     Document Type: Article

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