Point-record driving licence and road safety: An economic approach

Journal of Public Economics

Volumn 91, Issue 1-2, 2007, Pages 235-258

  Bourgeon, Jean Marc ^a   Picard, Pierre ^a  

^a ECOLE POLYTECHNIQUE   (France)

Author keywords

Driving licence; Law enforcement; Road safety

Indexed keywords

EID: 33845198881     PISSN: 00472727     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/j.jpubeco.2006.05.007     Document Type: Article

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