Playing hard(er) to get: The state, international couples, and the income requirement

European Journal of Migration and Law

Volumn 13, Issue 1, 2011, Pages 95-121

  Leerkes, Arjen ^a,b   Kulu Glasgow, Isik ^b  

^a ERASMUS UNIVERSITY ROTTERDAM   (Netherlands)

^b Ministry of Security and Justice   (Netherlands)

Author keywords

income requirement; international couples; marriage migration; migration control; policy effects

Indexed keywords

EID: 79952132609     PISSN: 1388364X     EISSN: 15718166     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1163/157181611X554267     Document Type: Article

References (74)

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5. In Denmark international couples (involving non-EU partners) now have to pay a deposit of about € 7.400, which is cashed if the couple applies for welfare. France and Germany have recently implemented integration exams in the country of origin as a requirement for partner immigration, and the British government has announced similar plans. Since 2010, the Norwegian income requirement has to be met by the sponsor alone, whereas before 2010 the spouses' joint income was taken into consideration.
6. See Rubin, L. (2004), "Love's Refugees: The Effects of Stringent Danish Immigration Policies on Danes and Teir Non-Danish Spouses", Connecticut Journal of International Law 20:319-322.
7. WODC/INDIAC (2009) Internationale gezinsvorming begrensd? Een evaluatie van de verhoging van de inkomens-en leeftijdseis bij migratie van buitenlandse part ners naar Nederland [International Family Formation Limited? An Evaluation of the Increase of the Income and Age Requirement for the Migration of Foreign Partners to the Netherlands]
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11. This is also advocated in Massey, D., J. Arango, G. Hugo, A. Kouaouci, A. Pellegrino and J. Taylor (2005), Worlds in Motion: Understanding International Migration at the End of the Millennium. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
12. Joppke, C. (1998), "Why Liberal States Accept Unwanted Immigration", World Politics 50 (2), pp. 266-293. (Pubitemid 28229510)
13. Hooghiemstra, E. (2003), Trouwen over de grens: Achtergronden van partnerkeuze van Turken en Marokkanen in Nederland. [Marrying across the Border: Back grounds of the Partner Choice of Turks and Moroccans in the Netherlands], The Hague: Sociaal en Cultureel Planbureau. PhD thesis, University of Amsterdam.
14. Bonjour, S. (2007) "Gezin en grens: Debat en beleidsvorming op het gebied van gezinsmigratie in Nederland sinds de jaren vijftig." [Family and Border: Debate and Policy Formation on the Terrain of Family Migration in the Netherlands Since the 1950s], Migrantenstudies 23 (1), pp. 2-23.
15. Ethnic groups are put in quotation marks when we refer to national origin rather than nationality. 'Turks' are first or second generation immigrants from Turkey. 'Dutch' sponsors are born in the Netherlands and have two parents born in the Netherlands. This definition reflects the definition by Statistics Netherlands.
16. Van der Zwaard, J. (2008) Gelukzoekers: Vrouwelijke huwelijksmigranten in Nederland [Happiness Seekers: Female Marriage Migrants in the Netherlands], Amsterdam: Artemis & Co.
17. Suksomboon, P. (2009), Thai Migrant Women in the Netherlands: Cross-Cultural Marriages and Families. Leiden: University of Leiden (PhD thesis).
18. De Hart, B. (2003) Onbezonnen vrouwen: Gemengde relaties in het nationaliteits recht en het vreemdelingenrecht. [Foolhardy women: Mixed relationships in the national and immigration law] Amsterdam: Aksant.
19. This includes family formation and family reunification. Most immigrants are foreign partners, even if parents, for example, may also be brought to The Netherlands. Source: Statistics Netherlands (online at: http://statline.cbs.nl, visited January 2010).
20. Duleep, H. and M. Regets (1996), "Admission Criteria and Immigrant Earning Profiles", International Migration Review 30 (2), pp. 571-590.
21. In 2006, 3.4% of non-Western immigrants in the potential working population received welfare (first and second generation combined). The national average was 2.7%. Source: Statistics Netherlands (online at: http://statline.cbs.nl; visited December 2009). Of all migrants who had to start the Dutch integration course in 2003 52% had completed lower secondary education or had attained a lower educational level (6% was illiterate), 22% had higher secondary education, and 26% had completed tertiary education.
22. Source: Significant (2004) Inburgering nieuwkomers. Kwalitatieve rapportage 2003. [Integration newcomers. Qualitative report 2003] Barneveld: Significant. About two-third of the migrants concerned were 'family formers/family reunificators'. In 2007 the distribution of these educational levels for the Dutch population as a whole was 27%, 42% and 31%. Source: OECD (2009) Education at a Glance 2009. Paris: OECD.
23. Nearly sixty percent of all 'Turks' marrying in 2002, opted for a partner from Turkey. For 'Moroccans' this figure was about fifty percent (see Figure 1).
24. De Hart, B. (2006), "Introduction: The Marriage of Convenience in European Immi gration Law", European Journal of Migration and Law 8, pp. 251-262.
25. Source: Dutch Parliament 2004-2005, 19 637, nr. 873.
26. See Nota van Toelichting, Staatsblad, 2004, nr. 496. The illustrations supporting the government's argument for restricting partner immigration only pertain to 'Moroccans' and 'Turks'.
27. In 2006, there were 7.83 million people in private households aged between 20 and 65, who had an income from labor or a business. Of these, 2.47 million people (32%) had a personal annual income below € 20.000 (with € 22.000 the 120% criterion is higher). Approximately 0.9 (11%) million people aged between 20 and 65 had a personal income below € 16.000 (The 100% criterion is about € 18.200). These figures include part-timers, such as students and mothers. In 2005, 8.5% of the full-timers, ages 15-65, earned less than € 20.000 (about 5% less than € 18.000). In the age category 20-25 this share was 45% (30% less than € 18.000). The number of persons with sufficient but 'unstable' income is unknown. About five percent of the workers in medium to highly skilled professions do not have a permanent contract. (Source of all figures: Statistics Netherlands, online at: http://statline.cbs.nl; visited July 2009 and June 2010).
28. For more information on the latter objective see WODC/INDIAC, supra note 2.
29. 2003/86/EG, OJ L 251, pp. 12-18.
30. Chakroun case C 578/08, line 44.
31. See also Hagendoorn, L. (1995), "Intergroup Biases in Multiple Group Systems: The Percep tion of Ethnic Hierarchies", European Review of Social Psychology 6 (1), pp. 199-228.
32. Examples in point are the distinction according to nationality with regards to the civic integration examination abroad (see note 18) and the question of whether increasingly restrictive policies can be applied to Turkey in the light of the 1963 Association Agreement between Turkey and the European Community.
33. Massey et al., supra note 4.
34. Ngai, M. (2004) Impossible Subjects: Illegal Aliens and the Making of Modern America. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
35. Massey et al., supra note 4.
36. Cornelius, W. (2001) "Death at the Border: Efficacy and Unintended Consequences of US Immigration Control Policy", Population and Development Review 27 (4), pp. 661-685;
37. Carling, J. (2007), "Migration control and migrant fatalities at the Spanish-African borders", International Migration Review 41 (2), pp. 316-343.
38. Todaro, M. and L. Maruszko (1987), "Illegal migration and US immigration reform: A conceptual framework", Population and Development Review, 13 (1), pp. 101-114.
39. Jacobson, D. and G. Ruffer (2003), "Courts across Borders: The Implications of Judicial Agency for Human Rights and Democracy", Human Rights Quarterly 25, pp. 74-92; (Pubitemid 36380840)
40. Sassen, S. (2006) "The De-nationalizing of the State and the Re-nationalizing of Political Discourse over Immigration", in M. Giugni and F. Passy (Eds.), Dialogues over Migration Policy, Lanham: Lexiton Books, pp. 57-65.
41. Joppke, supra note 5.
42. Espenshade, T. (1994) "Does the threat of border apprehension deter undocumented US immigration?", Population and Development Review 20 (4), pp. 871-892.
43. Cornelius, W. and M. Rosenblum (2005) "Immigration and Politics", Annual Review of Political Science 8, pp. 99-119. (Pubitemid 40977448)
44. Note that these two factors are related to 'opportunities' (capital) and 'desires' (commitment), i.e. two factors that are generally thought to be important for understanding human behaviour (see for instance Hedström, P. (2005) Dissecting the Social: On the Principles of Analytical Sociology. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Hedström adds 'beliefs' to these two factors. This third factor is not central in our analyses, even if beliefs are undoubtedly important. There were, for instance, quite some misunderstandings among the respondents about the precise height of the income requirement and the way in it was calculated (before taxes, after taxes, with holiday bonuses, without holiday bonuses, et cetera). Some respondents thought that the requirement was higher than it actually was.
45. Coleman, J. (1990), Foundations of Social Theory. Cambridge: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press.
46. Granovetter, M. (1973) "The Strength of Weak Ties", American Journal of Sociology, 78 (6), pp. 1360-1380.
47. Stanley, S. and H. Markman (1992), "Assessing Commitments in Personal Relation ships", Journal of Marriage and Family 54, pp. 595-608.
48. Becker, H. (1960), "Notes on the Concept of Commitment", American Journal of Sociology 66 (1), pp. 32-40.
49. Most sponsors had the Dutch nationality.
50. Blumer, H. (1954), "What is Wrong with Social Theory?", American Sociological Review 19 (1), pp. 3-10.
51. See Glaser B, Strauss A. (1967) Discovery of Grounded Theory. Strategies for Quali ta tive Research. Aldine Publishing Company, Chicago.
52. Directive 2004/38/EC (Article 8, paragraph 4) implies that sponsors are exempted from the income requirement if they are EU nationals and live in an EU country other than their own.
53. According to the Dutch Court of Justice in Eind, C-291/05, an employee has the right to return to the country of which (s) he is a national after having worked in a different EU country, even if (s) he did not effectively worked in that EU country.
54. *0.25=250).
55. Engbersen, G., M. van San and A. Leerkes (2006), "A Room with a View. Illegal im migrants in the Legal Capital of the World", Ethnography 7, pp. 209-242;
56. Leerkes, A., G. Engbersen and M. van San (2007), "Shadow Places. Patterns of Spatial Concentration and Incorporation of Irregular Immigrants in the Netherlands", Urban Studies 44 (8), pp. 1491-1516; (Pubitemid 47180489)
57. Leerkes, A. (2009), Illegal Residence and Public Safety in the Netherlands, Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press.
58. Van der Leun, J. (2003) Looking for Loopholes: Processes of Incorporation of Illegal Immigrants in the Netherlands. Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press.
59. Leerkes, supra note 41.
60. Leerkes, A. and D. Broeders (2010), "A Question of Mixed Motives? Formal and Informal Functions of Administrative Immigration Detention", British Journal of Criminology 50 (5), pp. 830-850.
61. See WODC/Indiac, supra note 2. A rough proxy for the number of people who have the age to marry is the number of people between 20 and 50 years of age. Between 2003 and 2006 the number of 'Dutch' in this age category indeed decreased with a few percent points, but it increased notably for 'Turks' (11%), 'Moroccans' (3%), and the category 'other non-Western countries'. Furthermore, the economic cycle may, at most, explain part of the decrease in the number of residence permits before the income requirement was raised in 2004. Between 2002 and 2004 the number of people on welfare increased due the post 9-11 fall of the economy. After 2004, however, the economy recovered. Moreover, it is unlikely that a reduction of marriage migration of more than 50% in 32 months time could merely be the result of processes of migrant integration, which tend to be gradual. Admittedly, partner immigration among 'Turks' and 'Moroccans' was already decreasing in the period before the new income requirement became effective (see Figure 1). This decrease may point at increased integration, even if part of it was probably related to the economic cycle and previous restrictive measures: the income requirement for married couples was raised in 2001, but for Dutch sponsors and foreigners admitted before 2001 there was a transitional period of three years. Furthermore, partner immigration in the category 'other non-Western countries' also fell by 30% (see Table 1). In this category, which includes 'Surinamese' and several smaller and relatively new immigrant groups in The Netherlands, partner immigration was only decreasing moderately before 2004. Finally, partner immigration also decreased among the 'Dutch'.
62. See also Van Huis, M. (2008) "Partnerkeuze van allochtonen" [Partner Choice of First-Gene ration and Second-Generation Immigrants], Demos, bulletin over bevolking en samenleving 24 (1), pp. 1-4.
63. On the postponement of partner choice under the influence of immigration rules also see Nielsen, H., N. Smith and A. Celikaksoy (2007), The Effect of Marriage on Education of Immigrants: Evidence from a policy reform restricting spouse support. Bonn: IZA. Discussion Paper Series no. 2899.
64. Aalbers, M. (2005) Prognose van gezinsvormende migratie van Turken en Marokkanen [Prognosis of partner immigration among Turks and Moroccans]. Voorburg: Statistics Netherlands.
65. Hooghiemstra, supra note 6.
66. On 'forced' separation among international couples in the United States see Constable, supra note 3.
67. Joppke, supra note 5.
68. See also chapter 9 in Walzer, M. (1983), Spheres of Justice. A Defence of Pluralism and Equality. Oxford: Blackwell.
69. Shorter, E. (1975), The Making of the Modern Family. New York: Basic Books.
70. Collins, R. (1988) Sociology of Marriage and the Family: Gender, Love and Property. Chicago: Nelson-Hall.
71. Schain, M. (2009), "The State Strikes Back: Immigration Policy in the European Union", The European Journal of International Law 20 (1), pp. 93-109.
72. For example, on August 21 2007 the Inspraak Orgaan Turken (an advocacy organization for Turks in the Netherlands) requested the European Commission to start an infringement procedure against the Dutch government. The organization claims that the Dutch rule that exempts nationals from certain industrialized countries (such as the United States of America and Japan) from the civic integration examination abroad is discriminatory, and contradicts the prohibition to discrimination according to nationality (article 12 TEC). It could also be argued that the Chakroun case implies that a failure to pass the civic integration examination abroad is, in itself, not a sufficient ground for rejecting a residence permit; applications concerning such 'problematic' foreign partners will have to be assessed individually.
73. Significant (2008) Kortetermijnevaluatie Wet Inburgering Buitenland. Eindrappor tage. [Short term evaluation Law Integration Abroad] Barneveld: Significant.
74. Article 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights states that public authorities may interfere with the right to free partner choice "in the interests of national security, public safety or the economic well-being of the country, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of health or morals, or for the protection of the rights and freedoms of others."