Earthquake Propensity and the Politics of Mortality Prevention

World Development

Volumn 39, Issue 9, 2011, Pages 1530-1541

  Keefer, Philip ^a   Neumayer, Eric ^b   Plümper, Thomas ^c  

^a WORLD BANK   (United States)

^b LONDON SCHOOL OF ECONOMICS   (United Kingdom)

^c UNIVERSITY OF ESSEX   (United Kingdom)

Author keywords

Democracy; Disaster; Mortality; Political economy; Public goods; Risk

Indexed keywords

DEMOCRACY; DISASTER MANAGEMENT; EARTHQUAKE; MORTALITY; NATURAL DISASTER; POLITICAL ECONOMY; PUBLIC GOODS; RISK ASSESSMENT;

EID: 79961169311     PISSN: 0305750X     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/j.worlddev.2011.02.010     Document Type: Article

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