Thick concepts, non-cognitivism, and wittgenstein’s rule-following considerations

South African Journal of Philosophy

Volumn 29, Issue 3, 2010, Pages 209-232

  Croom, Adam M ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 79960832940     PISSN: 02580136     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.4314/sajpem.v29i3.59143     Document Type: Article

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