Competitive behavior in market games: Evidence and theory

Journal of Economic Theory

Volumn 146, Issue 4, 2011, Pages 1437-1463

  Duffy, John ^a   Matros, Alexander ^b   Temzelides, Ted ^c  

^a UNIVERSITY OF PITTSBURGH   (United States)

^b UNIVERSITY OF SOUTH CAROLINA   (United States)

^c RICE UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

Competition; Evolutionary stability; Experimental economics; Full nash equilibrium; Market games; Market power

Indexed keywords

EID: 79960208586     PISSN: 00220531     EISSN: 10957235     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2011.05.013     Document Type: Article

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