IMF surveillance and financial markets-A political economy analysis

European Journal of Political Economy

Volumn 27, Issue 3, 2011, Pages 405-422

  Fratzscher, Marcel ^a   Reynaud, Julien ^b  

^a EUROPEAN CENTRAL BANK   (Germany)

^b UNIVERSITÉ PARIS 1 PANTHÉON SORBONNE   (France)

Author keywords

Emerging market economies; Financial markets; IMF; Political economy; Sovereign spreads; Surveillance

Indexed keywords

EID: 79959958136     PISSN: 01762680     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2011.01.002     Document Type: Article

References (47)

1. Baldwin D. Power analysis and world politics: new trends versus old tendencies. World Politics 1979, 31(2):161-194.
2. Barro R., Lee J.W. IMF programs: who is chosen and what are the effects?. Journal of Monetary Economics 2005, 52(7):1245-1269.
3. Bird G., Rowlands D. IMF lending: how is it affected by economic, political and institutional factors?. Journal of Policy Reform 2001, 4:243-270.
4. Brambor T., Clark W.R., Golder M. Understanding interaction models: improving empirical analyses. Political Analysis 2006, 14(1):63-82.
5. Brealey R.A., Kaplanis E.C. The impact of the IMF programs on asset values. Journal of International Money and Finance 2004, 23(2):253-270.
6. Brown K., Harlow W.V., Tinic S. Risk aversion, uncertain information, and market efficiency. Journal of Financial Economics 1988, 22:355-385.
7. Broz J.L., Hawes M.B. US domestic politics and international monetary fund policy. Delegation and Agency in International Organizations 2006, Cambridge University Press. D.G. Hawkins, D.A. Lake, D.L. Nielson, M.J. Tierney (Eds.).
8. Cady J. Does SDDS subscription reduce borrowing costs for emerging market economies?. IMF Working Paper No. 04/58, Washington, D.C 2004.
9. Collier P., Gunning J.W. The IMF's role in structural adjustment. The Economic Journal 1999, 109:634-651.
10. Dell'Ariccia G., Schnabel I., Zettelmeyer J. How do official bailouts affect the risk of investing in emerging markets?. Journal of Money, Credit, and Banking 2006, 38(7):1689-1714.
11. Dong L., Kho B.C., Stulz R. US Banks, crises and bailouts: from Mexico to LTCM. The American Economic Review 2000, 90:28-37.
12. Dreher A., Vaubel R. Does the IMF cause moral hazard and political business cycles? Evidence from panel data. Open Economies Review 2004, 15(1):5-22.
13. Dreher A., Marchesi S., Vreeland J.R. The political economy of IMF forecasts. Public Choice 2008, 137:145-171.
14. Dreher A., Strum J.-E., Vreeland J.R. Global horse trading: IMF loans for votes in the United Nations Security Council. European Economic Review 2009, 53(7):742-757.
15. Easton S., Rockerbie D. Does IMF conditionality benefit lenders?. Review of World Economics 1999, 127(2):347-357.
16. Edwards S., Santaella J.A. Devaluation controversies in the developing countries: lessons from the Bretton Woods era. A Retrospective on the Bretton Woods System 1993, University of Chicago Press, Chicago. M.D. Bordo, B. Eichengreen (Eds.).
17. Eichengreen B., Gupta P., Mody A. Sudden stops and IMF-supported programs. IMF Working Papers 06/101 2006.
18. Evrensel A.Y., Kutanm A.M. IMF-related announcements and stock market returns: evidence from financial and non-financial sectors in Indonesia, Korea, and Thailand. Pacific-Basin Finance Journal 2007, 15:80-104.
19. Fischer S. Reforming the International Monetary System. The Economic Journal 1999, 109:556-576.
20. Ganapolsky E.J.J., Schmukler S.L. Crisis management in Argentina during the 1994-95 Mexican crisis: how did markets react?. World Bank Policy Research Working Paper No. 1951 1998.
21. Glennerster R., Shin Y. Is transparency good for you?. Journal of Development Economics 2004, 62:385-421.
22. Hayo B., Kutan A.M. IMF-related news and emerging financial markets. Journal of International Money and Finance 2005, 24:1126-1142.
23. Holsti O. Content Analysis for the Social Sciences and Humanities 1969, Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley Ed.
24. International Monetary Fund External Evaluation of IMF Surveillance. Report by a Group of Independent Experts, Discussed at the Executive Board Meeting 99/100, September 8, 1999 1999.
25. International Monetary Fund IMF Executive Board Adopts New Decision on Bilateral Surveillance Over Members' Policies. Public Information Notice (PIN) No. 07/69 June 21, 2007 2007.
26. Jeanne O., Ostry J., Zettelmeyer J. A theory of international crisis lending and IMF conditionality. IMF Working Paper 08/236 2008.
27. Kamin S.B. Identifying the role of moral hazard in international financial markets. International Finance Discussion Paper No. 736 2002, Federal Reserve Board of Governors.
28. Kho B., Stulz R.M. Banks, the IMF, and the Asian crisis. Pacific-Basin Finance Journal 2000, 8:177-216.
29. Lane T., Phillips P. Does IMF financing result in moral hazard?. IMF Working Paper 00/168 2000.
30. Lombardi D., Woods N. The politics of influence: an analysis of IMF surveillance. Review of International Political Economy 2008, 15(5):711-739.
31. Marchesi S. Adoption of an IMF programme and debt rescheduling. An empirical analysis. Journal of Development Economics 2003, 70(2):403-423.
32. Marchesi S., Thomas J. IMF conditionality as a screening device. The Economic Journal 1999, 109:111-125.
33. Mody A., Savaria D. Catalysing private capital flows: do IMF programmes work as commitment devices?. The Economic Journal 2006, 116:843-867.
34. Oatley T., Yackee J. American interests and IMF lending. International Politics 2004, 41(3):415-429.
35. Ostry J., Zettelmeyer J. Strengthening IMF crisis prevention. IMF Working Paper 05/206 2005.
36. Pop-Eleches, G., 2009. From Economic Crisis to Reform: IMF Programs in Latin America and Eastern Europe. Princeton University Press Ed.
37. Przeworski A., Vreeland J.R. The effect of IMF programs on economic growth. Journal of Development Economics 2000, 62:385-421.
38. Przeworski A., Vreeland J.R. A statistical model of bilateral cooperation. Political Analysis 2002, 10:101-112.
39. Remolona E., Scatigna M., Wu E. Interpreting sovereign spreads. International banking and financial market developments, BIS Quarterly Review 2007, March.
40. Reynaud J., Vauday J. Geopolitics and international organizations: an empirical study on IMF facilities. Journal of Development Economics 2009, 89(1):139-162.
41. Reynaud J., Thimann C., Gatarek L. Proximity and linkages among coalition participants: a new voting power measure applied to the International Monetary Fund. ECB Working Paper Series 819 2007.
42. Rowlands, D., 1995. Political and economic determinants of IMF conditional credit agreements: 1973-1989, Norman Paterson School of International Affairs, Carleton University, mimeo.
43. Steinwand M., Stone R. The International Monetary Fund: a review of the recent evidence. The Review of International Organizations 2007, 3:123-149.
44. Sturm J.-A., Berger H., De Haan J. Which variables explain decisions on IMF credit? An extreme bounds analysis. Economics & Politics 2005, 17(2):177-214.
45. Thacker S. The high politics of IMF lending. World Politics 1999, 52(1):38-75.
46. Vreeland J.R. Institutional determinants of IMF agreements. Yale University, Dep. of Political Science, Leitner working paper No. 2001-06 2001.
47. Zhang Z. The impact of IMF term loans on US bank creditors' equity values: an event study of South Korea's case. Journal of International Financial Markets 2001, 11:363-394.