Network bargaining: Algorithms and structural results

Proceedings of the ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce

Volumn , Issue , 2009, Pages 159-168

  Chakraborty, Tanmoy ^a   Kearns, Michael ^a   Khanna, Sanjeev ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA   (United States)

Author keywords

Approximation algorithms; Bargaining; Equilibrium; Social networks

Indexed keywords

AXIOMATIC MODELS; BARGAINING; BIPARTITE GRAPHS; NETWORK STRUCTURES; REGULAR GRAPHS; SIMULATION METHODS; SOCIAL NETWORKS; STATISTICAL ANALYSIS;

COMPUTER SIMULATION; ELECTRIC CONDUCTIVITY MEASUREMENT; ELECTRONIC COMMERCE; GRAPH THEORY; SOCIAL NETWORKING (ONLINE); WINE;

APPROXIMATION ALGORITHMS;

EID: 77950569548     PISSN: None     EISSN: None     Source Type: Conference Proceeding    
DOI: 10.1145/1566374.1566398     Document Type: Conference Paper

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