A Survey of Ranking Theory

Synthese Library

Volumn 342, Issue , 2009, Pages 185-228

  Spohn, Wolfgang ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF KONSTANZ   (Germany)

Author keywords

Belief Function; Belief Revision; Doxastic Attitude; Ranking Function; Subjective Probability

Indexed keywords

EID: 85145889896     PISSN: 01666991     EISSN: 25428292     Source Type: Book Series    
DOI: 10.1007/978-1-4020-9198-8_8     Document Type: Chapter

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