Beauty contested: How much of keynes' remains in behavioural economics' beauty contests?

European Journal of the History of Economic Thought

Volumn 18, Issue 2, 2011, Pages 269-285

  Lanteri, Alessandro ^a,b   Carabelli, Anna ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF EASTERN PIEDMONT   (Italy)

^b International Centre for Economic Research   (Italy)

Author keywords

Beauty contest; Behavioural economics; Keynes; Rationality

Indexed keywords

EID: 79959338230     PISSN: 09672567     EISSN: 14695936     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1080/09672560903552512     Document Type: Article

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