Fast convergence of natural bargaining dynamics in exchange networks

Proceedings of the Annual ACM-SIAM Symposium on Discrete Algorithms

Volumn , Issue , 2011, Pages 1518-1537

  Kanoria, Yashodhan ^a   Bayati, Mohsen ^a   Borgs, Christian ^b   Chayes, Jennifer ^b   Montanari, Andrea ^a,c  

^a Stanford University   (United States)

^b MICROSOFT RESEARCH   (United States)

^c STANFORD UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

MESSAGE PASSING; POLYNOMIAL APPROXIMATION;

EXCHANGE NETWORKS; MATCHING POLYTOPE; MAXIMUM WEIGHT MATCHING; MESSAGE PASSING ALGORITHM; NASH BARGAINING SOLUTION; RANDOM PERTURBATIONS; TIME POLYNOMIALS; UNIFORMLY BOUNDED;

DYNAMICS;

EID: 79955720389     PISSN: None     EISSN: None     Source Type: Conference Proceeding    
DOI: 10.1137/1.9781611973082.118     Document Type: Conference Paper

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