How much do thoughts count?: Preference for emotion versus principle in judgments of antisocial and prosocial behavior

Emotion Review

Volumn 3, Issue 3, 2011, Pages 316-317

  Fedotova, Natalie O ^a   Fincher, Katrina M ^a   Goodwin, Geoffrey P ^a   Rozin, Paul ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA   (United States)

Author keywords

character; moral emotions; moral principles; prosocial; third party judgments

Indexed keywords

EID: 79959972113     PISSN: 17540739     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1177/1754073911402387     Document Type: Review

References (6)

1. Knobe, J., & Doris, J.M. (2010). Responsibility. In J. M. Doris and The Moral Psychology Research Group (Eds.), The moral psychology handbook (pp. 321-354). Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press.
2. Kupperman, J.J. (1991). Character. New York, NY: Oxford University Press.
3. Pizarro, D., Uhlmann, E., & Salovey, P. (2003). Asymmetry in judgments of moral blame and praise: The role of perceived metadesires. Psychological Science, 14, 267-272.
4. Schopenhauer, A. (2009). The two fundamental problems of ethics (C. Janaway, Trans.). Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press. (Original work published 1841 )
5. Wolf, S. (1980). Asymmetrical freedom. Journal of Philosophy, 77, 151-166.
6. Woolfolk, R.L., Doris, J.M., & Darley, J.M. (2006). Identification, situational constraint, and social cognition: Studies in the attribution of moral responsibility. Cognition, 100, 283-301.