Effects of ignorance and information on judgments and decisions

Judgment and Decision Making

Volumn 6, Issue 5, 2011, Pages 381-391

  Ayton, Peter ^a   Önkal, Dilek ^b   McReynold, Lisa ^a  

^a CITY UNIVERSITY   (United Kingdom)

^b BILKENT UNIVERSITY   (Turkey)

Author keywords

Heuristics; Inference; Judgmental forecasting; Recognition heuristic

Indexed keywords

EID: 79961009229     PISSN: None     EISSN: 19302975     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: None     Document Type: Article

References (35)

1. Andersson, P., Edman, J. & Ekman, M. (2005). Predicting the World Cup 2002: Performance and confidence of experts and non-experts. International Journal of Forecasting, 21, 565-576
2. Ayton, P. & Önkal, D. (1997). Forecasting football fixtures: Confidence and judged proportion correct. Unpublished manuscript, Department of Psychology, The City University, London.
3. Beaman, C. P., Smith, P. T., Frosch, C. A., McCloy, R. (2010). Less-is-more effects without the recognition heuristic. Judgment and Decision Making, 5, 258-271.
4. Bröder, A. and Eichler, A. (2006). The use of recognition information and additional cues in inferences from memory. Acta Psychologica, 121, 275-284.
5. Gigerenzer, G., & Goldstein, D. G. (1996). Reasoning the fast and frugal way: Models of bounded rationality. Psychological Review, 104, 650-669.
6. Gigerenzer, G. & Goldstein, D. G., (2011). The recognition heuristic: A decade of research. Judgment and Decision Making, 6, 100-121.
7. Gigerenzer, G., Hell, W. & Blank, H. (1988). Presentation and content: The use of base rates as a continuousvariable. Journal of Experimental Psychology: Human Perception and Performance, 14, 513-525.
8. Gigerenzer, G., Todd, P. M., & The ABC Research Group. (1999). Simple heuristics that make us smart. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
9. Goldstein, D. G., & Gigerenzer, G. (1999). The recognition heuristic: How ignorance makes us smart. In G., Gigerenzer, P. M. Todd, & the ABC Research Group (Eds.), Simple heuristics that make us smart (pp. 37-58). Oxford: Oxford University Press.
10. Goldstein, D. G., & Gigerenzer, G. (2002). Models of Ecological Rationality: The Recognition Heuristic. Psychological Review, 109, 75-90.
11. Hoffrage, U. (1995). The adequacy of subjective confidence judgments: Studies concerning the theory of probabilistic mental models. Unpublished doctoral dissertation, University of Salzburg, Austria.
12. Hoffrage, U. (2011). Recognition judgments and the performance of the recognition heuristic depend on the size of the reference class Judgment and Decision Making, 6, 43-57.
13. Kahneman, D. & Tversky, A. (1973). On the psychology of prediction. Psychological Review, 80, 237-251.
14. Katsikopoulos, K. V. (2010). The less-is-more effect: Predictions and tests. Judgment and Decision Making, 5, 244-257.
15. Koehler, D. J. (1996). A strength model of probability judgments for tournaments. Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes, 66, 16-21.
16. Koehler, J.J.J. (1995). The base-rate fallacy reconsidered - descriptive, normative, and methodological challenges. Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 19, 1-55.
17. Marewski, J. N., Gaissmaier, W., Schooler, L. J., Goldstein, D. G., & Gigerenzer, G. (2010). From recognition to decisions: Extending and testing recognition based models for multi-alternative inference. Psychonomic Bulletin & Review, 17, 287-309.
18. Newell, B. R. (2011). Recognising the Recognition Heuristic for what it is (and what it's not). Judgment and Decision Making, 5, 409-412.
19. Newell, B. R. & Fernandez, D. (2006). On the binary quality of recognition and the inconsequentiality of further knowledge: Two critical tests of the recognition heuristic. Journal of Behavioral Decision Making, 19, 333-346.
20. Newell B. R. & Shanks D. R. (2004). On the Role of Recognition in Decision Making Journal of Experimental Psychology: Learning, Memory, and Cognition, 30, 923-935.
21. Oppenheimer, D. M. (2003). Not so fast! (and not so frugal!): Rethinking the recognition heuristic. Cognition, 90, B1-B9.
22. Pachur, T. & Biele, G. (2007). Forecasting from ignorance: The use and usefulness of recognition in lay predictions of sports events. Acta Psychologica, 125, 99-116
23. Pachur, T., Bröder A., & Marewski J. N. (2008). The recognition heuristic in memory-based inference: Is recognition a non-compensatory cue? Journal of Behavioral Decision Making, 21, 183-210.
24. Pachur, T., & Hertwig, R. (2006). On the psychology of the recognition heuristic: Retrieval primacy as a key determinant of its use. Journal of Experimental Psychology: Learning, Memory, and Cognition, 32, 983-1002.
25. Pohl, R. (2006). Empirical tests of the recognition heuristic. Journal of Behavioral Decision Making, 19, 251-271.
26. Reimer, T., & Katsikopoulos, K. V. (2004). The use of recognition in group decision-making. Cognitive Science, 28, 1009-1029.
27. Richter, T., & Späth, P. (2006). Recognition is used as one cue among others in judgment and decision making. Journal of Experimental Psychology: Learning, Memory, and Cognition, 32, 150-162.
28. Schooler, L. J., & Hertwig, R. (2005). How forgetting aids heuristic inference. Psychological Review, 112, 610-628.
29. Serwe, S, & Frings, C. Who will win Wimbledon? The recognition heuristic in predicting sports events. Journal of Behavioral Decision Making, 19, 321-332.
30. Smithson, M. (2010). When less is more in the recognition heuristic. Judgment and Decision Making, 5, 230-243.
31. Spellman, B. A. (1993). Implicit learning of base rates. Psycholoquy 4(61) base-rate.4.spellman.
32. Spellman B. A. (1996). The implicit use of base rates in experiential and ecologically valid tasks. Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 19, 38.
33. Tversky, A., & Kahneman, D. (1973). Availability: a heuristic for judging frequency and probability. Cognitive Psychology, 5, 207-232.
34. Tversky, A., & Kahneman, D. (1974). Judgment under uncertainty: Heuristics and biases. Science, 185, 1124-1131.
35. Yates, J. F., McDaniel, L. S. & Brown, E. S. (1991). Probabilistic forecasts of stock prices and earnings: The hazards of nascent expertise. Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes, 40, 60-79.