Exploiting trust relations for Nash equilibrium efficiency in ad hoc networks

IEEE International Conference on Communications

Volumn , Issue , 2011, Pages

  Zheng, Shanshan ^a   Jiang, Tao ^a   Baras, John S ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF MARYLAND   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

HETEROGENEOUS RESOURCES; NASH EQUILIBRIUM; NODE COOPERATION; SOCIAL OPTIMUMS; THEORETIC ANALYSIS;

AD HOC NETWORKS; DECISION MAKING; GAME THEORY; TELECOMMUNICATION NETWORKS;

EFFICIENCY;

EID: 80052159598     PISSN: 05361486     EISSN: None     Source Type: Conference Proceeding    
DOI: 10.1109/icc.2011.5962655     Document Type: Conference Paper

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