A strategy to increase cooperation in the volunteer's dilemma: Reducing vigilance improves alarm calls

Evolution

Volumn 65, Issue 3, 2011, Pages 885-892

  Archetti, Marco ^a,b  

^a HARVARD UNIVERSITY   (United States)

^b UNIVERSITY OF BASEL   (Switzerland)

Author keywords

Alarm calls; Brinkmanship; Cooperation; Game theory; Group size effect; Public goods; Social dilemma; Strategy; Vigilance

Indexed keywords

ALARM SIGNAL; ANIMAL; EVOLUTIONARILY STABLE STRATEGY; GROUP SIZE; NATURAL SELECTION; PREDATION RISK; PROBABILITY; PUBLIC GOODS; SOCIAL BEHAVIOR; VIGILANCE;

ANIMAL; ANIMAL BEHAVIOR; ARTICLE; ATTENTION; BIOLOGICAL MODEL; COOPERATION; GAME; PREDATION;

ANIMALS; ATTENTION; BEHAVIOR, ANIMAL; COOPERATIVE BEHAVIOR; GAME THEORY; MODELS, BIOLOGICAL; PREDATORY BEHAVIOR;

ANIMALIA;

EID: 79952050639     PISSN: 00143820     EISSN: 15585646     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1111/j.1558-5646.2010.01176.x     Document Type: Article

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