War, moral hazard, and ministerial responsibility: England after the glorious revolution

Journal of Economic History

Volumn 71, Issue 1, 2011, Pages 133-161

  Cox, Gary W ^a  

^a STANFORD UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

CONFLICT MANAGEMENT; HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE; SOVEREIGNTY;

ENGLAND; UNITED KINGDOM;

EID: 79952941708     PISSN: 00220507     EISSN: 14716372     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1017/S0022050711000052     Document Type: Article

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