Profits of disorder: Images of the Transnistrian Moldovan Republic

Global Crime

Volumn 12, Issue 4, 2011, Pages 239-265

  Bobick, Michael ^a  

^a Cornell University ^*  (United States)

Author keywords

Criminality; Europe; Moldova; Organised crime; Sovereignty; Transnistria

Indexed keywords

EID: 80052940159     PISSN: 17440572     EISSN: 17440580     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1080/17440572.2011.616048     Document Type: Article

References (114)

1. For more on insecurity in Transnistria, see Mark Galeotti, "The Transdnistrian Connection: Big Problems from a Small Pseudo-State", Global Crime 6, no. 3-4 (2004): 398-405
2. Alex Kliment, "The Transnistrian Dilemma, SAIS Review 25, no. 1 (2005): 72
3. W. Alejandro Sanchez, "The "Frozen" Southeast: How the Moldova-Transnistria Question Has Become a Geo-Security Issue', Journal of Slavic Military Studies 22, no. 2 (2009): 153-76
4. For more on security issues in the Black Sea region, see Sabine Fischer, "The European Union and Security in the Black Sea Region After the Georgia Crisis', Southeast European and Black Sea Studies 9, no. 3 (2009): 333-49
5. Estimates of total casualties range from a few hundred to over a thousand, with the majority of them from the PMR; a commonly accepted range is between 600 and 1200 dead, with thousands more wounded. In a single battle which took place in Bender (June 19-21 1992), the PMR suffered 203 casualties and over a thousand wounded. In this battle Moldova had approximately 77 casualties. A full accounting of casualties in the conflict is difficult
6. This need for new shifting threats is rooted in collective anxieties contained by the binarism of the Cold War. In the United States, the open-ended government mobilisation under the rubric of the 'War on Terror' is perhaps the most visible manifestation of this phenomenon. Transnistria emerges not as a new threat distinct from the Cold War but as a remnant of it. It is a manifestation of the 'New Cold War'. See Mark McKinnon, The New Cold War: Revolutions, Rigged Elections, and Pipeline Politics (New York: Basic Books, 2007)
7. Edward Lucas, The New Cold War: Putin's Russia and the Threat to the West (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2008)
8. For an analysis of the PMR's case for statehood from the perspective, see the New York Bar Association's 2006 report, 'Thawing a Frozen Conflict: Legal Aspects of the Separatist Crisis in Moldova', http://www.nycbar.org/pdf/report/NYCity%20BarTransnistriaReport.pdf (accessed July 21, 2011)
9. It is not uncommon for whole articles or policy reports to be written without the author ever visiting the region. As a product of long-term ethnographic field research, this article is intended to be a corrective and situate these discourses of illegality in opposition to local social processes and assemblages of knowledge
10. For more on the issue of gas in Transnistria, see Rebecca Chamberlain-Creanga and Lyndon K. Allin, "Acquiring Assets, Debts, and Citizens: Russia and the Micro-Foundations of Transnistria's Stalemated Conflict', Demokratizatsiyia, Fall 2010
11. Chloe Bruce and Katja Yafimava, "Moldova's Gas Sector', in Russian and CIS Gas Markets and Their Impact on Europe, ed. Simon Pirani (New York: Oxford University Press, 2009), 170-202
12. Gas constitutes a subsidy insofar as the gas used by these enterprises is paid at a reduced rate to PMR authorities that fail to pay Gazprom. Receipts for gas constitute a means of financing the PMR state and a 'slush fund' available for elections and other pet projects
13. Despite the use of the 'black hole' rhetoric, the EU's concerns in Kaliningrad were primarily economic. In 2001, the region's per capita income was 500 dollars, 5 times less than Lithuania's and 40 times less than the EU average. Richard Krickus, The Kaliningrad Question (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 2002), 125
14. [Internationality is] a style of thought and global social organisation that tries to generate a plurality of nations, in order that, for any piece of land, and for any human being, there should be a definite answer to the question 'Which nation is responsible?' Internationality, you might say, is the tendency for the global imposition of the nation-form' (Jonathan Ree, "Internationality', Radical Philosophy 60 (1992): 9-10)
15. Benedict Anderson, Imagined Communities (London: Verso, 1991), 19 similarly argues that modern 'state sovereignty is fully, flatly and evenly operative over each square centimetre of a legally demarcated territory
16. For more on commensuration as an object of social scientific investigation, see Wendy Espeland and Mitchell Stevens, "Commensuration as a Social Process', Annual Review of Sociology 24 (1998): 313-43
17. For more on hospitality and ethnic relations in Moldova, see Jennifer Cash, "Whose House is Moldova? Hospitality as a Model for Ethnic Relations', Occasional Paper #290 (Washington, DC: Kennan Institute, Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, 2004)
18. European Parliament, Chairman's Report - Ad Hoc Delegation to Moldova, June 5-6, 2002, http://www.europarl.europa.eu/meetdocs/committees/afet/20021007/473437EN.pdf (accessed May 20, 2011)
19. Popescu perhaps best summarises this viewpoint. 'There is no apparent urgency for the EU to become more involved with this conflict: there is no fighting, people are not dying and terrorists are not being trained in Transnistria However, Transnistria matters for the EU. The conflict poses considerable soft security challenges to the enlarged EU as the separatist region has emerged into a hub for illicit trafficking in arms, people and drugs, organised crime, money laundering, and smuggling. Calm in appearance only, the security situation is far from stable and could deteriorate at any moment. The conflict is also the closest geographically to the enlarged EU - it stands less than 100 km from the border of Romania, due to join the EU in 2007-2008
20. Nicu Popescu, "The EU in Moldova: Settling Conflicts in the Neighborhood', EUISS Occasional Paper 60 (Paris: European Union Institute for Security Studies, 2005). Although there has been an inordinate amount of western attention focused on the PMR, the most recent governing coalition, the Alliance for European Integration, has shifted attention away from Transnistria and towards other internal Moldovan problems
21. This criminalisation works both ways. Pro-PMR Russians have focused on the alleged criminal activities of Moldovan leaders. For an example of this, see Aleksandr Boiko, Diktator i ego model': Moldova - vlast' bez legitimosti (Moscow: Evropa, 2005). Much of these sensational allegations come from Moldova's need to attract attention from the West. For the PMR, the evils of the Moldovan political elite (along with the potential for Moldova's unification with Romanian 'fascists') serve as a generative foundation for PMR patriotism
22. Exact casualty figures for the war do not exist, and the numbers that exist are highly politicised. An accepted casualty range is between 600 and 1200 dead, with thousands wounded, with the majority from left-bank Moldova (Transnistria). For more on the war and its dead, see Mike Bobick, "Bespredel and Belonging: Bodies, Politics, and Publics in the PMR', Unpublished manuscript
23. In my anecdotal observations, I have found that Romanians are particularly apt to believe in these outsize criminal allegations. One acquaintance who took a private car from Cluj, Romania to Chisinau told of the visible fear that came over his driver when he came to Chisinau, since 'it was close to Tiraspol, to Transnistria
24. M. Boris, age 70, retired factory worker
25. Chisinau is the capital of the Republic of Moldova, and Tiraspol is the capital of the PMR
26. For more on this violence, see "TRANSNISTRIA ASSESSMENT MISSION REPORT Transnistrian crisis: human dimension December 2008-February 2009', http://gppac.net/page.php?id=2294 (accessed May 20, 2011)
27. The demands of left-bank residents mostly emerged in response to Moldovan rapprochement with Romania and the adoption of Moldovan as the sole official language of the Republic. As an industrialised, multi-ethnic region that identified with the Soviet State, they demanded that Russian be made an official language. In Transnistria, a desire to separate from Moldova also stemmed from the fear of losing Soviet-era privileges. Furthermore, there are widespread and credible allegations that the separatist movements in Gagauzia and in Transnistria were initially coordinated by Soviet security services. This information comes from second-hand sources and diplomats in the Republic of Moldova
28. Although I have found these visceral effects to be applicable to the average Transnistrian citizen (especially for the older generation that participated in the strikes), for the political elite that has been in power since 1990, this narrative constitutes a handy foundational myth
29. At the time of the conflict the state produced numerous videos about the conflict. One film, Chronicle of an Undeclared War, produced 6 months after the war, appears to be a Soviet-era documentary of the region. Two minutes into the video, after introducing the region and showing its peaceful inhabitants voting in a referendum, there is a shot of a bullet-riddled window and ominous narration about the 'first blood spilled'. As the camera pans to the body, it zooms in and out on the wounds. This technique is repeated with other bodies, even going so far as to show close-ups of maggots eating bodies dumped in shallow graves. Twice during the film the cameraman approaches waiting refrigerated trucks containing bodies and calmly shows a man opening the trucks and displaying the haphazardly stacked bodies. Viewing this film, one has the sense that whoever made it knew that the bodies were important at the moment of filming, and that their importance would only increase in the future
30. The phenomenon of memory books was not limited to the PMR. Claiming and publicising claims of victimisation was an important means of constituting various post-Soviet successor states. Moldova published similar books listing victims of the Soviet regime. It should be noted that a similar book was published about the 2008 war in South Ossetia, documenting the Ossetian victims
31. Although one might be tempted to class these books under the rubric of the 'invention of tradition', objects that become central components of national cultures, these photographs and memorial books are better seen as material objects that, while they form the basis of a political community, are silent arguments are invoked when all other narrative tools and rationalisations fail. For more on the invention of tradition, see Eric Hobsbawm and Terrence Ranger, eds., The Invention of Tradition (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992)
32. Svetlana, early 20s, student at Transnistrian State University
33. Here I am reminded of a quote from the Russian formalist Viktor Shklovsky: 'It's impossible to lead the dead into battle, but you can line them up, cover them with a little sand and use them for a roadbed'. Viktor Shklovsky, A Sentimental Journey (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1970), 188
34. Originally cited in Serguei Oushakine, The Patriotism of Despair (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2009), 57
35. Moldova's veterans of the 1992 conflict receive measly pensions, if they are acknowledged by the state at all, while Transnistria actively supports veterans financially and socially. Transnistrian veterans are referred to as Defenders of Transnistria
36. One memorial book, the White Book of Transnistria, writes about trolleybuses in Chisinau with posters declaring 'We give you five years not in order to learn the language, but in order for you to leave here'. On the Supreme Soviet in Chisinau anti-Russian and anti-Semitic phrases were written in metre-high Russian letters: 'Russians beyond the Dnestr [the boundary between Moldovan and Transnistria], Jews into the Dnestr', Belaya Kniga PMR, http://www.vspmr.org/Upload/File/whitebook.pdf (accessed May 21, 2011)
37. Barthes writes that photography cannot signify except by assuming a mask that forms the face into the product of a society and of its history. Roland Barthes, Camera Lucida (New York: Hill and Wang, 1981), 34
38. For more on how these divisions played out in the 1990 Moldova election, see J.A. Mason, "Internationalist Mobilization During the Collapse of the Soviet Union: The Moldovan Elections of 1990', Nationalities Papers 37, no. 2 (2009): 159-76
39. Oushakine, The Patriotism of Despair, 5
40. Oushakine, The Patriotism of Despair, 5-6
41. For an overview of this, see Vladimir Solonari, Purifying the Nation: Population Exchange and Ethnic Cleansing in Nazi-Allied Romania (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins, 2009)
42. Not being Romanian territory, Transnistria was used as a killing field of extermination for Jews and non-Romanians by the fascist regime of General Ion Antonescu. This bloody period was stressed by the Soviets as distinguishing Moldova from Romania. The symbolic linkage between death and Romania lingers in the popular imagination, especially among those fully socialised in the USSR. See Solonari 2009 for more on the subject of Romania's actions during the Second World War. In March 2011, Transnistrian State University held a conference entitled 'The Eastern Policy of Romania in the Past and the Present'. At the conference, PMR President Igor Smirnov took pains to stress the role played by Romania in the region: 'For at least the last century, the Romanian factor has influenced the destiny of our region and has, unfortunately, been a thread to regional peace and stability'. 'In Tiraspol, experts discuss the phenomenon of "Greater Romania"', http://www.nr2.ru/pmr/325655.html (accessed March 26, 2011)
43. In Soviet Nationality Policy, the idea that Moldovans and Romanians constituted separate peoples was central to their plans to bring Moldova into Soviet orbit. This included identifying 'Moldovan' as a separate language and insisting on the use of the Cyrillic script in the MSSR, although the language spoken there is really a dialect of Romanian
44. As a Soviet border state, Moldova had limited economic and social exchanges with Romania. Infrastructure was oriented to the East
45. This particular book was written by two history professors at Transnistrian State University (PGU) who work at the scientific research laboratory 'History of Transnistria'. During fieldwork, I came to know the biographical details of some left-bank intellectuals. Their socialisation and internalisation of the Soviet knowledge and categories led them to forsake the nationalising Moldova for Transnistria. Much of PGU's faculty came from the Moldovan Academy of Sciences who left Chisinau and moved to Transnistria when the nationalist mobilising and bespredel began in the late 1980s/early 1990s
46. N.V. Babilunga and B.G. Bomeshko, Dubossary: Krovotochatschaya Rana Pridnestrov'ya (Tiraspol: Transnistrian Cooperative University, Scientific Research Lab for the History of the Transnistrian Region, 1993), 2
47. Moldova's entry came from Sunstroke Project featuring Olia Tira. The musicians were from left-bank Moldova, while the singer is a Moldovan born in East Germany
48. The fictional lands of Ruritania come from Anthony Hope's 1894 novel, The Prisoner of Zenda
49. See Vesna Goldsworthy, Inventing Ruritania: The Imperialism of the Imagination (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1998)
50. Anthony Hope's fictional Ruritania has become a placeholder for academic discussion of fictional lands
51. One local journalist had the following response to my question about Lilin: "I am a resident of Bender and I have very deep roots in this city. There never existed here what the author writes about almost all are inclined to believe that this is nonsense.' Personal communication, June 28, 2011
52. His self-given nickname Kolima is a play on words. It is, on the one hand, a shortened, familiar form of Nicolai. It also references a famous destination for political and criminal exiles in the Soviet Union. Kolyma is a region in the Russian Far East that became one of most notorious Gulag labour camps
53. The arch rivals of Lilin's urkas are the Black Seed, more commonly known as the vory-v-zakone. Both recorded their criminal biographies on the body through tattoos and similarly valued honour over money and worldly possessions. For more details about the truth of Lilin's criminal societies, see reviews from Donald Rayfield, "Review of Siberian Education', Literary Review, July 2010
54. Federico Varese "Tattoo Tales', Times Literary Supplement, January 14, 2011. These are reproduced in Appendix 1
55. Much of the book deals with the symbolic and semiotic aspects of crime. For criminals, tattoos constitute a visible life history. It is perhaps fitting that Lilin utilises his own body as a canvas for urka culture. For more on tattoo culture in the Soviet and post-Soviet periods, see D.S. Baldaev, Tatuirovki zakliuchennykh (St. Petersburg: Limbus Press, 2001)
56. Sergei Vasiliev, Danzig Baldaev, and Alexei Plutser-Sarno, Russian Criminal Tattoo Encyclopaedia. 3 vols. (London: Fuel, 2009)
57. For a recent work addressing these issues, see Eliot Borenstein, Overkill: Sex and Violence in Contemporary Russian Popular Culture (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2007)
58. Eliot Borenstein, "Chernukha', in Encyclopedia of Russian History, ed. James R. Millar (Farmington, MI: Thomson/Gale, 2004), 242
59. The forum thread, 'Bender, Famous City of Siberian Urkas - Italian sensation!' has since been closed, but some of the posts are archived, http://siberia-bendery.livejournal.com/672.html and http://siberia-bendery.livejournal.com/504.html.
60. One user writes, 'I'm sorry, but the book is obviously complete nonsense, intended to make a quick profit. I was born and raised in Bender, and even though my ancestors were not from there, I can safely say that in the thirties Siberian criminals were not sent there. At a minimum, because Bender was then part of Romania "I was born in an area with a bad reputation." - it's a pity that the author, who was supposedly born in 1980 does not know, that in the 1980s it was possible to talk of the flowering of Bender, both economically and socially. It is unclear what kind of "bad reputation" he is talking about it's a pity, that European were so deeply deceived', http://siberia-bendery.livejournal.com/504.html (accessed June 14, 2011)
61. The film will star John Malkovich as Kolima's grandfather Kuzya. It is set to begin production in August 2011 and will be filmed in Lithuania. The film will be directed by Gabriele Salvatores. 'Malkovich enrols for "Education"', http://www.variety.com/article/VR1118039411 (accessed July 5, 2011)
62. Nicolai Lilin, Siberian Education (Edinburgh, London: Canongate, 2010), 40
63. Ibid., 422
64. For more on this phenomenon as it relates to organised crime in Italy and Russia, see Diego Gambetta, The Sicilian Mafia: The Business of Private Protection (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1993)
65. Federico Varese, "Is Sicily the Future of Russia? Private Protection and the Rise of the Russian Mafia', Archives Européennes de Sociologie 35, no. 1 (1994): 224-58
66. Federico Varese, The Russian Mafia: Private Protection in a New Market Economy (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005)
67. Vadim Volkov, Violent Entrepreneurs: The Use of Force in the Making of Russian Capitalism (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2002), 20
68. For more on the criminalisation of market building involving the post-Soviet state and quasi-state actors, see Stephen Handelman, Comrade Criminal (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1997)
69. David Satter, Darkeness at Dawn: The Rise of the Russian Criminal State (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2004)
70. Federico Varese, The Russian Mafia: Private Protection in a New Market Economy (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005)
71. Joma Nazpary, Post-Soviet Chaos (London: Pluto Press, 2002)
72. Max Weber, 'Politics as a Vocation', in From Max Weber: Essays in Sociology, ed. Hans Gerth and C. Wright Mills (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1946), 78
73. The first declaration of independence of the Pridnestrovian Moldavian Soviet Socialist Republic (PMSSR). This first declaration occurred in 1990 in the context of the Soviet Union. The PMSSR was originally conceived of as new Soviet Republic separate from the Moldovan Soviet Socialist Republic
74. Edward Ozhiganov, 'The Republic of Moldova: Transdniester and the 14th Army', in Managing Conflict in the Former Soviet Union, ed. Alexei Arbatov, Abram Chayes, Antonia Handler Chayes, and Lara Olson (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1997), 162-3
75. Political organising was centred on Tiraspol, which was the capital of the PMSSR. Similarly, Chisinau is the seat of Moldovan political power
76. Some of the early violence involved policemen in left-bank Moldova turning on each other, some siding with Chisinau and some with Tiraspol. For a military perspective on the conflict, see Neil V. Lamont, "Territorial Dimensions of Ethnic Conflict: The Moldovan Case, 1991-March 1993', Journal of Slavic Military Studies 6, no. 4 (1993): 576-612
77. Also see Stuart Kaufman, Modern Hatreds: The Symbolic Politics of Ethnic War (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2001), especially chap. 5 ('Elite Conspiracy in Moldova's Civil War')
78. This is the case today. During floods, drought, and an economic blockade, local authorities appealed to Russia for humanitarian aid. In the case of the 2006 economic blockade, the arrival of an aid convoy from Russia was a very visible manifestation of public diplomacy. The fact that any and all visible aid come from Russia must be seen within the larger political context in which Russia guarantees the PMR's de facto sovereignty by limiting potential competitors or the assertion of other claims to sovereignty. Sovereignty becomes the basis for a host of other claims (humanitarian aid, charity, cultural diplomacy, and so on)
79. Ilascu and Others v. Moldova and Russia, 48787/99, Council of Europe: European Court of Human Rights, 8 July 2004, http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/414d9df64.html (accessed May 2, 2011)
80. Moldova was alleged to have received military support from Romania. Romanian arms, military identification documents, and other material artefacts are displayed in a PMR memorial museum in Bender as evidence of Romanian military involvement
81. Estimates of those killed during the conflict vary widely. As OSCE background paper, "The Transdniestrian Conflict in Moldova: Origins and Main Issues' estimates that the fighting caused several hundreds of deaths and some 100,000 refugees. "Transdniestrian Conflict: Origins and Issues', http://www.osce.org/moldova/42308 (accessed July 21, 2011)
82. Grachev gained notoriety primarily because of his military incompetence and longstanding allegations of corruption. In the PMR, he was alleged to be involved in a scheme that used the military field bank of the 14th Army to exchange then worthless Soviet rubles for Russian rubles. During fieldwork, informants described suitcases, automobiles, and trains full of old Soviet rubles that were converted. Allegedly, Alexander Lebed and Mikhail Bergman (the former commander of the Tiraspol garrison of the 14th Army) tried to halt this illicit scheme but were personally rebuked by Grachev
83. For more on Lebed's political career and how his military experience influenced his politics, see Benjamin Lambeth, The Warrior Who Would Rule Russia (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 1996) Lyndon Allin n.d., 'Before the Fall: Aleksandr Lebed's Life and Times Through June 1995
84. Harold Elletson, The General Against the Kremlin: Alexander Lebed, Power and Illusion (London: Little Brown, 1999)
85. Alexander Lebed, My Life and My Country (Washington, DC: Regnery Publishing, 1997)
86. Lebed, My Life and My Country, 331
87. Lebed has no memorial in the PMR despite being responsible for bringing peace to the region. Given the PMR authorities penchant for monuments and commemorative plaques, Lebed's absence is telling. In October, 2010, PMR President Igor Smirnov unveiled a memorial plaque honouring Karl Friedrich Hieronymus, Freiherr von Münchhausen, and aka Baron Münchhausen. The plaque was unveiled in the Turkish fortress located in the PMR city of Bender. http://www.nr2.ru/pmr/303869.html (accessed October 20, 2010)
88. Ivan, late 40s, municipal employee.
89. Vlada, mid-20s, translator
90. Vassily, early 20s, NGO worker
91. Alexei, late 20s, English tutor
92. This phenomenon is discussed in Varese, The Russian Mafia, 57-9, 68, 126-9
93. as well as in Volkov, Violent Entrepreneurs, 6-11, 103-5
94. The phenomenon of athletes becoming racketeers is not uncommon in the post-Soviet space. Athletes, particularly wrestlers and boxers, could command force, which in turn became a commodity. Business would pay for protection, and for a fee these purveyors of force would guarantee property rights, contracts, and could collect debts. The case of Anatoly Bykov is perhaps the most exemplary. During the Soviet period Bykov was a physical education teacher and amateur boxer who rose from commanding a gruppirovka (gang) to controlling the world's second largest aluminium smelter, Kras
95. Smuggling was prevalent (and profitable) in both leftand right-bank Moldova
96. Vladimir, mid-50s, employed in transportation and logistic
97. These numbers should not be seen as exact figures. But given the times, they should be seen for what they are: extremely large sums of money paid to fundamentally alter the fundamental dynamics of market processes in the region. Figures cited Orest Kollontai, "Republic of Sheriff', Krasnaya Zvezda, December 7, 2001. http://www.redstar.ru/2001/12/07_12/3_02.html (accessed April 21, 2011)
98. Alena V. Ledevena, How Russia Really Works: The Informal Practices That Shaped Post-Soviet Politics and Business (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2006)
99. Just as PMR exports to Europe go there with Moldovan customs stamps, when Sheriff plays in the European Champions League, they play under the Moldovan flag. When the Moldovan international team plays a home match, they play it in Tiraspol at Sheriff stadium, since it is the only stadium in Moldova approved for international matches by the Fédération Internationale de Football Association (FIFA)
100. Maksim, mid-30s, IT professional
101. Currently, Moldovan imports are taxed at a rate of 100%, essentially making them uncompetitive
102. Although some might see this as the inherent competition in capitalism, the significant political and legislative power possessed by Sheriff insulates them from any potential competition. The situation is much more akin to a state-supported monopoly. The PMR is small enough and the cost barrier associated with establishing a market presence is high enough to limit competition. Challenging Sheriff simply is not feasible given their cosy relationship with PMR authorities
103. Grigory, early 40s, owner of three mini-markets
104. These brands include Soviet brands as well as western brands produced under license in Ukraine
105. The concept of nashe denotes something that is considered to be ours or local. It is opposed to the foreign. As an adjective, nashe can be applied to consumer goods, ideas, formal/informal institutions, accepted social standards, currencies, food products, and so on. It is important to note the policing mechanism implicit in this idea: that which is not ours is foreign and often threatening by definition. This is perhaps all the more important in a place like the PMR
106. Charles Tilly, "War Making and State Making as Organized Crime', in Bringing the State Back In, ed. Peter Evans, Dietrich Rueschemeyer, and Theda Skocpol (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985), 169.
107. Tilly points out to two ways of state-building (a capital intensive path and a coercive intensive path). PMR does not clearly fit any mode, but it is closer to the capitalised in which rulers cooperated with capitalists 'to rent or purchase military force and thereby warred without building permanent massive structures
108. Charles Tilly, Capital, Coercion, and European States, AD 990-1992 (London: Blackwell, 1990), 30
109. For more on the changing definitions of organised crime and their relationship to criminology, see Federico Varese, "What is Organized Crime?', in Organized Crime, ed. Federico Varese (London: Routledge, 2010), 1-30
110. This touches upon the core of why the Transnistrian conflict has been difficult to resolve: both sides receive significant rents by prolonging the status quo
111. "Both OCGs and Mafia groups have been defined here against the backdrop of existing states, with which they compete for offering services of governance. Logically, all share a crucial aspiration that of governing exchanges. The state is indeed the most common and most well-developed institutional structure, which provides governance for those having assets and wanting to exchange them. At its core, the state is a third party that uses violence to protect assets and enforce agreements (contracts) among individuals, and a territory where these individuals reside demarcated by the reach of the enforcer's enforcement power'. Varese, "What is Organized Crime?', 19-20
112. One rumour in early 2010 held that Sheriff's holdings were for sale for a few billion dollars. Other rumours intimate that Sheriff is simply the money laundering wing of the power ministries that eliminated the banditry of the 1990s
113. See Charles King, "The Benefits of Ethnic War: Understanding Eurasia's Unrecognized States', World Politics 53, no. 4 (2001): 524-52
114. Proposed reforms include abolishing the institution of the vice president and adding a post of prime minister. These reforms are intended to harmonise the PMR's system of governance with the Russian Federation. One western analyst cynically remarked that renaming the Supreme Soviet a legislature would constitute reform in the PMR