Federal power, non-federal actors: The ramifications of free enterprise fund

Fordham Law Review

Volumn 79, Issue 6, 2011, Pages 2425-2454

  Krent, Harold J ^a  

^a IIT Chicago Kent   (United States)

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EID: 79959899267     PISSN: 0015704X     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: None     Document Type: Conference Paper

References (279)

1. 130 S. Ct. 3138 (2010).
2. Id. at 3164.
3. The Supreme Court so concluded on the basis of the parties' stipulation. Id. at 3148-49;
4. id. at 3182 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
5. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745.
6. Free Enter. Fund, 130 S. Ct. at 3147-49.
7. See 15 U. S. C. §§ 7212-7213 (2006).
8. Id. § 7214.
9. Free Enter. Fund, 130 S. Ct. at 3155 (2010)
10. (quoting THE FEDERALIST No. 70 (Alexander Hamilton)).
11. Id. at 3153.
12. Id. at 3179-80 (Breyer, J., dissenting);
13. see also id. app. A, at 3184-92.
14. Id. at 3180-81.
15. 15 U. S. C. § 7211 (b) (2006).
16. Id.
17. See Donna M. Nagy, Is the PCAOB A "Heavily Controlled Component" of the SEC?: An Essential Question in the Constitutional Controversy, 71 U. PITT. L. REV. 361, 372(2010) (noting that PCAOB Board members' "salaries are almost four times the amount received by the SEC's Chairman and Commissioners, but are comparable to those commanded in the private sector.");
18. see also S. REP. NO. 107-205, at 7 (2002) (stating that competitive salaries for PCAOB staff members were essential to ensure that the "Board have a strong, well-trained, and experienced staff, of sufficient size to carry out its responsibilities").
19. See Richard H. Pildes, Separation of Powers, Independent Agencies, and Financial Regulation: The Case of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, 5 N. Y. U. J. L. & BUS. 485, 504-06 (2009).
20. With respect to the removal provision, Chief Justice Roberts confusingly observed that, The rigorous standard that must be met before a Board member may be removed was drawn from statutes concerning private organizations like the New York Stock Exchange. While we need not decide the question here, a removal standard appropriate for limiting Government control over private bodies may be inappropriate for officers wielding the executive power of the United States. Free Enter. Fund, 130 S. Ct. at 3158 (citation omitted). Rather, the relevant question should be whether the individual to be removed is exercising significant authority under the laws of the United States.
21. See Donna M. Nagy, Playing Peekaboo with Constitutional Law: The PCAOB and Its Public/Private Status, 80 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 975, 1000-03 (2005).
22. Free Enter. Fund, 130 S. Ct. at 3148
23. (citing Brief for Petitioners
24. Free Enter. Fund, 130 S. Ct. 3138 (No. 08-861)
25. *9 n. 1;
26. Brief for the U. S, Free Enter. Fund, 130 S. Ct. 3138 (No. 08-861)
27. *29 n. 8).
28. The Court also posited that congressional labeling was not dispositive, relying on its prior opinion in Lebron v. National Railroad Passenger Corp., 513 U. S. 374 (1995).
29. Free Enter. Fund, 130 S. Ct. at 3148.
30. American Clean Energy and Security Act of 2009 (Waxman-Markey Bill), H. R. 2454, 111th Cong. § 707.
31. S. 773, 111th Cong. § 8 (2010).
32. Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, § 2715, 124 Stat. 119, 885-87 (2010)
33. (to be codified at 42 U. S. C. § 300 gg-15).
34. See Harold J. Krent, The Private Performing the Public: Delimiting Delegation to Private Parties, 65 U. MIAMI L. REV. 507 (2011).
35. 298 U. S. 238 (1936).
36. Id. at 310-11.
37. Id.
38. Id. at 311.
39. Id.
40. Id.
41. 295 U. S. 495 (1935).
42. Act of June 16, 1933, ch. 90, 48 Stat. 195
43. invalidated by Schechter, 295 U. S. 495.
44. Schecter, 295 U. S. at 521-22.
45. Id. at 551.
46. Congress has delegated to private parties in numerous other contexts and these delegations have, on occasion, been more direct. In 1893, Congress delegated authority to the American Railway Association to establish a mandatory height for drawbars on railroad cars, and legislated that failure to comply with the height requirement subjected all railroad companies to civil penalties. Act of Mar. 2, 1893, ch. 196, 27 Stat. 531.
47. The Supreme Court upheld the delegation with little discussion. See St. Louis, Iron Mountain & S. Ry. v. Taylor, 210 U. S. 281, 285-87 (1908).
48. Further, private parties have served on governmental agencies such as the Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC), which operates as part of the Federal Reserve System. See 12 U. S. C. § 263 (2006).
49. The private members are elected annually by the boards of directors of the twelve regional Federal Reserve Banks, which are privately owned. Id.
50. The FOMC as a whole discharges the critical policymaking function of determining sales and purchases of government securities in the open market. See id.
51. Schechter, 295 U. S. at 537.
52. Id.
53. Ch. 296, 50 Stat. 246 (codified as amended in scattered titles of U. S. C).
54. See, e.g., 7 U. S. C. §§ 2101-2118 (2006) (cotton);
55. id. §§ 2901-2911 (beef);
56. id. §§ 4501-4514 (dairy).
57. 310 U. S. 381 (1940).
58. Id. at 399;
59. see also Cospito v. Heckler, 742 F.2d 72, 86-87 (3d Cir. 1984);
60. Chiglades Farm, Ltd. v. Butz, 485 F.2d 1125, 1133-34 (5th Cir. 1973);
61. cf. Correctional Servs. Corp. v. Malesko, 534 U. S. 61, 74(2001) (refusing to extend a Bivens cause of action to private prison operator).
62. As Justice Benjamin N. Cardozo stated in concurrence in Schechter, "it is the imprimatur of the President that begets the quality of law", not the plans forwarded for approval by the trade groups. 295 U. S. at 552 (Cardozo, J., concurring).
63. See Currin v. Wallace, 306 U. S. 1, 6(1939) (designation of tobacco marketing areas);
64. United States v. Rock Royal Co-operative, Inc., 307 U. S. 533, 577-78 (1939);
65. H. P. Hood & Sons, Inc. v. United States, 307 U. S. 588, 595(1939);
66. United States v. Frame, 885 F.2d 1119, 1125-29 (3d Cir. 1989) (beef program);
67. United States v. MacMullen, 262 F.2d 499, 500-01 (2d Cir. 1958) (wheat quotas).
68. 456 U. S. 188 (1982).
69. Id. at 192.
70. Id. at 190.
71. Id. at 191
72. (citing 42 C. F. R. §§ 405.807-.812 (1980));
73. see also Bowen v. Mich. Acad, of Family Physicians, 476 U. S. 667 (1986) (sketching the limited availability of judicial review under Part B).
74. Schweiker, 456 U. S. at 195.
75. Id.
76. Id. at 199 (internal quotations omitted).
77. Id. at 196.
78. 742 F.2d 72 (3d Cir. 1984).
79. Id. at 74-75, 79;
80. see also, e.g., City of Dallas v. FCC, 165 F.3d 341, 359-60 (5th Cir. 1999) (upholding delegation to determine whether particular cable operators could access video systems);
81. Geo-Tech Reclamation Indus., Inc. v. Hamrick, 886 F.2d 662, 666 (4th Cir. 1989) (upholding delegation to communities in effect to veto landfill permits if sufficient opposition were voiced).
82. Cospito, 742 F.2d at 75-77.
83. Id. at 76.
84. Id. at 88.
85. Id. at 89.
86. Id. at 90 (Becker, J., dissenting).
87. Id. at 91.
88. 557 F.2d 1008 (3d Cir. 1977).
89. Id. at 1011-12.
90. Id. at 1012.
91. Id.
92. Id.
93. Id.
94. See First Jersey Secs. Inc. v. Bergen, 605 F.2d 690, 697-700 (3d Cir. 1979) (following Todd, even though Congress had subsequently weakened SEC oversight of the NASD's findings).
95. See supra notes 18-19 and accompanying text.
96. Free Enter. Fund v. Pub. Co. Accounting Oversight Bd., 130 S. Ct. 3138, 3157(2010) (internal quotation marks omitted).
97. See Virginia v. EPA, 108 F.3d 1397, 1405 (D. C. Cir. 1997) (noting Appointments Clause issue that would arise from permitting federal government to delegate decisionmaking authority to states over pollution attainment policy).
98. U. S. CONST, art. II, § 2, cl. 2.
99. Id.
100. See Edmond v. United States, 520 U. S. 651, 662-63 (1997);
101. Morrison v. Olson, 487 U. S. 654, 671-72 (1988).
102. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U. S. 1, 118-41 (1976);
103. Myers v. United States, 272 U. S. 52, 117, 163-64 (1926).
104. 424 U. S. 1.
105. Id. at 126, 140.
106. Id. at 137.
107. Id. at 138-43. Individuals exercising authority that is only intermittent, however, may fall outside the Buckley rule.
108. See Krent, supra note 21, at 536.
109. U. S. CONST, art. VI, cl. 3.
110. U. S. CONST, art. II, § 4. The Secretary of Treasury appointed Kenneth Feinberg, a New York attorney, to set the compensation that executives of entities receiving Troubled Asset Relief Program (TARP) funds can earn.
111. See 74 Fed. Reg. 28, 394 (June 15, 2009) (to be codified at 31 C. F. R. pt. 30);
112. Eric Dash, The Walking Wounded, N. Y. TIMES, June 11, 2009, at B1. Given that Feinberg issued binding orders affecting private rights, his status as an officer seems relatively clear, yet Congress did not lodge his appointment in the Secretary of Treasury as would be required under Article II to legitimate the appointment. Thus, appointment of Feinberg can only comport with the Constitution if he is not considered an "officer of the United States."
113. See Michael W. McConnell, Op-Ed., The Pay Czar Is Unconstitutional, WALL ST. J., Oct. 29, 2009, at A25.
114. For those embracing a theory of directory authority, the lack of presidential appointment is not fatal. Rather, if the President can order state officials to take particular positions or substitute state officials' decisions for his own, or so the argument goes, then fidelity to Article II is maintained. Not only do I challenge the existence of such directory authority, see Harold J. Krent, From a Unitary to a Unilateral Presidency, 88 B. U. L. REV. 523 (2008), but any presidential bossing of state officials would almost surely violate the federalism principles built into the Tenth Amendment.
115. See infra text accompanying notes 148-54
116. 520 U. S. 651 (1997).
117. Id. at 659.
118. Buckley, 424 U. S. at 113.
119. Id. at 129.
120. See infra text accompanying notes 106-14.
121. 501 U. S. 252 (1991).
122. Id. at 255.
123. Id. at 277.
124. Id.
125. Regional Rail Reorganization Act of 1973, Pub. L. No. 93-236, § 210 (a), 87 Stat. 985, 1000(1974).
126. Id. § 201 (d)
127. Stat, at 988.
128. E.g., Morrison v. Olson, 487 U. S. 654, 675-76 (1988) (questioning the adequacy of the President's authority over the independent counsel);
129. Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U. S. 714, 723(1986) (questioning the adequacy of the President's removal authority over the Comptroller General).
130. Morrison, 487 U. S. at 671;
131. Bowsher, 478 U. S. at 726;
132. Weiner v. United States, 357 U. S. 349, 353(1985);
133. Humphrey's Ex'r v. United States, 295 U. S. 602, 629-30 (1935);
134. Myers v. United States, 272 U. S. 52, 126-27 (1926).
135. Myers, 272 U. S. at 163-64.
136. Id. at 135.
137. Morrison, 487 U. S. at 658.
138. Id. at 695-96.
139. Free Enter. Fund v. Pub. Co. Accounting Oversight Bd., 130 S. Ct. 3138, 3152(2010).
140. Id. at 3154.
141. See id.
142. Id. at 3164.
143. Contrast to Mistretta v. United States, 488 U. S. 361 (1989), in which the President could remove Article III judges sitting on the Sentencing Commission from their administrative duties, although he could not affect their roles as judges.
144. Id. at 411.
145. See supra note 18 and accompanying text.
146. Free Enter. Fund, 130 S. Ct. at 3154.
147. Id. at 3155.
148. See supra notes 86-87 and accompanying text.
149. Id. at 3169 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
150. Id. at 3169-73.
151. See id. at 3155 (majority opinion) ("By granting the Board executive power without the Executive's oversight, this Act subverts the President's ability to ensure that the laws are faithfully executed-as well as the public's ability to pass judgment on his efforts.").
152. If Congress eliminated the funding mechanism under which the Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB) currently operates, the private standard setting group could no longer function.
153. Justice Breyer in dissent stressed that congressional arrangements that can result in congressional aggrandizement of executive power are most likely to violate the separation of powers doctrine. Id. at 3167 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
154. 478 U. S. 714 (1986).
155. 2 U. S. C. §§ 901-07 (2006).
156. Bowsher, 478 U. S. at 727.
157. Id. at 720;
158. id. at 785 n. 4 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
159. Id. at 726 (majority opinion).
160. Id. at 733.
161. Myers v. United States, 272 U. S. 52, 177(1926).
162. See generally Krent, supra note 21.
163. See 5 U. S. C. § 551 (1) (2006) (limiting applicability of APA to agencies (i.e., authorities) of the United States).
164. 15 U. S. C. § 7215 (b) (5) (A) (2006).
165. Lawrence A. Cunningham, Private Standards in Public Law: Copyright, Lawmaking and the Case of Accounting, 104 MICH. L. REV. 291, 294(2005). In essence, Congress had delegated comparable authority to the American Institute of CPAs (AICPA) through the middle of the twentieth century.
166. Nagy, supra note 16, at 985-87. Since 1973, the SEC has recognized the Financial Accounting Standards Board as the official entity setting standards for public company accounting.
167. See Commission Statement of Policy Reaffirming the Status of the FASB as a Designated Private-Sector Standard Setter, Securities Act Release No. 8221, 80 SEC Docket 139 (Apr. 25, 2003);
168. Exchange Act Release No. 47, 743, 80 SEC Docket 139 (Apr. 25, 2003);
169. Accounting Series Release No. 150, 3 SEC Docket 275 (Dec. 20, 1973). Note that if Congress merely adopted preexisting AICPA standards, no constitutional problem would arise.
170. To be sure, there is a fine line between standard setting that represents the exercise of significant authority within the meaning of Buckley, and classifications that the government can contract out to private contractors to formulate. See Practice Mgmt. Info. Corp. v. Am. Med. Ass'n, 121 F.3d 516 (9th Cir. 1997) (addressing Congress's instruction to the Health Care Financing Administration to establish uniform code for assessing reimbursement for physician services)
171. amended by 133 F.3d 1140 (9th Cir. 1998).
172. See, e.g., 15 U. S. C. § 780-3 (b) (7) (2006).
173. Id. § 780 (b) (8).
174. Id. § 78s (e) (1), (f).
175. Compare Whiteside & Co. v. SEC, 883 F.2d 7, 9 (5th Cir. 1989) (asserting that review of findings by the self regulatory organization is de novo)
176. with Seaton v. SEC, 670 F.2d 309, 311 (D. C. Cir. 1982) (utilizing preponderance of the evidence standard).
177. But see MBH Commodity Advisors v. CFTC, 250 F.3d 1052, 1062-64 (7th Cir. 2001) (suggesting that each agency may construe statutory provision providing for review of self-regulatory organizations' findings differently, depending on mission of agency).
178. See generally Roberta S. Karmel, Should Securities Industry Self-Regulatory Organizations Be Considered Government Agencies?, 14 STAN. J. L. BUS. & FIN. 151 (2008).
179. Moreover, Free Enterprise Fund squarely places the status of the adjudicators in Schweiker v. McClure in doubt. Those adjudicators resolved claims between private parties and the government without meaningful review by the Department of Health and Human Services
180. See Pub. Citizen v. Dep't of Justice, 491 U. S. 440, 455-65 (1989).
181. See, e.g., Train v. Nat'l Res. Def. Council, Inc., 421 U. S. 60 (1975).
182. National Prohibition Act (Volstead Act), ch. 85, 41 Stat. 305 (1919);
183. Fugitive Slave Act of 1793, ch. 7, § 1, 1 Stat. 302, 302.
184. 28 U. S. C. § 2674 (2006) ("The United States shall be liable, respecting the provisions of this title relating to tort claims, in the same manner and to the same extent as a private individual under like circumstances....").
185. See supra note 20 and accompanying text.
186. If the President could supervise state entities' and officials' exercise of delegated authority, the constitutional problem would recede, and so Professor Steven G. Calabresi has argued.
187. See Steven G. Calabresi & Saikrishna B. Prakash, The President's Power to Execute the Laws, 104 YALE L. J. 541 (1994). It is difficult to conceive, however, how Presidents could oversee or alter implementation efforts by state officials and entities. Indeed, the prospect that Presidents could reverse decisions made by state officials would turn federalism principles on their head.
188. See also supra note 76.
189. See supra note 20 and accompanying text.
190. See, e.g., Train v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 421 U. S. 60 (1975).
191. Free Enter. Fund v. Pub. Co. Accounting Oversight Bd., 130 S. Ct. 3138, 3168(2010)
192. (Breyer, J., dissenting) (citing 7 U. S. C. § 2009aa-1 (2006)).
193. See, e.g., EnergySolutions, LLC v. Utah, 625 F.3d 1261, 1265-68 (10th Cir. 2010) (discussing Congress's delegation of low-level radioactive waste disposal policy to the states).
194. U. S. CONST, art. I, § 10, cl. 3.
195. See, e.g., Metro. Wash. Airports Auth. v. Citizens for the Abatement of Aircraft Noise, Inc., 501 U. S. 252, 255(1991).
196. See, e.g., Seattle Master Builders Assoc, v. Pac. Nw. Elec. Power & Conservation Planning Council, 786 F.2d 1359, 1363 (9th Cir. 1986).
197. See, e.g., U. S. Steel Corp. v. Multistate Tax Comm'n, 434 U. S. 452, 459-72 (1978).
198. Cuyler v. Adams, 449 U. S. 433, 440(1981).
199. New York v. Atl. States Marine Fisheries Comm'n, 609 F.3d 524, 531 (2d Cir. 2010).
200. Similarly, there is no constitutional impediment to incorporating evolving state law as the governing rule of decision, as in the FTCA example.
201. Harold J. Krent, Fragmenting the Unitary Executive: Congressional Delegations of Administrative Authority Outside the Federal Government, 85 NW. U. L. REV 62, 80-84 (1990).
202. 109 U. S. 513 (1883) (upholding statute authorizing states to determine compensation in takings cases).
203. Id. at 519.
204. Id.
205. See also AT&T Corp. v. Iowa Utils. Bd., 525 U. S. 366, 411-12 (1999) (Thomas, J., concurring in part).
206. 505 U. S. 144 (1992).
207. Id. at 149, 153
208. (citing 42 U. S. C. § 2021e (d) (2) (C) (2006)).
209. Id. at 161 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).
210. Id. at 166.
211. Id. at 168.
212. 521 U. S. 898 (1997).
213. Id. at 930.
214. Id. at 922.
215. Id. at 923.
216. Id. at 923 n. 12. The dissent noted the weakness in Justice Scalia's argument as well.
217. Id. at 960 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
218. U. S. CONST, art. VI, cl. 3.
219. 7 U. S. C. § 2009aa-1 (2006).
220. Free Enter. Fund v. Pub. Co. Accounting Oversight Bd., 130 S. Ct. 3138, 3168(2010) (Breyer, J., dissenting).
221. 7 U. S. C. § 2009aa-1 (a) (2).
222. Id. § 2009aa-1 (d) (1).
223. A similar example is the International Swaps and Derivatives Association (ISDA), formed in the mid-1980s by industry members trading in swaps and derivatives. See Sean M. Flanagan, The Rise of a Trade Association: Group Interactions Within the International Swaps and Derivatives Association, 6 HARV. NEGOT. L. REV. 211, 234-38 (2001).
224. The ISDA lobbied to keep the industry self-regulated. Id. at 245-46.
225. However, presumably because of the role that swaps played in the market blow up and the collapse of Lehman Brothers and AIG in 2008, swaps are now regulated by the SEC and CFTC under the Dodd-Frank Act. Pub. L. No. 111-203, §§ 701-74, 124 Stat. 1376, 1641-802 (2010).
226. U. S. CONST, art. II, § 2, cl. 2.
227. Great Lakes Basin Compact, Pub. L. No. 90-419, art. II (B), 82 Stat. 414, 414(1968);
228. see MARIAN E. RIDGEWAY, INTERSTATE COMPACTS: A QUESTION OF FEDERALISM 156-57 (1971).
229. U. S. CONST, art. I, § 10, cl. 1.
230. Id.
231. See U. S. Steel Corp. v. Multistate Tax Comm'n, 434 U. S. 452, 460-72 (1978) (distinguishing between alliances and other agreements lost in history).
232. Cf. Barron v. Mayor & City Council of Balt., 32 U. S. (7 Pet.) 243, 249(1833) (commenting that states cannot enter into any agreements with foreign powers).
233. 389 U. S. 429 (1968).
234. Id. at 430-31 & n. 1.
235. Id. at 436 ("[S]tate involvement in foreign affairs and international relations [are] matters which the Constitution entrusts solely to the Federal Government....").
236. See Crosby v. Nat'l Foreign Trade Council, 530 U. S. 363, 366-68 (2000).
237. See id. at 383-84.
238. 530 U. S. 363.
239. Id. at 374-77;
240. see also Am. Ins. Ass'n v. Garamendi, 539 U. S. 396, 413-29 (2003) (striking down California's facilitation of Holocaust era insurance claims);
241. Von Saher v. Norton Simon Museum, 592 F.3d 954, 968 (9th Cir. 2010) (holding that California cannot extend the statute of limitations for recovering art stolen during the Holocaust).
242. 39 U. S. (14 Pet.) 540 (1840).
243. Id. at 570 ("The power of deciding whether a fugitive from a foreign nation should or should not be surrendered... is one of the powers that the states are forbidden to exercise without the consent of Congress.").
244. In essence, the concern is that the political safeguards of federalism do not protect the interests of states that cannot exert sufficient influence in Congress as a whole.
245. Free Enter. Fund v. Pub. Co. Accounting Oversight Bd., 130 S. Ct. 3138, 3155-56 (2010).
246. See Steven G. Calabresi, Some Normative Arguments for the Unitary Executive, 48 ARK. L. REV. 23, 65-66 (1995).
247. Calabresi argues in part that the unitary executive is designed to prevent members of Congress from legislating purely to benefit particular geographic sectors. For a response, see Evan Caminker, The Unitary Executive and State Administration of Federal Law, 45 U. KAN. L. REV. 1075, 1110(1997), doubting that such concerns should lead to curbing delegations to state officials, as long as only citizens within the states are affected.
248. Calabresi, supra note 181, at 35.
249. See, e.g., J. Gregory Sidak, The Petty Larceny of the Police Power, 86 CALIF. L. REV. 655 (1998)
250. (reviewing FRED S. MCCHESNEY, MONEY FOR NOTHING: POLITICIANS, RENT EXTRACTION, AND POLITICAL EXTORTION (1997));
251. Aaron D. Zibart, Note, Eulogizing the Line Item Veto Act: Clinton v. City of New York and the Wisdom of Presidential Legislating, 88 KY. L. J. 505 (2000).
252. U. S. Steel Corp. v. Multistate Tax Comm'n, 434 U. S. 452, 494(1978);
253. see also Rhode Island v. Massachusetts, 37 U. S. (12 Pet.) 657, 726(1838).
254. Cf. West Virginia ex rel. Dyer v. Sims, 341 U. S. 22, 30-31 (1951) (rejecting challenge to compact addressing discharge into Ohio River).
255. See also the discussion in Virginia v. EPA, 108 F.3d 1397 (D. C. Cir. 1997), addressing the difficulty of confining impact of pollution to states within a single compact or alliance.
256. See Lynn A. Baker, Putting the Safeguards Back into the Political Safeguards of Federalism, 46 VILL. L. REV. 951, 963(2001).
257. U. S. Steel, 434 U. S. at 473.
258. See, e.g., EnergySolutions, LLC v. Utah, 625 F.3d 1261 (10th Cir. 2010) (involving an operator of a waste site resorting to the courts in an effort to permit waste from outside the compact states to be stored at the site).
259. See generally Michael S. Greve, Compacts, Cartels and Congressional Consent, 68 MO. L. REV. 285, 289(2003).
260. Greve cites several examples, such as the Northeast Dairy Compact, 7 U. S. C. § 7526 (2006), to demonstrate the potential for state compacts to result in harm to nonparticipating states.
261. See also Joseph J. Spengler, The Economic Limitations to Certain Uses of Interstate Compacts, 31 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 41, 42(1937) ("[C]ontrol by compacting state may injure the inhabitants of non-compacting states.").
262. Spengler uses the example of a compact designed to control production of cotton. Id at 44.
263. Cotton-producing states would benefit, while those outside the compact whose citizens purchase cotton would have to pay more for the cotton. Id.
264. See THE DEBATES IN THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787 WHICH FRAMED THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA REPORTED BY JAMES MADISON 23-26 (Gaillard Hunt & James Brown Scott eds., int'l ed. 1920).
265. For a cynical summary of delegation in general, see DAVID SCHOENBROD, POWER WITHOUT RESPONSIBILITY: HOW CONGRESS ABUSES THE PEOPLE THROUGH DELEGATION (1993).
266. See W. & S. Life Ins. Co. v. State Bd. of Equalization of Cal., 451 U. S. 648 (1981);
267. Lewis v. BT Inv. Managers, Inc., 447 U. S. 27, 44(1980);
268. H. P. Hood & Sons, Inc. v. Du Mond, 336 U. S. 525, 542-43 (1949).
269. The only congressional constraints may be the Commerce Clause, Equal Protection, and Privileges and Immunities Clauses. W. & S. Life Insurance, 451 U. S. at 655-56.
270. 511 U. S. 641 (1994).
271. Id. at 647 (internal quotation marks omitted).
272. Exploitation of nonparticipating states by those in compacts is so likely "that Congress is called in to review the arrangement at the outset." Saul Levmore, Interstate Exploitation and Judicial Intervention, 69 VA. L. REV. 563, 570 n. 17 (1983).
273. As the Court stated in Maine v. Taylor, 477 U. S. 131 (1986)
274. "[i]t is well established that Congress may authorize the States to engage in regulation that the Commerce Clause would otherwise forbid." Id. at 138.
275. See Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass'ns, 531 U. S. 457, 474-75 (2001) ("[W]e have almost never felt qualified to second-guess Congress regarding the permissible degree of policy judgment that can be left to those executing or applying the law." (internal quotation marks omitted)).
276. For a discussion of the Tenth Amendment as underenforced, see Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Authority, 469 U. S. 528 (1985).
277. For an argument that the Due Process Clause is also underenforced, see Harold J. Krent, The Supreme Court as an Enforcement Agency, 55 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1149 (1998).
278. Cf. Kent v. Dulles, 357 U. S. 116, 129(1958) (construing delegation narrowly to avoid constitutional question).
279. See also Hampton v. Mow Sun Wong, 426 U. S. 88, 112(1976) (construing delegation to Civil Service Commission narrowly to limit power to exclude resident aliens from federal workforce).