Incentive mechanisms for safe driving: A comparative analysis with dynamic data

Review of Economics and Statistics

Volumn 93, Issue 1, 2011, Pages 218-227

  Dionne, Georges ^a   Pinquet, Jean ^b   Maurice, Mathieu ^a   Vanasse, Charles ^c  

^a HEC MONTRÉAL   (Canada)

^b UNIVERSITÉ PARIS OUEST NANTERRE LA DÉFENSE   (France)

^c NONE

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 79957453209     PISSN: 00346535     EISSN: 15309142     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1162/REST_a_00054     Document Type: Article

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