Modelling and the fall and rise of the handicap principle

Biology and Philosophy

Volumn 26, Issue 5, 2011, Pages 677-696

  Grose, Jonathan ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF BRISTOL   (United Kingdom)

Author keywords

Alan Grafen; Amotz Zahavi; Costly signaling; Deception; Handicap principle; Honest signaling

Indexed keywords

EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS; MODELING; THEORETICAL STUDY;

EID: 79960327944     PISSN: 01693867     EISSN: 15728404     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1007/s10539-011-9275-1     Document Type: Article

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