Acquiring assets, debts and citizens: Russia and the micro-foundations of Transnistria's stalemated conflict

Demokratizatsiya

Volumn 18, Issue 4, 2010, Pages 329-356

  Chamberlain Creangǎ, Rebecca ^a   Allin, Lyndon ^b  

^a Woodrow Wilson International Center   (United States)

^b GEORGETOWN UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

citizenship; de facto states; Moldova; Russia; Transnistria

Indexed keywords

CITIZENSHIP; CONFLICT MANAGEMENT; EUROPEAN UNION; SECESSIONISM; SOVEREIGNTY;

MOLDOVA; RUSSIAN FEDERATION; TRANSNISTRIA;

EID: 78650647000     PISSN: 10746846     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.3200/DEMO.18.4.329-356     Document Type: Article

References (150)

1. Georgia's once-frozen conflict with South Ossetia had a number of similarities to the Transnistrian conflict, including a porous border, a certain level of ethnic intermingling, and a situation in which individuals on both sides of the conflict, as well as the peacekeepers, made money through illicit trade, providing incentive to see the conflict continue indefinitely.
2. Notable differences between the South Ossetian case and the Transnistrian conflict include a stronger ethnic element to the conflict in South Ossetia than in Transnistria, including the possibility of unifying with the territorially contiguous North Ossetian region of the Russian Federation; in Transnistria, language has been the more divisive issue, and unification with Russia-as well as Russian military intervention to the extent of Russia's 2008 incursion into Georgia-is an unrealistic possibility because Transnistria does not share a border with Russia.
3. This article uses "Transnistria" to refer to the region also known as Pridnestrov'e and Transd-niester, without intending to suggest a political judgment in the selection of a toponym. See Stefan Troebst, "'We are Transnistrians!': Post-Soviet Identity Management in the Dniester Valley," Ab Imperio 4, no. 1 (2003): 437-466 for a discussion of the issues which arise when translating the word Pridnestrov'e from Russian to English.
4. The Transnistrian region has a population of 550,02 people, according to its most recent 2004 census. The topography of the region includes flat plains, rolling hills and steep river cliffs confined within a space of 4,163 square kilometers (1,626 square miles), about the size of Luxembourg.
5. For more information consult Nikolai Babilunga et al., Fenomen Pridnestrov'ia (Tiraspol, 2000) and The Atlas of the Dniester Moldavian Republic (2nd edition), (Tiraspol, 2000).
6. See Sergey Markedonov, Turbulentnaia Evraziia [Turbulent Eurasia] (Moscow: Academia, 2010): 90-95
7. on the "Transnistria-Moldova Conflict." For a detailed report on the violence, see Neil Lamont, "Territorial Dimensions of Ethnic Conflict: The Moldovan Case, 1991-March 1993," Journal of Slavic Military Studies 6, no. 4 (1993): 576-612.
8. Angela Kachuyevski, "Seeking Solutions in Transnistria: Looking Beyond Russia to the Challenges of 'Undoing'." Paper presented at the IREX 2008 Regional Symposium: Frozen Conflicts and Unrecognized States in Southeast Europe and Eurasia, hosted in collaboration with the Kennan Institute of the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, Washington, D.C., April 9-11, 2008. Available at http://www.irex.org/programs/symp/08/Kachuyevski-Angela- Executive-Sum-mary.pdf (accessed June 30, 2010).
9. For a more in-depth look at the issues behind the conflict, see the report by the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, "Transdniestrian Conflict: Origins and Main Issues" (Vienna: CSCE Conflict Prevention Centre, 1994). Available at http://www.osce.org/moldova/ 13173.html (accessed October 10, 2010).
10. For an earlier discussion of how some of the factors discussed in this article were relevant to the initial conflict, see Charles King, "The Benefits of Ethnic War," World Politics 53, no. 4 (July 2001): 524-552.
11. Charles King, The Moldovans: Romania, Russia, and the Politics of Culture (Stanford: Hoover Institution Press, 2000).
12. Stuart Kaufman and Stephen Bowers, "Transnational dimensions of the Transnistrian conflict," Nationalities Papers 26, no. 1 (1998): 129-46. (Pubitemid 28320958)
13. See Nicu Popescu, "Transnistria's Survival" in Monica Heintz (ed.), Weak State, Uncertain Citizenship: Moldova (Frankfurt am Main: Peter Lang, 2008): 55-70.
14. The peacekeeping format has been dominated by Russia, the only third party to have troops in the region, despite Russia's prom ises to withdraw its 1,200-1,52 servicemen from the region as part of the commitments agreed to at the OSCE summit in Istanbul in 1999. There are also 21,02 tons of ex-Soviet hardware and ammunition remaining in Transnistria, which were also supposed to be withdrawn under the Istan bul Commitments. Russia has since backed away from honoring the Istanbul Commitments related to its troops and armaments in Transnistria.
15. In 2004, the European Court of Human Rights noted that "[t]he Russian army is still stationed in Moldovan territory in breach of the undertakings to withdraw them completely given by the Russian Federation at the OSCE summits in Istanbul (1999)
16. Porto (2001)." Ila?cu et al. v. Russia and Moldova, Eur. Ct. H.R. (2004). For more information on the dispute over the Istanbul Commitments, see also NATO, "Questions and Answers on CFE," policy memo c. 2007, available at http://www.nato.int/issues/arms-control/cfe-qa-factsheet.pdf (accessed October 4, 2010).
17. Nicu Popescu, "Transnistria's Survival,"
18. and Jeff Chinn, "The Case of Transdniester (Moldova),"in Lena Jonson and Clive Archer (eds.), Peacekeeping and the Role of Russia in Eurasia (Boulder and Oxford; Oxford 1996): 103-120;
19. and Mihai Gribincea, Trupele ruse în Republica Moldova: Factor stabilizator sau surs? de pericol? [Russian Troops in the Republic of Moldova: A Stabilizing Factor or a Source of Danger?] (Chi?in?u, 1998).
20. Alla Stoeva, "Manipulation of Consciousness in Transnistrian Mass Media," Mass Media in Moldova, December 2005, 24-26;
21. Dumitru Mânz?rari, "Information or Illusion," Mass Media in Moldova, June 2007, 26-28.
22. Nicu Popescu, "Transnistria's Survival," 57.
23. Pål Kolstø and Andrei Malgin, "The Transnistrian Republic: A Case of Politicized Regionalism," Nationalities Papers 26 (1998): 103-12.
24. Transnistria was once a showcase for Soviet industry, while right-bank Moldova specialized in agriculture. This left Moldova with fewer industrial resources than Transnistria in the post-Soviet era. See Charles King, The Moldovans. Regarding socioeconomic factors, see also Valeriu Mosneaga and Alexei Tulbure in "Some Aspects of the Trans-Dniestrian Problem," in Hans-Georg Ehrhart and Oliver Thränert (eds.), European Conflicts and International Institutions: Cooperating with Ukraine (Baden-Baden, 1998): 135-144.
25. Stefan Troebst, "'We are Transnistrians!'"
26. and Vladimir Solonari, "Creating a 'People': A Case Study in Post-Soviet History-Writing," Kritika: Explorations in Russian and Eurasian History 4, no. 2 (2003): 411-438.
27. See Rebecca Chamberlain-Creang?, "The Transnistrian People?: Citizenship and Imaginings of 'the State' in an Unrecognized Country," Ab Imperio 4, no. 4 (2006): 371-399.
28. Jeffrey Rubin, "The Timing of Ripeness and the Ripeness of Timing," in Louis Kriesberg and Stuart Thorson (eds.) Timing the De-escalation of International Conflicts (Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, 1991): 237-246.
29. See also Ulrich Schneckener and Stefan Wolff (eds.), Managing and Settling Ethnic Conflicts: Perspectives on Successes and Failures in Europe, Africa and Asia (New York: Palgrave MacMillian, 2004).
30. On the anthropological study of conflict, see, for example, Georg Elwert, Stephan Feuchtwang and Dieter Neubert, "The Dynamics of Collective Violence" in ibid (eds.) Dynamics of Violence: Processes of Escalation and De-escalation in Violent Group Conflicts (Berlin: Duncker and Hum-blot, 1999): 7-31
31. as well as Paul Richards (ed.), No Peace, No War: An Anthropology of Contemporary Armed Conflicts (Athens, OH: Ohio University Press, 2005).
32. On the social-psychological study of conflict, review Dean Pruitt, Sung Hee Kim and Jeffrey Rubin, Social Conflict: Escalation, Stalemate, and Settlement, third edition (Boston: McGraw-Hill, 2004).
33. See Paul Richards (ed.), No Peace, No War, and Valery Tishkov, Chechnya: Life in a War-Torn Society (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2004).
34. More concerned with the intersection of societal and transnational factors in conflict than the latter books is sociologist Georgi Derluguian's monograph, Bourdieu's Secret Admirer in the Caucasus: A World-System Biography (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2005).
35. Derluguian's thoughtful analysis of how ethnic violence emerged in the Caucasus amid the Soviet Union's collapse, however, has narrow relevance for this article's focus on protracted, nonviolent, non-ethnic conflict in the post-Socialist 21st century, and so is not engaged further. Moreover, anthropologists appear to pay little attention to "stalemates" as particular types of conflict in the first place. This is evidenced in one of the few volumes dedicated to a contemporary anthropology of conflict, No Peace, No War (Paul Richards, ed.)-a title resonating with Transnistria's deadlocked, liminal status between violence and settlemen-but which provides no examples of stalemated conflict.
36. A good exception is Fithen and Richards' 2005 study of militia solidarities in Sierra Leone, illustrating the global-local interplay through the example of security companies linked to the international diamond mining industry in the country making possible seemingly traditional, "barbarous" militia mobilization.
37. On the social context of war, see Paul Richards, No Peace, No War, 3.
38. We use this term to describe the de facto government and state-like apparatus which currently controls the territory of Transnistria.
39. See Rebecca Chamberlain-Creang?, "The Transnistrian People." Anatol Gudîm, Evolution of the Transnistrian Economy: Critical Appraisal (CISR report). Chi in u, 2001. Available at http://www.cisr-md.org/reports/cont- transn.html (accessed October 1, 2010).
40. This also includes the other secessionist regions studied by Kimitaka Matsuzato in "From Belligerent to Multi-ethnic Democracy: Domestic Politics in Unrecognized States after the Ceasefires," Eurasian Review 1, Winter (2008): 98-99.
41. According to Moldovan authorities, out of Transnistria's population of 555,000, 58.7 percent of persons in Transnistrian older than 16 have at least one type of Moldovan identity document, including a passport. See Moldova Suverana, July 25, 2007.
42. Moreover, the TMR's lack of structural capacity is noticeable when masses of peoples from Transnistria obtain legal documents on the right, not left bank. This is most notably true for marriage certificates, which need international recognition when applying for other documents, like European-country visas. All of my several dozen informants from left-bank Rybnitsa, who married within the past decade and a half, after Transnistria's founding, were married by law in right-bank Rezina (at the Oficial Starii Civil) under the banner of a Moldovan, not Transnistrian flag. Another structural challenge to TMR de facto independence is that half of the region's able-bodied population is working abroad. Labor migration from Moldova and Transnistria rose to alarming levels starting in 1994. Transnistria alone has around 200,02 persons working abroad - almost half of its official population of 555,000. (Interview with Evgenii Shevchuk, Chairman of the Supreme Soviet Parliament, "Transnistrian Moldovan Republic," conducted by Rebecca Chamberlain, Tiraspol, March 7, 2008.)
43. one informant told me, 'who wants to exchange the documents from a superpower for a passport from a banana republic'." See Mike Bobick, "Bespredel and Belonging: Bodies, Politics, and Publics in the Transnistrian Moldovan Republic," unpublished manuscript, 2010.
44. One scholar refers to this as the "outsourcing of de facto statehood," whereby secessionist authorities allow other countries to assist with or assume control over their state-like functions. Nicu Popescu, "Outsourcing De Facto Statehood," CEPS Policy Brief, 2006.
45. See also Florian Muhlfried, "Citizenship at War: Passports and Nationality in the 2008 Russian-Georgian Conflict," Anthropology Today 2: 8-13.
46. For evidence of Transnistrian officials wanting Russian troops in Transnistria to protect the region, read "Smirnov: Pridnestrov'e ne protiv rossiiskih raket" ["Smirnov: Transnistria is not against Russian missiles"], InterFax, February 15, 2010, available online at http://www.interfax. ru/txt.asp?id=123748&sec=1476 (accessed September 16, 2010). Rank-and-file perceptions of Russian troops are based on personal communication with fieldwork interlocutors.
47. Stuart Kaufman and Stephen Bowers, "Transnational dimensions of the Transnistrian conflict."
48. This was witnessed after the 2008 Georgian war over South Ossetia, when the Russian and Moldovan Presidents swiftly met to assure Transnistria's peace, even if not settlement. Renewed armed hostility was generally perceived to be unlikely in Transnistria.
49. In the context of contemporary Russian foreign policy, this phrase was coined by President Medvedev shortly after the 2008 war in Georgia as he articulated five fundamental principles of Russian foreign policy: "As is the case of other countries, there are regions in which Russia has privileged interests. These regions are home to countries with which we share special historical relations and are bound together as friends and good neighbours. We will pay particular attention to our work in these regions and build friendly ties with these countries, our close neighbours." In the context of this article, it should also be noted that the fourth principle articulated by Medvedev included commitments to "protect the lives and dignity of our citizens, wherever they may be" and to "protect the interests of our business community abroad." Interview given by Dmitry Medvedev to Television Channels Channel One, Rossia, NTV, August 31, 2008, available at http://archive. kremlin.ru/eng/speeches/2008/08/31/1850-type82912type82916- 206003.shtml (accessed October 15, 2010).
50. Nicu Popescu, "Russia's Soft Power Ambitions," Centre for European Policy Studies (CEPS) Policy Brief 115, October 26, 2006.
51. The goal is to influence the decisionmaking of countries in alignment with the "soft power" state. See Joseph Nye, Bound to Lead: The Changing Nature of American Power (New York: Basic Books, 1990)
52. and ibid., Soft Power: The Means to Success in World Politics (Cambridge, MA: Perseus, 2004).
53. Kimitaka Matsuzato, "Identity Politics in Unrecognized Abkhazia and Transnistria: Inter-Orthodoxy Relations and Trans-border Minorities." Paper presented at the 39th National Convention of the American Association for the Advancement of Slavic Studies, New Orleans, Louisiana, November 15-18, 2007. 37.
54. More precisely, 255,000,02 Russian rubles were transferred to the Transnistrian Parliament's account around February 18, 2009. The Kremlin's choice to give this money to the Transnistrian Parliament, or Supreme Soviet, and not the Executive branch under the control of President Igor Smirnov is an example of Russia's use of its largesse to reward or punish local actors and perpetuate a situation where all are dependent to a certain extent on ties with Moscow in order to maintain their local standing.
55. For ordinary people's perceptions of welfare in Transnistria and right-bank Moldova, see Rebecca Chamberlain-Creang?, "The Transnistrian People." Over 6 million US dollars will be spent on support for pensioners, while 880 thousand US dollars will go towards maternity hospitals, orphan and boarding schools, and elderly homes ("Pridnestrovie received humanitarian financial aid from the Russian Federation." Parliamentary News, February 19, 2009.) As a point of reference, in 2006 Russian humanitarian aid to Transnistria amounted to 77 million US dollars (Infotag, February 20, 2009).
56. The line between factory and politics in Transnistria is a blurred one. Many major private enterprises are owned or operated by a state or municipal politician. What "politics" exists in Transnistria plays out in factories and via business interests. Workers are mobilized for election campaigns and political action. Workplaces are proxy sites of election voting, sometimes by way of early Soviet-style unanimous voting in work collectives. Examining these dynamics is important at a time of nascent political competition and pluralism in Transnistria, considered crucial for Moldova's future reintegration. Ethnographic fieldwork in Transnistria and Moldova was carried out during 2004-2006 and summer 2007 and spring 2009.
57. Dan Ionescu, "Life in the Dniester 'Black Hole'," Transition 20, no. 2 (1996). These issues have continued to bedevil the region, albeit to a lesser extent, even after the introduction of the EU Border Assistance Mission in late 2005.
58. Igor Munteanu et. al, Moldova pe Calea Democra?iei ?i Stabilitii [Moldova on the Road to Democracy and Stability], (Chi?in?u: Cartier, 2005): 137.
59. This connects with a point made by economist Anatol Gudîm that stalemate permitted the secessionist regime to carve out is own post-socialist economic path, avoiding sharp economic liberalization and developing a socially oriented market economy with high state regulation of economic processes. Anatol Gudîm. Evolution of the Transnistrian Economy: Critical Appraisal (CISR report). Chi?in?u, 2001, available at http://www. cisr-md.org/reports/cont- transn.html (accessed September 30, 2010).
60. See Angela Kachuyevski, "Seeking Solutions in Transnistria." Also note: "[I]n the last two years the Tiraspol authorities have proceeded actively to sell the enterprises situated in the region. These enterprises are sold especially to citizens of the Russian Federation. Regarding this is the plant 'Pribor' in Bender, the enterprise 'Moldavizolit' in Tiraspol, 'Buket Moldavii' in Dubasari, the cable plant in Bender and the shoe factory 'Tighina' The single objective is to assure Russia has enough geopolitical and economic advantage [.]" (Munteanu, Moldova pe Calea Democra?iei, 137.)
61. Two of the factories are located in the city of Rybnitsa, where author Chamberlain conducted ethnographic field research for almost sixteen months.
62. The position of Chi?in?u authorities on Transnistrian privatization has changed several times over the years. Toward the end of his second term in office, Moldovan President Voronin made it clear that he would be willing to provide a guarantee that the Transnistrian privatization results will remain unchallenged as part of his government's "package" settlement proposal. More recently, under the Alliance for European Integration coalition government, recognition of the results of the Transnistrian privatization program appears to still be something that Chi?in?u would be willing to use as a bargaining chip in settlement talks.
63. The Association of the Bar of the City of New York, Thawing a Frozen Conflict: Legal Aspects of the Separatist Crisis in Moldova (2006), 66-72. Available at http://www.nycbar.org/pdf/ report/NYCity%20BarTransnistriaReport. pdf (accessed October 15, 2010).
64. Because of the timing of our fieldwork, we were not able to fully assess the impact of the global economic downturn on Russian and Ukrainian FDI in Transnistria, however it seems possible that one consequence may be a change in investment trends in the region.
65. On the other hand, it appears Transnistria may be sharing in Russia's economic "bounce" in 2010 (in July 2010, the region published figures stating that its first-half 2010 industrial output had risen 27.1 percent year-on-year), and if Alisher Usmanov's own fortunes are any indication, the purchasing power of Russian capital did not suffer lasting diminution due to the recent crisis-Usmanov's rankings in the annual Forbes list of billionaires have followed the boom-bust-rebound trend of the Russian economy: 278th in 2006, 142nd in 2007; 91st in 2008; 450th in 2009; and 100th in 2010.
66. Gazprom has been described by one leading Russian political commentator as a "second foreign ministry" which may be more powerful than Russia's official Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Remarks by Lilia Shevtsova at the American Institute for Contemporary German Studies, October 1, 2007, author's notes.
67. Munteanu, Moldova pe Calea Democra?iei. Russian economic strength in the breakaway entity bolsters Russia's geopolitical influence on the European Union's (EU) eastern flank, obstructing EU and NATO expansion aspirations into Moldova and Ukraine, Russia's imagined traditional sphere of influence. Transnistria's unrecognized status may also provide an 'off shore' tax haven for big business evading taxes. Transnistrian factories become front companies through which corporations' true profits are disguised and taxes avoided. The company's website is http://www.aommz.com.
68. Andrei Brezianu, Historical Dictionary of the Republic of Moldova (Lanham, MD, 2000): 165-166. MMZ is supposedly the world's leading producer of "black steel" (chernyi prokat). Because of MMZ's disproportionate and positive influence, industrial growth is consistently higher in Transnistria than in the rest of Moldova. This is because of the strong demand for Transnistria's steel and metal on global markets in the decade preceding the 2008-09 global economic downturn. External commerce was developing dynamically in Transnistria with 50 percent of exports delivered to non-CIS countries (see IDIS Viitorul financial reports 2005-2006). However, this started to change when the European Union penalized the plant in winter 2009 for "dumping" cheap steel on European markets.
69. Paul Starobin & Catherine Belton, "Gazprom: Russia's Enron?" BusinessWeek, February 18, 2002, available online at http://www.businessweek.com/magazine/content/02-07/b3770079.htm (accessed October 11, 2010).
70. The MMZ's power is not just in its high-tech innovation and production. Plant leadership has been known to assume quasi-state functions, such as negotiating at least once with the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE). This happened in summer 2004 when the OSCE and MMZ effectively bypassed Transnistrian central authorities in finding a resolution to local civil unrest in Rybnitsa - the outcome of which had bearing on the MMZ's production and sales. The case of civil unrest refers to confrontations between minority 'Romanian' speakers and TMR police over the latter's forcible closure of 'Romanian-language' schools operating in Rybnitsa, Tiraspol, Bendery and other towns throughout Transnistria during summer 2004. As the story with the steel plant goes, the MMZ's exports (via new customs-stamp approval) were under threat from Chi?in?u authorities, angry at the civil unrest against co-ethnics in Transnistria. In exchange for Chi?in?u customs/export approval, the MMZ agreed to give one of its old kindergartens to the disenfranchised, Chi?in?u-subordinated Romanian-language school in Rybnitsa.
71. Paul Starobin and Catherine Belton, "Gazprom: Russia's Enron?" BusinessWeek, February 18, 2002.
72. EIM owns 45.6 percent of shares, Rumney Trust Reg. 45 percent, Steel Invest Limited 8.23 percent, while 1.17 percent of shares are owned by individuals. The Austrian-Ukrainian Hares Group also once had shares in the plant. For more detailed information, see the MMZ website: http://www.aommz.com/ pls/webus/webus.main.show?main-id=10&m-id=67 (accessed October 1, 2010).
73. Cândea and Sorin Ozon, "The Oasis," Romanian Centre for Investigative Journalism, July 19, 2006, available at http://old.crji.org/ arhiva/e-060719.htm 9accessed October 1, 2010).
74. Anita Raghavan, "The Hard Man of Russia," Forbes, March 29, 2010, available at http:// www.forbes.com/forbes/2010/0329/billionaires-2010- europe-usmanov-internet-media-hard-man-of-russia.html (accessed October 1, 2010).
75. Has Promised to Shower Russia with Gifts," Lenta.ru, October 1, 2007, available at http://lenta.ru/news/2007/10/01/everything/ (accessed October 3, 2010).
76. Vadim Dubnov, "Pridnestrovskaia Model' v Natural'nuiu Velichinu" ["A Full-Scale Transnistrian Model"], Gazeta.ru, October 13, 2008, available online at http://www.gzt.ru/topnews/politics/203763. html (accessed October 4, 2010).
77. Andrei Dorofeev, "Kak 'Russkie Patrioty' Grabiat Prorossiiskie Anklavy - Issledovanie Eksperta" ["How 'Russian Patriots' Steal from Pro-Russian Enclaves - Expert Report"], Novyi Region 2, November 23, 2005, available at http://www.nr2.ru/crimea/47172.html (accessed October 4, 2010).
78. Described in Chamberlain-Creang?, "The Transnistrian People'?," 2008, 113.
79. Vitalii Kulik, "Kto 'Zakazal' Ukrainu v Pridnestrovskom Uregulirovanii" ["Who 'Took out a Hit' on Ukraine in Transnistrian Settlement Process?"], Politika+, June 30, 2010, available at http://www.politika.org.ua/?p=1812 (accessed October 2, 2010).
80. Lenta PMR, "Pridnestrov'e Ustupit Moshchneishii Maiak Rossii" ["Transnistria to Cede Powerful Beacon to Russia"], October 1, 2007. This speaks of a purchase price of over $3 million and suggests that the auction was not going to be a competitive one.
81. This refers to shop-floor employees being subordinated not to managers, but to trade-union leaders like in socialist days, as explained in a written interview with Evgenii Berndikov, Rybnitsa Cement Plant Manager, February 2006. Moreover, Soviet-nostalgic signs and slogans (like "Praise Labor!" and "Celebrate 50 years of the USSR") also dot factory walls and old machinery, reminding workers of a proud "Slavic" socialist past, which the Transnistrian state sees itself in continuity with. Such imagery seemingly regenerates a national(ist) narrative promising socioeconomic stability and rootedness in something larger than the individual.
82. Rebecca Chamberlain. "Between Money and Soul: Slav Minorities' Moral Economy in a Trans-national Cement Factory." Paper presented at the American Social Science Research Council's (SSRC) Inter-Asian Connections Conference, workshop Post-collective Economic Lives and Livelihoods: Studies of Economy, Institution and Everyday Practice in Post-socialist Eurasia and Asia, Dubai School of Government, Dubai, United Arab Emirates (UAE), February 21-23, 2008. 67 This is according to the MMZ's economic director in an interview in "Kak Rybnitsa Porabota-lai s Biudzhetom Rasschitalis'," Dobryi Den', February 9, 2005: 1
83. quoted in Chamberlain-Creang?, "The 'Transnistrian People'?," 2008, 113.
84. Informal conversation with anonymous interlocutor in Rezina, Republic of Moldova, con ducted by Rebecca Chamberlain, spring 2010.
85. Contrary to Western media depictions, for clarification, we do not believe the TMR is a communist country, as it does not meet the criteria for being communist or "socialist" laid out in Verdery, 1998. Its Communist-economic appearance is due to the TMR's continued use of certain Soviet-era symbols and its high level of state regulation of economic processes. See Anatol Gudîm, "Evolution of the Transnistrian Economy." On socialist paternalism, see Katherine Verdery, What Was Socialism, and What Comes Next? (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1996): 24-26.
86. Interview with anonymous Western diplomat in Chi?in?u, Moldova, August 2007.
87. These figures may actually be higher (see second number), as Transnistria's Minister of Finance announced in January 2010 that pensioners in Transnistria have been receiving their monthly payments about 150 Rubles ($15) smaller than before, at the time data was collected (see "Tiraspol Hopes for Russian Help in 2010, Too," Infotag, 16 January 2010).
88. Data was gathered by a trusted research assistant in the region in December 2009. The information was verified by cross-checking several websites, including the following in Transnistria: "Tiraspol hopes for Russian Help in 2010, Too," Infotag, January 16, 2010, and "A Series of Measures to Promote the Employment of People Offered," Parliamentary News of the Transnistrian Supreme Soviet, December 29, 2009, as well as "Russia's Financial Assistance for Transnistria," Infotag, February 20, 2009. In Moldova, the following information on social benefits was found up until 2007: Republic of Moldova Government Decision Number 325 from March 21, 2007 (published March 23, 2007) on social security benefits and the indexation of state benefits (cu privire la indexarea presta?iilor de asigur ri sociale ?i a unor presta?ii sociale de stat), and "Average Amount of Allowance for Children" (e.g. on "unique allowance at the birth of the first child" and "unique allowance at the birth of every next child")
89. National Bureau of Statistics of the Republic of Moldova. In early 2006, official Transnistrian sources acknowledged that their debt to Gazprom was in excess of 1.5 billion US dollars, although in 2007 the same authorities alleged that the debt was only 1.3 billion US dollars. Some Chisin?u officials believe it to be as high as 2 billion US dollars. In 2007, the plant manager at MMZ, Anatoly Belitchenko, accidently made a public statement to a journalist that Usmanov had acquired Transnistria's debt to Gazprom. Dmitry Matveev and Inna Kramarenko, "Anatolii Belitchenko: Pridnestrovskii Gazovyi Dolg Pereshel k Rossiiskomu Kholdingu 'Metalloinvest'" ["Anatoly Belitchenko: Transnistrian Gas Debt Transferred to Russian Holding Company Metalloinvest"], Novyi Region 2, March 21, 2007, available at http://www.nr2. ru/pmr/110416.html (accessed September 30, 2010).
90. Although the statement was made at a public press conference, the journalist who published the remarks was asked not to do so by factory management. His interpretation of that part of the incident was that it reflected the inexperience of Transnistrian factory managers in dealing with the press (interview conducted by Lyndon Allin, September 2008). Other news outlets had juicier headlines for this story. See Svetlana Gamova and Mikhail Sergeev, "'Gazprom' Peredal Pridnestrov'e Alisheru Usmanovu" ["Gazprom Transfers Transnistria to Alisher Usmanov"], Nezavisimiaia Gazeta, March 23, 2007, available online at http://www.ng.ru/economics/2007-03-23/1-gazprom. html;
91. Ekaterina Tsyrlina and Alexei Sadykov, "1.2mlrd Dollarov dlia Usmanova" ["$1.2bn for Usmanov"], RBK Daily, March 23, 2007, available at http://www.rbcdaily.ru/2007/03/23/tek/269330 (accessed October 4, 2010).
92. The details of many of the transactions described above are unsubstantiated, and any attempt to depict the present situation can only be based on rumors and allegations, many of which are published in often unreliable newspapers or even less reliable news websites. It is therefore impossible to draw conclusions on the current status of Transnistrian industrial assets with complete certainty.
93. Russia can also use the gas debt to extract additional concessions from the Chisin?u authorities in the event of a potential conflict settlement.
94. Local opposition newspaper Novaya Gazeta decried the local authorities' policy of "insisting to the population that gas is delivered on special terms" and hinting that "Russia loves us and will eventually write off this debt," concluding that the revelations about the gas debt meant that "We have seen the true status of the [Transnistrian] Republic. We have been sold. And the buyer can do with us as he pleases." "'Respublika Prodana': Pridnestrov'e za Nedeliu" ["'The Republic has been Sold: Transnistria Weekly Press Review"], Regnum, April 4, 2007, available online at http://www. regnum.ru/news/807700.html.
95. Interview with anonymous Transnistrian professor from the "Shevchenko" Transnistria State University, conducted by Rebecca Chamberlain, September 2008.
96. Ethnographic fieldnotes of Rebecca Chamberlain, May 2010.
97. Chamberlain-Creang?, 2009 ACTR-ACCELS report.
98. Rebecca Chamberlain, May 2009 fieldnotes. In this context, it is interesting to recall a couple of puns on the TMR's Russian name, IIpimHecTpoBCKaa MoxmaBCicaa Pecny6jiHica, or ITMP. The joke in the early 1990s was that ITMP stood for "rioMorn MHe, POCCHH!" ("Help me, Russia!"); later, as Smirnov and his family came to be more entrenched in power, the abbreviation was jokingly held to stand for "TlanHHa H Moa Pecny6jiHKa" ("Daddy's and my republic").
99. The TMR's ability to unify the diverse identities within its territory and to construct a hege monic identity along national-patriotic lines-the sine qua non of a modern nation-state-seems only superficially successful, as just a segment of the population finds notable identification with " Transnistria" (see Chamberlain-Creang?, 2006, for an explanation).
100. This statement is made well aware that "identity" (whether national, ethnic, class, etcetera) can be an objective category and/or a subjective self-identification at the individual level. When multiple individuals become fixated around a particular category is when a collective or social group identity can be said to exist. How ever, individuals and groups are only ever temporarily fixated around a category. The role of the ethnographer is to explain how, when and why individuals and groups become linked to specific categories of identification. This is considered a constructivist, interactional, processual view of identity formation, in the vein of Brubaker et al. 2008 and Calhoun 1993, all of whom stress that
101. collective self-understanding and shared dispositions, no matter how fleeting or enduring, arise over time in relation to "others" via social-political action or "contestation," the word I prefer. However, more theoretical and empirical work can be done to untangle the complicated relationship between practice, meaning, identification, and social location in understanding "national" identity formation (and its failure) in
102. and Craig Calhoun, Why Nationalism?: Sovereignty, Self-determination and Identity in a World-system of States [Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 1993.])
103. This is in so far as there is increasing movement towards the EU and Romanian culture on the right-bank, as "Transnistrianness" finds its meaning in opposition to "Romanianness" on the right-bank. See Chamberlain-Creang? 2009 ACTR-ACCELS report.
104. This is especially if these rank-and-file Russian dispositions are not linked up to similarly held beliefs across the river in right-bank Moldova (for more see Chamberlain-Creang? 2006, footnote 96). Connecting these persons and positions could be a positive, confidence-building step in track-two conflict-resolution outreach.
105. I. Kramarenko, "Oglasheny Predvaritel'nye Itogi Pridnestrovskoi Perepisi Naseleniia," Olvia-Press n.d. 2005, available at http://www.olvia.idknet.com/ol37-09-05.htm (accessed October 4, 2010); author's interviews with local analysts in Chi?in?u and Tiraspol.
106. EU integration is not in spite of, but in conjunction with maintaining important CIS cooperation (mainly at the economic level). Moldovan Deputy Minister of Reintegration, Dr. Ion Stavil?, explained to me how he envisions Moldova balancing both the EU and CIS (in so many words): "Moldova prefers integration with the EU and cooperation with the CIS. Moldova cannot go in both directions [in terms of integration]. [.] We do not want the opposite. We do not want integration into CIS and only cooperation with the EU." It is clear that EU integration is a priority to many Moldovan goverment officials.
107. Note that the question of whether a country's issuing a passport to an individual justifies a claim of "citizenship" of that country is not resolved under international law and is beyond the scope of this article; here, we use the term "citizen" interchangeably with "passport holder."
108. Figure cited by the Moldovan Ministry of Reintegration. Interview with Deputy Minister of Reintegration Ion Stavil? conducted by Lyndon Allin, June 2009. The OSCE Mission in Chi?in?u cites a figure of 120,02 Russian citizens in all of Moldova, including Transnistria and the right bank. Interview with OSCE official conducted by Lyndon Allin, May 2009.
109. Figure cited by a source close to the Transnistrian government. Interview, June 2009.
110. The Moldovan government recently claimed 360,02 Moldovan passport holders reside in Transnistria; Transnistrian officials have at times claimed the number is closer to 100,000. Interestingly, although all available estimates suggest that many more residents of Transnistria hold Moldovan passports than passports of any other country, a 2004 survey found that residents of the region had a relatively low level of identification with Moldova as a country. When asked to state which "state formation" they most closely identified with, 55.9 percent of Transnistrians stated that they "fully" identified with the TMR; 47.6 percent fully identified with the Russian Federation; 44.4 percent with Ukraine; and only 35.5 percent with Moldova. Close behind Moldova was the CIS, with 32.8 percent. A number of respondents evidently felt able to "fully" identify with more than one of the choices presented, suggesting a certain degree of flexibility in Transnistrians' choice of a "fatherland" (a term used to characterize the findings of this survey question by one academic).
111. Sergei V. Oleinikov, SMI v Protsesse Sistemnoi Transformatsii Informatsionnogo Prostranstva Pridnestrov'ia [The Mass Media and the Process of Systemic Transformation of Transnistria's Information Space], unpublished dissertation, SPbGU, 2006, 66-67.
112. Interview with OSCE official in Chi?in?u, May 2009. Moldovan officials estimated the number of Ukrainian passport holders in Transnistria at 70-80,000. Interview in Chi?in?u, June 2009.
113. Interview in Tiraspol, June 2009.
114. Interview in Tiraspol, June 2009.
115. Note: Ethnic Russians make up only one-third of Transnistria's multi-ethnic population, while the percentage of persons with Russian citizenship is slightly higher. (The exact figure is unknown.)
116. Ethnographic fieldnotes of Rebecca Chamberlain, July 2006.
117. Although the Tagliavini Report on the 2008 Georgian conflict found Russia's conduct in making passports available to residents of South Ossetia and Abkhazia to be inconsistent with international law, it was very careful to limit this finding to the particular facts of the case, in particular the mass scale of the citizenship conferrals (over 75 percent of the population in each case) and questions about whether, given the lack of options with respect to travel documents, residents of these regions accepted Russian citizenship voluntarily. Neither of these factors pertain to Transnistria, so therefore the Tagliavani Report's analysis regarding "passportization" is not necessarily applicable there. See Report of the Independent International Fact-Finding Mission on the Conflict in Georgia, September 2009, Vol. II, 155-83. For a detailed examination of the international law implications of Russia's citizenship policy in Abkhazia
118. see also Lyndon Allin, Passport Power: Citizenship, Travel Documents and Russian Leverage in Abkhazia (University of Washington Press, forthcoming).
119. A more detailed discussion of Romanian citizenship policy in Moldova is beyond the scope of this article, not because it is not arguably just as contentious as the Russian practice, but because this article is focused on transnational activity inside Transnistria, and relatively few left-bank inhabitants have acquired Romanian citizenship.
120. It was suggested to me that this Russian passport-issuing initiative might be part of a Moscow-issued protocol on May 31, 2006 to help Transnistria's local economy in the wake of so-called "economic blockade." For information, see http://www.olivia.idknet.com/01131-05-06.htm. (accessed October 5, 2010).
121. The author's interlocutor believes it is easier for a Russian than Moldovan passport holder to get a visa to visit a European country. This locally held opinion may in fact be correct, as 2010 debate over allowing EU visa liberalization to Russians before Moldovans revealed that EU countries' Ministries of the Interior preferred Russians because their data suggested Russians, as opposed to Moldovans, more reliably returned to their home country after their visas expired. Still, an even more important reason for preferring Russian over Moldovan citizenship is that the Russian passport provides the chance to resettle in Russia. This is even if there are occasional stories of Transnistrian-issued Russian passport holders being harassed by Moscow police.
122. However, it is unclear whether all holders of Russian citizenship have the right to relocate to Russia, or if residency permits are needed first before moving. Also uncertain is the residency-permit status of Sergei's family which allowed them to move.
123. See Natalia Cojocaru and Stela Suhan, "Organizarea ?i reorganizarea social? a conflictului din Transnistria" ["The Organization and Social Reorganization of the Conflict in Transnistria"], Sociologie Româneasc? 1, no. 3 (2003): 40-53.
124. Claim based on conversations with anonymous expatriate policymakers in Moldova, while one of us was serving as a "US Embassy Policy Specialist" in 2007.
125. Natalia Cojocaru and Stela Suhan, "Organizarea ?i reorganizarea social? a conflictului din Transnistria" ["The Organization and Social Reorganization of the Conflict in Transnistria"]: 40-53
126. and Stela Suhan and Natalia Cojocaru, "Memorie colectiv? ?i construc?ii identitare în Transnitria" [Collective Memory and the Constuction of Identity in Transnistria] (Chi?in?u: Institutul de Politici Publice, 2002)
127. The tendency toward emigration was illustrated by the results of a survey of graduating high school students conducted in 2002, which found that 9.6 percent planned to leave Transdniester in the near future and 48.3 percent would leave after completing their education, while only 20.6 percent stated they had no plans to leave the region. Elena M. Bobkova, Spetsifika Sotsializatsii Molodiozhi v Usloviiakh Pridnestrov'ia [Unique Aspects of Youth Socialization in Transnistria], unpublished dissertation, MGU 2005, 148.
128. For discussion on belonging and Russian passport making, read Michael Bobick, "Bespre-del and Belonging: Bodies, Politics, and Publics in the Transnistrian Moldovan Republic," unpublished manuscript, 2010.
129. Still, the Transnistrian "state" apparatus is able to appear in control of and able to capitalize on its "foreign" public-even amid Russian "passportization" and massive em/migration-as Transnistria's Russian-citizen community provides legitimacy in the first place for requesting and receiving foreign aid from Russia.
130. Such older russophones (notably of multi-ethnic backgrounds) had everything to lose in an indigenous-run Moldova, and everything to gain in a russophonic self-styled state. For them, an independent state symbolized the preservation of Russian language rights and continuity with a Soviet-style way of life (Chamberlain-Creang?, "The Transnistrian People," 387).
131. Chamberlain-Creang?, "The Transnistrian People," 387.
132. For a list of such compatriot groups in Transnistria, see the website of the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, attesting to the close state connection to these social community groups, available at http://www.mid.ru/ns-dgpch.nsf/ aa259d77f08b8f4543256da40037b908/ff0b06a742a63c5a c32572f9004a2a15 (accessed October 1, 2010).
133. Alexander Suvorov Russian Community of Rybnitsa, founded in December 1, 1999: "The main goals of activity: the support, development and protection of Russian culture, spiritual traditions, historical memory; protection of national, civil, economic, social, religious and other rights and freedoms of members of the community and all those associated with them; the preservation of friendly relations between people of all nationalities living in the Transnistrian Moldovan Republic, the support and creation of necessary conditions for people wishing to relocate to Russia or to become its citizens; the conduct of charitable programs to those in need." Additional information includes mention of the following: 152 members and directors: Vladimir Fedorov (Chairman), Aleksandr Gvozdev (Chairman of the Executive Committee) and Vladimir Pilan (Deputy) (see ibid). Bearing in mind these names, note that the January 20, 2005 edition of the Rybnitsa weekly independent newspaper Dobryi Den'-with its special coverage of the MMZ's twentieth anniversary-show the top fourteen leaders in the MMZ at the time of its writing to include: General Manager A. Belitchenko, Alexander Saprygin, V. Berkovskii, Museum Director L. Kolomiets, Production Managers N. Lozovskii, Shandrovskii, V. Pershinov, V. Fedorov, Igor Derevianchenko, V. Petrovich, and Trade Union leaders V. Breslaets, A. Gvozdev, N. Zudanova, A. Korchinskii.
134. Recently there has been talk of creating a new EU-Russia security forum, which would tackle Transnistria as one of its first tasks, as proposed at a June 2010 meeting between Russian President Dmitry Medvedev and German Federal Chancellor Angela Merkel. "Russian Official Sees Chance to Solve Transdniester Conflict," Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, June 24, 2010, available at http://www.rferl.org/articleprintview/2081330.html (accessed June 25, 2010).
135. See also Prezident Rossii, "Memorandum po itogam vstrechi Prezidenta Rossii D. Medvedeva I Federal'nogo kant-slera Germanii A. Merkel' 4-5 iiunia 2010 goda, g. Mezeberg," available at http://news.kremlin. ru/ref-notes/575 (accesed June 7, 2010).
136. The revelation in 2009 that Russia's 2007 cyber-attacks on Estonian government networks had been coordinated from Transnistria suggests that the region is useful to Russian elites not only for laundering money but also for minimizing Russian accountability for such unsavory tactics. Ivan Buranov et al., "Aktsiia Khakerskogo Nepovinoveniia" ["Hackers' Civil Disobedience"], Kommersant, March 12, 2009 (quoting Nashi kommisar Konstantin Goloskokov as saying that the cyber-attacks involved "seven people in our office in Transnistria"), available online at http://www. kommersant.ru/doc-rss.aspx?DocsID=1136738;
137. Nargiz Asadova, "Nam, Russkim za Granitsei, Inostrantsy ni k Chemu" ["We Overseas Russians Are Indifferent to Foreigners"]
138. Ekho Moskvy, March 5, 2009 (quoting Duma Deputy Sergei Markov as saying that the attacks were organized from "one of the unrecognized republics"), available at http://www.echo.msk.ru/blog/n-asadova/576689- echo/ (accessed October 1, 2010).
139. The authors of this article wish to stress that this label is not necessarily a fair one. We use it here only as it was once popular in Western media beyond the Prut River. See Dan Ionescu, "Life in the Dniester 'Black Hole'," Transition 20, no. 2 (1996).
140. Rubin, "The Timing of Ripeness": 237-246.
141. This is in the event Russia decided to abide by its 1999 Istanbul Agreement promises and remove its troops.
142. As we have seen, the extreme pragmatism with which Transnistrians and indeed all Mol-
143. dovans regard citizenship suggests that even if they were to have the desire and the opportunity to obtain a passport seen as more "valuable," they would likely do everything possible to maintain the validity of their Russian passport as a hedge against the unpredictability of their day-to-day lives.
144. Transnistria's 2006 referendum on independence showed that the majority of persons desire independence and further integration with Russia, even if they do not know how to implement this. Several years later, at the time of writing this article, it is likely that persons authentically identify with Transnistria on some level (e.g. as a birthplace) and Russia on another (e.g. through citizenship); however, it seems the Transnistria element is gradually ebbing away as Transnistria struggles to sustain itself amid worldwide economic downturn and as Russia plays a more visible role in the region.
145. Kozaka: Rossiiskii Plan Ob"edineniia Moldovy i Pridnestrov'ia," Regnum. ru, available at http://www.regnum.ru/news/458547.html (accessed September 30, 2010).
146. This assertion is based on personal conversation with a number of Russian analysts who defend Russia's guest for a "sphere of influence" based on examples of British or American aligned territories.
147. For evidence of Moscow's hesitant attitude towards the Republic of Moldova's EU aspirations, see the following report, see http://www.wiltonpark. org.uk/documents/conferences/WP949/ pdfs/WP949.pdf?633908177496976250 (accessed July 9, 2010).
148. Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov, in response to a proposal to introduce European troops into the Transnistrian peacekeeping format, stated that European troops might already be in the region "if the EU had not foiled the signing of the [Kozak] memorandum in 2003." See "Lavrov Vidit Vozmozhnost' Prisutstviia Mirotvortsev ES v Pridnestrov'e" ["Lavrov Sees Possibility of EU Peacekeepers in Transnistria"], RIA Novosti, June 23, 2010.
149. Before reintegration can happen, we believe both regions need to develop a culture of power-sharing, as they make progressive, timely structural changes in developing the rule of law, respect for human rights, and a genuine, socially-oriented market economy.
150. Popescu, "Transnistria's Survival." The issue at hand is contested property rights over certain industrial enterprises, on which current de facto owners and the Moldovan government both have claims. Up until now, Moldovan authorities have refused to recognize the results of the TMR's privatization program. However, Mol-dovan officials may be increasingly willing to do so, as evidenced in this possibility being included in Voronin's 2008 "package" proposal for conflict settlement. We believe Moldova acknowledging the legitimacy of Transnistrian privatization can undercut the economic ("offshore") incentives for the current owners of productive assets to resist reunification.