Chronic misperception and international conflict: The U.S.-Iraq experience

International Security

Volumn 36, Issue 1, 2011, Pages 73-100

  Duelfer, Charles A ^a   Dyson, Stephen Benedict ^b  

^a UNITED NATIONS   (United States)

^b UNIVERSITY OF CONNECTICUT   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 80052276419     PISSN: 01622889     EISSN: 15314804     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1162/ISEC_a_00045     Document Type: Article

References (108)

1. See also Chaim Kaufmann, "Threat Inflation and the Failure of the Marketplace of Ideas: The Selling of the Iraq War," International Security, Vol. 29, No. 1 (Summer 2004), pp. 5-48.
2. Yaacov Y.I. Vertzberger, The World in Their Minds: Information Processing, Cognition, and Perception in Foreign Policy Decision making (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1990), pp. 35, 37.
3. Jack S. Levy, "Misperception and the Causes of War: Theoretical Linkages and Analytical Problems," World Politics, Vol. 36, No. 1 (October 1983), p. 79.
4. Vertzberger, The World in Their Minds, p. 8.
5. Arthur A. Stein, "When Misperception Matters," World Politics, Vol. 34, No. 4 (July 1982), pp. 508-509.
6. Robert Jervis, "Hypotheses on Misperception," World Politics, Vol. 20, No. 3 (April 1968), pp. 458.
7. Levy, "Misperception and the Causes of War," p. 94.
8. Robert Jervis, "Perceiving and Coping with Threat," in Jervis, Richard Ned Lebow, and Janice Gross Stein, eds., Psychology and Deterrence (Baltimore, Md.: Johns Hopkins Univeristy Press, 1985), p. 33.
9. Robert Jervis, "Signaling and Perception: Drawing Inferences and Projecting Images," in Kristen Renwick Monroe, ed., Political Psychology (Mahwah, N.J.: Lawrence Erlbaum, 2002), pp. 293-314.
10. Vertzberger, The World in Their Minds, p. 9.
11. Roberta Wohlstetter, Pearl Harbor: Warning and Decision (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1962), pp. 56, 70.
12. Alexander L. George, "The 'Operational Code': A Neglected Approach to the Study of Political Leaders and Decision-making," International Studies Quarterly, Vol. 13, No. 2 (June 1969), pp. 190- 222.
13. Stephen Peter Rosen, War and Human Nature (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 2005), pp. 27-55.
14. Jonathan Mercer, "Emotional Beliefs," International Organization, Vol. 64, No. 1 (Winter 2010), pp. 1-31.
15. Deborah Welch Larson, "The Role of Belief Systems and Schemas in Foreign Policy Decision-Making," Political Psychology, Vol. 15, No. 1 (March 1994), pp. 17-33.
16. Robert Jervis, Perception and Misperception in International Politics (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1976), pp. 291-296.
17. Deborah Welch Larson, Origins of Containment: A Psychological Explanation (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1985), pp. 50-57.
18. Richard K. Herrmann, "Image Theory and Strategic Interaction in International Relations," in David O. Sears, Leonie Huddy, and Robert Jervis, eds., Oxford Handbook of Political Psychology (New York: Oxford University Press, 2003), p. 290.
19. Kevin M. Woods, with Michael R. Pease, Mark E. Stout, Williamson Murray, and James G. Lacey, Iraqi Perspectives Project: A View of Operation Iraqi Freedom from Saddam's Senior Leadership, (Norfolk, Va.: Joint Center for Operational Analysis, 2006).
20. Kevin M.Woods, James Lacey, and Williamson Murray, "Saddam's Delusions: The View from the Inside," Foreign Affairs, Vol. 85, No. 3 (May/June 2006), pp. 2-26.
21. Kevin M. Woods, The Mother of All Battles: Saddam Hussein's Strategic Plan for the Persian Gulf War (Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 2008).
22. Kevin M. Woods, Williamson Murray, and Thomas Holaday, with Mounir Elkamri, "Saddam's War: An Iraqi Military Perspective of the Iran-Iraq War," McNair Paper, No. 70 (Washington, D.C.: Institute for Strategic Studies, National Defense University, 2009).
23. Kevin M. Woods and Mark E. Stout, "Saddam's Perceptions and Misperceptions: The Case of 'Desert Storm,'" Journal of Strategic Studies, Vol. 33, No. 1 (February 2010), pp. 5-41.
24. Kevin M. Woods and Mark E. Stout, "New Sources for the Study of Iraqi Intelligence during the Saddam Era," Intelligence and National Security, Vol. 25, No. 4 (August 2010), pp. 47-87.
25. See Woods and Stout, "New Sources for the Study of Iraqi Intelligence during the Saddam Era," p. 548.
26. Robert Jervis, "Images and the Gulf War," in Stanley A. Renshon, ed., The Political Psychology of the Gulf War: Leaders, Publics, and the Process of Conflict (Pittsburgh, Pa.: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1993), p. 173.
27. Joyce Battle, ed., "Saddam Hussein Talks to the FBI," National Security Archive Electronic Briefing Book, No. 279 (Washington, D.C.: National Security Archive, George Washington University, 2009), http://www.gwu.edu/_nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB279/index.html.
28. Charles Duefler, Comprehensive Report of the Special Advisor to the DCI on Iraq's WMD (Washington, D.C.: Central Intelligence Agency, September 30, 2004), https://www.cia.gov/library/reports/general-reports-1/iraq_wmd_2004/inde x.html.
29. Efraim Karsh and Inari Rautsi, Saddam Hussein: A Political Biography (New York: Free Press, 1991), p. 208.
30. F. Gregory Gause III, "Iraq's Decisions to Go to War, 1980 and 1990," Middle East Journal, Vol. 56, No. 1 (Winter 2002), p. 56.
31. Deputy Prime Minister Tariq Aziz, conversations with Charles Duelfer at the Iraqi Mission to the United Nations in New York, November 22, 1993, and March 17, 1994; and Ambassador Nizar Hamdoon, conversation with Charles Duelfer, June 2, 1995.
32. Woods et al., Iraqi Perspectives Project, p. 16.
33. Former Foreign Minister Naji Sabri al-Hadithi, conversation with Charles Duelfer, February 11, 2004.
34. Woods, The Mother of All Battles, p. 291.
35. Battle, "Saddam Hussein Talks to the FBI," Interview No. 4, pp. 5-6.
36. Multiple conversations between Duelfer and Ambassadors Nizar Hamdoon (especially a lunch conversation on June 3, 1996) and Saed Hasan al-Musawi between 1993 and 1998; and Duelfer conversations with presidential secretary to Saddam, Abed Hamid Mahmud, on March 21 and 24, 2004.
37. Battle, "Saddam Hussein Talks to the FBI," casual conversation, May 13, 2004, p. 2.
38. Gause, "Iraq's Decisions to Go to War," p. 69.
39. Bruce W. Jentleson, With Friends Like These: Reagan, Bush, and Saddam, 1982-1990 (New York: W.W. Norton, 1994).
40. Barry Rubin, "The United States and Iraq: From Appeasement toWar," in Amatzia Baram and Barry Rubin, eds., Iraq's Road to War (New York: St. Martin's, 1993), pp. 256- 257.
41. Rubin, "The United States and Iraq," p. 263.
42. Karsh and Rautsi, Saddam Hussein, p. 214.
43. Battle, "Saddam Hussein Talks to the FBI," casual conversation, June 11, 2004, p. 3.
44. Abed Hamid Mahmud, conversation with Duelfer, March 21 and 24, 2004; and Deputy Prime Minister Tariq Aziz, conversation with Duelfer, June 18, 2004.
45. Kalevi J. Holsti, "National Role Conceptions in the Study of Foreign Policy," International Studies Quarterly, Vol. 14, No. 3 (September 1970), pp. 233-309.
46. Richard Ned Lebow, Between Peace and War: The Nature of International Crisis (Baltimore, Md.: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1981), p. 107.
47. Battle, "Saddam Hussein Talks to the FBI," Interview No. 4, p. 3.
48. Karsh and Rautsi, Saddam Hussein, p. 216.
49. George H.W. Bush and Brent Scowcroft, A World Transformed (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1998), p. 311.
50. Quoted in Woods, The Mother of All Battles, p. 49.
51. Charles Duelfer, Hide and Seek: The Search for Truth in Iraq (New York: Public Affairs, 2009), pp. 154-155.
52. "Report of the Executive Chairman of UNSCOM to the United Nations Security Council," UN doc. S/23165, October 25, 1991, especially pars. 17-19, 32, and appendix 3, pars. B, C.
53. Duelfer, Hide and Seek, pp. 137-161.
54. Madeleine Albright, "SecState Albright Policy Speech on Iraq," Georgetown University, Washington, D.C., March 26, 1997, http://www.fas.org/news/iraq/1997/03/bmd970327b.html.
55. Abed Hamid Mahmud, conversations with Duelfer; and Nizar Hamdoon, conversations with Duelfer.
56. Contemporaneous UNSCOM minutes of meeting.
57. Rolf Ekeus meeting with Anthony Lake on October 11, 1994 between 5:05 p.m. and 5:35 p.m.; and UNSCOM minutes of meeting.
58. Abed Hamid Mahmud, conversations with Duelfer; and Nizar Hamdoon, conversations with Duelfer.
59. UNSCOM meeting minutes.
60. Woods et al., Iraqi Perspectives Project, pp. 90-91.
61. Battle, "Saddam Hussein Talks to the FBI," Interview No. 3, p. 3.
62. Tariq Aziz, conversation with Duelfer, Baghdad, June 18, 2004. These views were also expressed by Aziz during final meetings with UNSCOM leadership in Baghdad, August 3, 1998.
63. Duelfer, Hide and Seek, pp. 200-201.
64. Woods, Lacey, and Murray, "Saddam's Delusions."
65. Yuen Foong Khong, Analogies at War: Korea, Munich, Dien Bien Phu, and the Vietnam Decisions of 1965 (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1992).
66. David Patrick Houghton, U.S. Foreign Policy and the Iran Hostage Crisis (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001).
67. Khong, Analogies at War.
68. Duelfer, Hide and Seek, pp. 52-53.
69. This point arose, in particular, in a discussion between Duelfer and Ambassador Hamdoon in New York City on March 7, 2003, and also less directly in a conversation with former Foreign Minister Naji Sabri in Qatar on February 11, 2004.
70. George W. Bush, Decision Points (New York: Random House, 2010), p. 269.
71. Duelfer, Hide and Seek, p. 202.
72. Woods et al., "Saddam's War," p. 6.
73. Karsh and Rautsi, Saddam Hussein, p. 152.
74. Johanna McGreary, "Inside Saddam's World," in Turi Munthe, ed., The Saddam Hussein Reader: Selections from Leading Writers on Iraq (New York: Thunder's Mouth, 2002), p. 484.
75. Battle, "Saddam Hussein Talks to the FBI," Interview No. 1.
76. This point, in particular, was raised in a discussion with Ambassador Hamdoon on March 7, 2003, in New York City, and again less directly in a conversation with former Foreign Minister Naji Sabri on February 11, 2004, in Qatar.
77. Gause, "Iraq's Decisions to Go to War," p. 47.
78. Quoted in Woods and Stout, "Saddam's Perceptions and Misperceptions," p. 12.
79. Quoted in Woods, The Mother of all Battles, p. 267.
80. Battle, "Saddam Hussein Talks to the FBI," casual conversation, June 11, 2004, p. 1.
81. Duelfer, Comprehensive Report of the Special Advisor to the DCI on Iraq's WMD, pt. 1, p. 32.
82. Efraim Karsh and Lawrence Freedman, "Saddam Hussein and the Gulf War," in Munthe, The Saddam Hussein Reader, p. 214.
83. Woods and Stout, "Saddam's Perceptions and Misperceptions," p. 32.
84. Battle, "Saddam Hussein Talks to the FBI," casual conversation, June 11, 2004, p. 2.
85. Duelfer, Comprehensive Report of the Special Advisor to the DCI on Iraq's WMD, pt. 1, p. 441.
86. Bush, Decision Points, p. 269.
87. Robert Jervis, Why Intelligence Fails: Lessons from the Iranian Revolution and the Iraq War (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 2010), p. 129.
88. Jervis, "Signaling and Perception," pp. 293-314.
89. Woods, The Mother of All Battles, p. 54.
90. Battle, "Saddam Hussein Talks to the FBI," Interview No. 9, p. 1.
91. Karsh and Rautsi, Saddam Hussein, p. 158.
92. Battle, "Saddam Hussein Talks to the FBI," Interview No. 2, p. 5.
93. Paul K. Davis and John Arquilla, Deterring or Coercing Opponents in Crisis: Lessons from the War with Saddam Hussein (Santa Monica, Calif.: RAND, 1991), p. 7 (emphasis in original).
94. Tariq Aziz discussions with Duelfer in the 1990s, including April 8, 1995, in New York and November 18, 1994, in New York, both at the residence of Iraq Permanent Representative to the UN; and June 18, 2004, in Baghdad.
95. Holsti, "National Role Conceptions in the Study of Foreign Policy."
96. Herrmann, "Image Theory," p. 291.
97. Robert Jervis, "Deterrence and Perception," International Security, Vol. 7, No. 3 (Winter 1982/ 83), pp. 3-30.
98. Steve A. Yetiv, "Groupthink and the Gulf Crisis," British Journal of Political Science, Vol. 33, No. 3 (July 2003), p. 429.
99. Bush and Scowcroft, A World Transformed, p. 435.
100. UNSCOM staff, discussions with Charles Duelfer, late 1995.
101. Amer al-Saadi, conversation with Duelfer, May 15, 2004.
102. Jervis, Why Intelligence Fails, p. 139.
103. Duelfer recollections of numerous discussions with both policy analysts at the White House, the Department of State, and the Department of Defense and especially with CIA intelligence analysts charged with assessing Iraqi WMD programs.
104. Duelfer, Hide and Seek, p. 253.
105. Jervis, Why Intelligence Fails, pp. 140-142.
106. Davis and Arquilla, Deterring or Coercing Opponents in Crisis.
107. Jervis, Why Intelligence Fails, p. 127.
108. Wohlstetter, Pearl Harbor.