The political economy of the environmental criminal justice system: A production function approach

Public Choice

Volumn 148, Issue 3-4, 2011, Pages 611-630

  Almer, Christian ^a   Goeschl, Timo ^b  

^a UNIVERSITY OF BERN   (Switzerland)

^b UNIVERSITY OF HEIDELBERG   (Germany)

Author keywords

Criminal enforcement; Environmental law; GMM; Political economy

Indexed keywords

EID: 80052363586     PISSN: 00485829     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1007/s11127-010-9687-5     Document Type: Article

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