Basis for a general theory of organizations

Management Decision

Volumn 49, Issue 2, 2011, Pages 270-283

  Bonet, Fernando J Peris ^a   Peris Ortiz, Marta ^b   Pechuán, Ignacio Gil ^b  

^a UNIVERSITY OF VALENCIA   (Spain)

^b UNIVERSITAT POLITÈCNICA DE VALÈNCIA   (Spain)

Author keywords

Critical thinking; Organizational theory

Indexed keywords

EID: 79952342237     PISSN: 00251747     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1108/00251741111109151     Document Type: Article

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