Framing effects in public goods: Prospect Theory and experimental evidence

Games and Economic Behavior

Volumn 72, Issue 2, 2011, Pages 439-447

  Iturbe Ormaetxe, Iñigo ^a   Ponti, Giovanni ^a,b   Tomás, Josefa ^a   Ubeda, Luis ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF ALICANTE   (Spain)

^b LUISS UNIVERSITY   (Italy)

Author keywords

C92; D81; Framing; H40; Prospect Theory; Public good provision

Indexed keywords

EID: 79956371190     PISSN: 08998256     EISSN: 10902473     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2010.10.004     Document Type: Article

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