Human rights in the EU: Rethinking the role of the European convention on human rights after Lisbon

European Constitutional Law Review

Volumn 7, Issue 1, 2011, Pages 64-95

  Weiß, Wolfgang ^a,b  

^a Deutsche Universität für Verwaltungswissenschaften Speyer   (Germany)

^b OXFORD BROOKES UNIVERSITY   (United Kingdom)

Author keywords

Charter of Fundamental Rights of the EU; European Convention on Human Rights; European Court of Human Rights; European Court of Justice; European Union; Human rights; Treaty of Lisbon

Indexed keywords

EID: 79956142997     PISSN: 15740196     EISSN: 17445515     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1017/S157401961110005X     Document Type: Article

References (178)

1. That Art. 6(3) TEU refers only to the ECHR does not rule out other international human rights instruments (as questioned by M. Dougan, 'The Lisbon Treaty', CMLRev (2008) p. 617 at p. 665, n. 234) because the same wording of Art. 6(2) TEU-Nice did not hinder the ECJ from referring to other instruments, ECJ, Case C-540/03 Parliament v. Council [2006] ECR I-5769, para. 37;
2. A. Rosas, 'The EU and International Human Rights Instruments', in Kronenberger (ed.), The EU and the International Legal Order (T.M.C Asser Press 2001), p. 53.
3. The ECJ always interpreted Art. 6(2) TEU as a reaffi rmation of its methodology: ECJ, Case C-415/93, Bosman [1995] ECR I-4921, para. 79;
4. see also S. Douglass-Scott, 'A Tale of Two Courts: Luxembourg, Strasbourg and the Growing European Human Rights Aquis', CML Rev (2006) p. 629 at p. 633;
5. R. Alonso Garcia, 'The General Provisions of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the EU', ELJ (2002), p. 492 at p. 493 et seq.
6. The same applies to the new Art. 6(3) TEU, cf. Dutheil de la Rochère, 'The Protection of Fundamental Rights in the EU: Community of Values with Opt-Out', in I. Pernice et al. (eds.), Ceci n'est pas une constitution. Constitutionalisation without a Constitution? (Nomos 2009), p. 119 at p. 122.
7. See Dougan, n. 1 at p. 663.
8. See S. Peers, 'Taking Rights Away? Limitations and Derogations', in S. Peers and Ward (eds.), The EU Charter of Fundamental Rights (Hart 2004), p. 141 at p. 164, 169, 173 et seq.;
9. W. Weiß, 'Grundrechtsquellen im Verfassungsvertrag', Zeitschrift für Europarechtliche Studien (2005), p. 323 at p. 327, 333.
10. In essence this view is in line with the view by Peers, supra n. 3 at p. 175, who applies Art. 52(3) FRC exclusively in case of overlap with the other paragraphs of Art. 52. 'This Treaty marks a new stage in the process of creating an ever closer union among the peoples of Europe.'
11. The citizens are mentioned in conjunction with the EU in Arts. 3(2), 9, 10(2), (3) and 11(1) TEU.
12. J. Callewaert, 'Unionisation and "Conventionisation" of Fundamental Rights in Europe', in J. Wouters et al. (eds.), The Europeanisation of International Law (T.M.C. Asser Press 2008) p. 109 at p. 116.
13. See I. Pernice, 'The Charter of Fundamental Rights in the Constitution of the European Union', WHI Paper 14/02, at p. 10;
14. reprinted in D. Curtin et al. (eds.), The Emerging Constitution of the EU (Oxford UP 2003).
15. Callewaert, supra n. 7 at 117: 'indirect adoption'.
16. Peers, supra n. 3 at 170.
17. D. Curtin et al. (eds.), The Emerging Constitution of the EU, 2003, Ibid., p. 171.
18. OJ 2007 C 303/17.
19. Republished in OJ 2010 C 83/389.
20. I. Pernice, 'The Treaty of Lisbon and Fundamental Rights', in S. Griller and J. Ziller (eds.), The Lisbon Treaty. EU Constitutionalism without a Constitutional Treaty? (Springer 2008), p. 235 at p. 242.
21. ECJ, Case C-61/94, Commission v. Germany [1996] ECR I-3989, para. 52.
22. See also ECtHR 30 June 2005, Appl. No. 45036/98, Bosphorus, para. 159.
23. See also the joint concurring opinion of Judges Rozakis, Tulkens, Traja, Botoucharova, Zagrebelsky and Garlickito ECtHR, Bosphorus, ibid., para. 4.
24. The re is much debate about Art. 53 FRC and its interpretation, cf. Alonso Garcia, supra n. 1 at p. 507 et seq. Since it is drafted in the image of the safeguard clause of Art. 53 ECHR, one may at least conclude that the ECHR is intended to be a minimum standard.
25. See Callewaert, supra n. 7 at p. 117.
26. Conversely, the European Parliament, in its resolution of 19 May 2010, on the institutional aspects of the EU's accession to the ECHR, opined that this Convention would constitute the minimum standard of protection for human rights, only after accession to it (2009/2241(INI), in no. 17).
27. See Alonso Garcia, supra n. 1 at p. 498, footnote 35;
28. C. Grabenwarter, 'Die Grundrechte', in Verfassungsvertrag der EU (FS Öhlinger2004) p. 469 at p. 476.
29. See also P. Craig and G. de Burca, EU Law, 4th edn. (Oxford UP) 2008, 386.
30. Douglass-Scott, supra n. 1 at 662.
31. T. Blanke and B. Veneziani, in B. Bercussion (ed.), European Labour Law and the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights (Nomos 2006) p. 258 et seq., p. 295. Art. 28 on collective action, for example, is quite new and has subsequently been identifi ed as a general principle of EU law; see recently ECJ, Case C-341/05, Laval [2007] ECR I-11767, para. 91 et seq. Another example is Art. 36 on access to services of general economic interest, the interpretation of which is very contentious.
32. Art. 52(5) FRC is far from being precise and clear cut, see Dougan, supra n. 1 at p. 663-664.
33. See Dutheil de la Rochère, supra n. 1 at p. 123.
34. See D. Chalmers and G. Monti, European Union Law. Updating Supplement (Cambridge UP 2008) p. 69.
35. ECJ Case C-144/04, Mangold [2005] ECR I-9981, para. 75.
36. ECJ 19 Jan. 2010, Case C-555/07, Kücükdeveci, para. 21 et seq.
37. ECJ, Case C-456/02, Trojani [2004] ECR I-7573, paras. 37-46.
38. See the proposal by Dougan, supra n. 1 at 665, to treat the FRC as the authoritative source for fundamental rights and to overcome its defi ciencies by interpretive perseverance.
39. ECJ, Case C-260/89, ERT [1991] ECR I-2925, paras. 42-43.
40. ECJ, Kücükdeveci, supra n. 28 at paras. 21-23.
41. See, inter alia, ECJ, ERT, supra n. 31 at para. 41.
42. ECJ, Case 4/73, Nold [1974] ECR 491, para. 13; Case 44/79, Hauer [1979] ECR 3727, para. 20.
43. ECJ, Joined Cases 46/87 & 227/88, Hoechst [1989] ECR 2859, para. 13.
44. For more detail on the impact of Art. 351 TFEU, see J. Klabbers, Treaty Confl ict and the EU (Cambridge UP 2009), p. 163 et seq.
45. ECtHR 23 March 1995, Appl. No. 15318/89, Loizidou, para. 75: 'constitutional instrument of European public order.'
46. CFI, Case T-54/99, max.mobil [2002] ECR II-313, para. 48;
47. Case T-99/04, AC Treuhand [2008] ECR II-1501, para. 45.
48. CFI, Case T-99/04, AC Treuhand [2008] ECR 1501, para. 45.
49. See already CFI, Case T-112/98, Mannesmann Röhrenwerke [2001] ECR II-729, paras. 59, 75.
50. Recently exemplifi ed in ECJ, Mangold, supra n. 27 at para. 74-5.
51. For a detailed discussion, see T. Tridimas, The General Principles of EU law, 2nd edn. (Oxford UP 2007) 6, 23 ('creative and eclectic judicial process');
52. W. Weiß, Verteidigungsrechte im EG-Kartellverfahren (Heymann 1996) p. 31-61.
53. Similarly A. Andreangeli, EU Competition Enforcement and Human Rights (Edward Elgar 2008) p. 10
54. and A.G. Mazák, opinion in Case C-411/05 Palacios de la Villa, para. 87 et seq.
55. ECJ, Case 11/70, Internationale Handelsgesellschaft [1970] ECR 1125, para. 4. CFI, Case T-112/98, Mannesmann Röhrenwerke [2001] ECR II-729, para. 59;
56. Case T-43/02, Jungbunzlauer [2006] ECR II-3435, para. 74, with further references to judgements of the ECJ.
57. See, e.g., ECJ, Case 117/76, Ruckdeschel [1977] ECR 1753, para. 7;
58. Case C-36/92 SEP [1994] ECR I-1911, para. 36;
59. Case 155/79, AM&S [1982] ECR 1575, para. 13.
60. ECJ, Case 155/79, AM&S. 1982] ECR 1575, para. 25-6;
61. the ECtHR appears to be more generous, Andreangeli, supra n. 40 at p. 120.
62. ECJ, Joined Cases 46/87 and 227/88, Hoechst [1989] ECR 2859, para. 18.
63. In contrast, ECtHR confi rmed the protection of business premises under Art. 8 ECHR in a decision adopted some months before, Appl. No. 10461/83, Chappel v. UK, judgment of 30 March 1989, paras. 51, 64.
64. ECJ, Case 374/87, Orkem [1989] ECR 3283, para. 30.
65. ECJ, Case C- 274/99 P, Conolly [2001] ECR I-1611, paras. 39-49.
66. ECJ, Case C-238/99 P et al., LMV [2002] I-8375, para. 274;
67. CFI, Case T-236/01, Tokai Carbon [2004] ECR II-1181, para. 405.
68. See CFI, Case T-236/01, Tokai Carbon [2004] ECR, II-1181, para. 405, with regard to the right to remain silent.
69. This is one area where inconsistencies between the ECJ and the ECtHR are observed: F. van den Berghe, 'The EU and Issues of Human Rights Protection', European Law Journal (2010) p. 112 at 120 et seq.
70. ECJ, Case 374/87, Orkem [1989] ECR 3283, paras. 29, 34 et seq.
71. See ECJ, Case 238/99 P. et al., LMV [2004] ECR I-8375, para. 271, 274.
72. E.g., M. Araujo, 'The Respect for Fundamental Rights within the European Network of Competition Authorities', in B.E. Hawk (ed.) Antitrust Law and Policy (Fordham Corp. L. Inst. 2005), p. 511 at 520 et seq.;
73. Van den Berghe, supra n. 49 at 121 (with regard to protection of business premises).
74. See ECJ, Case 238/99 P et al., LMV [2004] ECR I-8375, para. 279.
75. ECJ, Case C-301/04 P, SGL Carbon [2006] ECR I-5915, para. 48.
76. Ibid., para. 43.
77. ECtHR, Appl. No. 10828/84, Funke, para. 44;
78. Appl. No. 19187/91, Saunders, paras. 69, 71, 76;
79. Appl. No. 31827/97, J.B. v. Switzerland, paras. 64-71;
80. recently, Appl. Nos. 15809/02 and 25624/02, O'Halloran and Francis, paras. 45 et seq.
81. CFI, Case T-236/01, Tokai Carbon [2004] ECR II-1181, para. 405.
82. See CFI, Case T-112/98, Mannesmann Röhrenwerke [2001] ECR II-729, para. 77;
83. Tokai Carbon, supra n. 57 at para. 406.
84. See Andreangeli, supra n. 40 at p. 147, 149.
85. S. Brammer, Cooperation between National Competition Agencies in the Enforcement of the EC Competition Law (Hart 2009), p. 250 et seq., p. 510, footnote 92.
86. ECJ, Case C-94/00, Roquette Frères [2002] ECR I-9011, para. 29.
87. The ECtHR held that Art. 8 ECHR also applies to business premises (Appl. No. 13710/88, Niemitz, para. 29).
88. See ECJ, Case C-238/99 P, LVM [2002] ECR I-8375, para. 251. In this case the ECJ did not rule on the merits of the CFI's statement (in Case T-305/94, LVM [1999] ECR II-931, para. 420) that the 'development of the case-law of the ECtHR relating to Art. 8 of the ECHR has no direct impact on the merits of the solutions adopted in Hoechst.'
89. For a concurring view, see H. Scheer, 'The Interaction between ECHR and EC Law', Zeitschrift für Europarechtliche Studien (2004) p. 663 at 677, footnote 64;
90. C. Nowak, 'Grundrechte im europäischen Konstitutionalisierungsprozess', in T. Bruha and C. Nowak (eds.), Die Europäische Union: Innere Verfasstheit und globale Handlungsfähigkeit (Nomos 2006) p. 107 at p. 134.
91. Other scholars contend that the ECJ conformed to Strasbourg case-law, see, e.g., Callewaert, supra n. 7 at p. 113;
92. F. Jacobs, 'The ECHR, the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights and the ECJ', in I. Pernice et al. (eds.) The Future of the European Judicial System in a Comparative Perspective (Nomos 2006) p. 291 at p. 292.
93. ECJ, Case C 450/06, Varec [2008] ECR I-581, para. 48.
94. Douglass-Scott, supra n. 1.
95. Andreangeli, supra n. 40 at 8.
96. J. Callewaert, 'The European Convention on Human Rights and European Union Law: A Long Way to Harmony', EHRLR (2009) p. 768 at p. 769.
97. See ibid., p. 774 et seq., where Callewaert mentions in particular the right to remain silent in antitrust enforcement.
98. Douglass-Scott, supra n. 1 at 665.
99. Cf. ECJ, Case C-145/04, Spain v. UK [2006] ECR I-7917, para. 95.
100. See also Alonso Garcia, supra n. 1 at 499, footnote 36.
101. The interpretation given in a case is binding upon the parties to the dispute (Art. 46(1) ECHR), but enfolds a quasi ergo-omnes, de-facto binding eff ect beyond the individual case, because the observations made by the ECtHR are generally applicable to comparable situations in all state parties (N. Lavranos, Legal Interaction between Decisions of International Organisations and EU Law (Europa Law 2004) 168);
102. and the ECtHR may authoritatively interpret its judgments, Art. 46(3) ECHR.
103. A.W. Heringa and L. Verhey, 'The EU Charter: Text and Structure', Maastricht Journal of European and Comparative Law (2001) p. 11 at p. 17;
104. C. Lenaerts and E. de Smijter, 'The Charter and the Role of the European Courts', Maastricht Journal of European and Comparative Law (2001) p. 90 at p. 99;
105. Peers, supra n. 3 at 171.
106. See ECtHR 25 April 1978, Appl. No. 5856/72, Tyrer, para. 31.
107. See Andreangeli, supra n. 40 at p. 15 et seq.
108. ECtHR, Appl. No. 12726/87, Autronic, para. 47.
109. Report of the European Commission on Human Rights of 30 May 1991, Appl. No. 11598/85, Stenuit, para. 66;
110. implicitly ECtHR, Appl. No. 53892/00, Lilly France, para. 23 et seq.
111. See also Brammer, supra n. 60 at p. 253 et seq., 301.
112. Contra, with regard to the right to remain silent, see W. Wils, 'Powers of Investigation and Procedural Rights and Guarantees in EU Antitrust Enforcement', World Competition (2006) p. 3 at p. 19, footnote 66.
113. Alonso Garcia, supra n. 1 at p. 497 et seq;
114. P. Lemmens, 'The Relation between the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the EU and the European Convention on Human Rights - Substantive Aspects', MJ (2001) p. 49 at p. 54 et seq.
115. See also Peers, supra n. 3 at p. 164;
116. W. Sadurski, 'The Charter and Enlargement', ELJ (2002) p. 340 at p. 354.
117. Peers, supra n. 3 at 166.
118. Peers (ibid. p. 153 et seq., p. 166) observes a diff erence between ECJ case-law and Art. 52(1) FRC, in that the necessity requirement and the 'prescribed by law' requirement were new.
119. The necessity requirement, however, is part of the proportionality assessment usually made by the ECJ, and the 'prescribed by law' requirement has sometimes also been addressed by the ECJ (cf. ECJ, Case 46/87, Hoechst [1989] ECR 2859, para. 19).
120. It is possible that, in the future, Art. 290 TFEU might have an impact: it explicitly reserves the essential elements of an area for legislative acts.
121. See ECtHR 21 Nov. 2001, Appl. No. 35763/97, Al Adsani v. UK, para. 53.
122. Ibid., para. 54.
123. See C. Grabenwarter and T. Marauhn, in Grothe and Marauhn (eds.), EMRK/GG Konkordanzkommentar zum europäischen und deutschen Grundrechtsschutz (2006), ch. 7, mn. 17.
124. Cf. Peers, supra n. 3 at p. 147 et seq., p. 178 et seq.
125. Examples: CFI, Joined Cases T-222/99, T-327/99, and T-329/99, Martinez and de Gaulle [2001] ECR II-2823, paras. 230 et seq. (upheld by the ECJ, Case C-488/01, Martinez [2003] ECR I-3355, para. 78 et seq.), where the CFI mentions Art. 11 ECHR and does not refer to Art. 11(2) but applies the general EU limitations. ECJ, Case C-112/00, Schmidberger [2003] ECR I-5659, paras. 77-80 refer to Arts. 10 and 11 ECHR and their limitation provisions but applies only the general limitation standards of EC law.
126. Peers, supra n. 3 at 141.
127. See the Commission's Guidelines on the method of setting fines, OJ 2006 C 210/2, paras. 4, 30, 37.
128. See D. Slater et al., 'Competition Law Proceedings before the European Commission and the Right to a Fair Trial: No Need for Reform?', Global Competition Law Centre Working Paper 04/08, p. 12-15
129. and the riposte by W. Wils, 'The Increased Level of EU Antitrust Fines, Judicial Review, and the ECHR', World Competition (2010) p. 5.
130. ECtHR, Appl. No. 73053/01, Jussila, para. 43.
131. This judgment raised some debate about what exactly Art. 6 ECHR demands in the case of 'non-hard' criminal law, as the ECtHR opined that 'the criminal-head guarantees will not necessarily apply with their full stringency.' See, on the one hand, Wils, supra n. 88 at p. 20 et seq.
132. and, on the other, A. Riley, 'The Modernisation of EU Anti-Cartel Enforcement: Will the Commission Grasp the Opportunity?', ECLR (2010) p. 191 at p. 199.
133. ECJ, Case C-235/92 P, Montecatini [1999] ECR I-4539, para. 176, where the Court makes reference to the criteria of the leading Özturk case on the applicability of Art. 6 ECHR on quasicriminal procedures by the ECtHR.
134. See also European Human Rights Commission, YECHR (1990) p. 46 at p. 52;
135. Wils, supra n. 88 at 18.
136. For its implication in Art. 6(3) ECHR, see ECtHR, Appl. Nos. 12629/87 and 13965/88, S v. Switzerland, para. 48;
137. E. Gippini-Fournier, 'Legal Professional Privilege in Competition Proceedings', in B. Hawk (ed.), International Antitrust Law and Policy (Fordham Int. L Inst. 2005) p. 587 at p. 613 et seq.
138. See CFI, Case T-112/98, Mannesmann Röhrenwerke [2001] ECR II-729, paras. 66 et seq.
139. An example of this is CFI, Case T-112/98, Mannesmann Röhrenwerke [2001] ECR II-729, paras. 66 et seq.
140. Ibid.
141. CFI, Joined Cases T-125/03 and T-253/03, Akzo Nobel [2007] ECR II-3523, para. 176.
142. Commission Staff Working Paper accompanying the Report on the Functioning of Regulation 1/2003, SEC (2009) p. 574 final, p. 21 et seq.
143. See ECJ, Joined Cases 46/87 & 227/88, Hoechst [1989] ECR 2859, para. 17.
144. ECtHR, Appl. No. 37971/97, Stés Colas Est SA, para. 41.
145. Ibid., para. 47.
146. Ibid., para. 48.
147. Ibid., para. 49.
148. See also I. Aslam and M. Ramsden, 'EC Dawn Raids: A Human Rights Violation?', Comp. Law Review (2008) p. 61 at p. 76 et seq.;
149. M. Lienemeyer and D. Waelbroeck, 'Case Comment', CML Rev (2003) p. 1481 at p. 1496.
150. For more detail, see C. Tomuschat, 'The Effects of the Judgments of the European Court of Human Rights according to the German Constitutional Court', German Law Journal (2010) p. 513 at p. 518.
151. Decision of the Federal Constitutional Court, Vol. 111, p. 287 at p. 324: The offi cial English translation (available at , last visited 7 June 2010) reads in the relevant part (para. 50): 'If, in ... proceedings in which ... Germany is involved, the ECHR establishes that there has been a violation of the Convention ..., and if this is a continuing violation, the decision of the ECtHR must be taken into account in the domestic sphere, that is the responsible authorities or courts must discernibly consider the decision and, if necessary, justify understandably why they nevertheless do not follow the international law interpretation of the law.'
152. For a riposte, see Tomuschat, supra n. 103 at p. 522-525.
153. D. Thurnherr, 'The Reception Process in Austria and Switzerland', in H. Keller and A. Stone Sweet (eds.) A Europe of Rights. The Impact of the ECHR on National Legal Systems (Oxford UP 2008), p. 311 at p. 312, 325, p. 344-351.
154. E. de Wet, 'The Reception Process in the Netherlands and Belgium', in H. Keller and A. Stone Sweet (eds.), A Europe of Rights, supra n. 105 at p. 229, 235 and 253.
155. Lavranos, supra n. 73 at 180-181.
156. ECJ, Case 181/73, Haegeman [1974] ECR 449, para. 5;
157. Opinion 1/91 EEA Agreement [1991] ECR I-6079, para. 37 (on ex-Art. 300(7) ECT, now Art. 216(2) TFEU).
158. See ECJ, Case 30/88, Greece v. Commission [1989] ECR 3711, para. 13;
159. Case C-188/91, Shell [1993] ECR I-363, para. 17; Case C-192/89, Sevince [1990] ECR I-3461, para. 9.
160. For the well-known exception of WTO law, see Craig and de Burca, supra n. 21 at p. 206 et seq.
161. See Lavranos, supra n. 73 at p. 53.
162. Resolution of 19 May 2010, supra n. 19, sub. 1, last recital.
163. ECJ, Case C-36/02, Omega Spielhallen GmbH [2004] ECR I-9609;
164. for what follows, see paras. 34-39.
165. See L. Besselink and J.H. Reestman, 'Editorial', EuConst (2008) p. 199 at p. 204.
166. See the statements by its former president, L. Wildhaber, in an interview conducted by S. Greer, EHRLR (2010) p. 165 at p. 170, 174 et seq.
167. F. Matscher, 'Methods of Interpretation of the Convention', in R. Macdonald et al.(eds.), The European System for the Protection of Human Rights (Kluwer 1993), p. 63 at p. 70 et seq.
168. See ECtHR, Appl. No. 5493/72, Handyside, para. 48;
169. G. Letsas, A The ory of Interpretation of the European Convention on Human Rights (Oxford UP 2007) p. 86, 90 et seq.;
170. F. Ost, 'The Original Canons of Interpretation of the European Court of Human Rights', in M. Delmas-Marty (ed.), The European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights (Kluwer 1992) p. 283 at p. 305-306, 308-309.
171. Ost, supra n. 115 at 305.
172. See ECtHR 30 March 2004, Appl. No. 74025/01, Hirst, para. 40;
173. Ost, supra n. 115 at p. 306;
174. Letsas, supra n. 115 at p. 91;
175. A. Torres Pérez, Conflicts of Rights in the European Union (Oxford UP 2009) p. 30.
176. See ECJ, supra n. 112 at para. 37.
177. ECtHR 30 June 2005, Appl. No. 45036/98, para. 155 et seq.
178. F. van den Berghe, supra n. 49 at p. 117.