Did the airline tariff publishing case reduce collusion?

Journal of Law and Economics

Volumn 53, Issue 3, 2010, Pages 569-586

  Miller, Amalia R ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF VIRGINIA   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 79954484128     PISSN: 00222186     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1086/605294     Document Type: Article

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