Notes: OIRA avoidanc

Harvard Law Review

Volumn 124, Issue 4, 2011, Pages 994-1015

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EID: 79952015256     PISSN: 0017811X     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
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References (156)

1. Martha Minow, Dean, Harvard Law Sch., Introduction of Cass R. Sunstein, Adm'r of OIRA, at Harvard Law School (Mar. 1, 2010).
2. Pub. L. No. 96-511, 94 Stat. 2812 (codified as amended in scattered sections of the U.S.C.).
3. Exec. Order No. 12,866, 3 C.F.R. 638 (1993), reprinted as amended in 5 U.S.C. § 601 (2006).
4. See generally STEPHEN G. BREYER ET AL., ADMINISTRATIVE LAW AND REGULATORY POLICY 102-22 (6th ed. 2006).
5. 5 U.S.C. § 553 (2006).
6. See Elena Kagan, Presidential Administration, 114 HARV. L. REV. 2245, 2285-90 (2001). Others have challenged this view in powerful terms.
7. See, e.g., Nicholas Bagley & Richard L. Revesz, Centralized Oversight of the Regulatory State, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 1260, 1305-10 (2006).
8. See, e.g., Steven Croley, White House Review of Agency Rulemaking: An Empirical Investigation, 70 U. CHI. L. REV. 821 (2003).
9. See, e.g., Lisa Schultz Bressman & Michael P. Vandenbergh, Inside the Administrative State: A Critical Look at the Practice of Presidential Control, 105 MICH. L. REV. 47 (2006).
10. But see Sally Katzen, A Reality Check on an Empirical Study: Comments on "Inside the Administrative State," 105 MICH. L. REV. 1497 (2007).
11. For an account of strong presidential control and regulatory coherence, see Croley, supra note 7. Others have argued that presidential control is complicated by various factors. See generally Bressman & Vandenbergh, supra note 8. Still others have argued that OIRA is subject to the same political pressures that other agencies are - and that it cannot check public choice problems in the regulatory process.
12. See Bagley & Revesz, supra note 6, at 1304-12.
13. See, e.g., Richard H. Pildes & Cass R. Sunstein, Reinventing the Regulatory State, 62 U. CHI. L. REV. 1, 5 (1995).
14. Under SEC v. Chenery Corp. (Chenery II), 332 U.S. 194 (1947), agencies have almost unfettered discretion over the choice of form by which they will take action.
15. But cf. Morton v. Ruiz, 415 U.S. 199 (1974); NLRB v. Wyman-Gordon Co., 394 U.S. 759 (1969). While the structure of E.O. 12,866 gives agencies an incentive to avoid OIRA review by acting in ways other than § 553 rulemaking, this Note will focus on OIRA avoidance within the limits of § 553.
16. It also seems plausible that agencies might try to avoid OIRA review by splitting single rules into multiple parts.
17. See Donald R. Arbuckle, OIRA and Presidential Regulatory Review: A View from Inside the Administrative State 15 (2008) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with the Harvard Law School Library).
18. See Matthew C. Stephenson, The Strategic Substitution Effect: Textual Plausibility, Procedural Formality, and Judicial Review of Agency Statutory Interpretations, 120 HARV. L. REV. 528 (2006);
19. see also M. Elizabeth Magill, Agency Choice of Policymaking Form, 71 U. CHI. L. REV. 1383 (2004).
20. Christopher C. DeMuth & Douglas H. Ginsburg, White House Review of Agency Rulemaking, 99 HARV. L. REV. 1075, 1075 (1986).
21. Id.
22. Pildes & Sunstein, supra note 10, at 15; see also id. at 11-16.
23. Id. at 14.
24. See id. at 16.
25. See Harold H. Bruff, Presidential Management of Agency Rulemaking, 57 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 533, 540-42 (1989).
26. See id. at 541-43.
27. Pub. L. No. 67-13, 42 Stat. 20.
28. See Bruff, supra note 19, at 546.
29. See, e.g., id. at 546-52; Anthony Vitarelli, Note, Happiness Metrics in Federal Rulemaking, 27 YALE J. ON REG. 115, 117-18 (2010).
30. See Vitarelli, supra note 23, at 118.
31. Pildes & Sunstein, supra note 10, at 3.
32. A regulatory impact analysis is an extensive cost-benefit analysis of a rule's potential economic impact. See John D. Graham, Saving Lives Through Administrative Law and Economics, 157 U. PA. L. REV. 395, 435 n.184 (2008).
33. See Pildes & Sunstein, supra note 10, at 3.
34. Id.
35. Id. at 4; see also id. at 4-6.
36. See, e.g., Bagley & Revesz, supra note 6, at 1263-66.
37. See, e.g., Kagan, supra note 6, at 2280
38. Alan B. Morrison, Commentary, OMB Interference with Agency Rulemaking: The Wrong Way to Write a Regulation, 99 HARV. L. REV. 1059, 1064- 65 (1986);
39. Pildes & Sunstein, supra note 10, at 5. President Clinton sought to remedy these problems in E.O. 12,866 by limiting OIRA's ability to engage in ex parte communications with parties not employed by the executive branch, see Exec. Order No. 12,866, § 6(b)(4), 3 C.F.R. 638, 647-48 (1993), reprinted as amended in 5 U.S.C. § 601 (2006), and by placing time limits on OIRA review
40. see id. § 6(b)(2), 3 C.F.R. at 646-47.
41. Kagan, supra note 6, at 2285.
42. See id. at 2286.
43. See BREYER ET AL., supra note 4, at 104.
44. See Exec. Order No. 12,291, § 3, 3 C.F.R. 127, 128-30 (1981), reprinted in 5 U.S.C. § 601.
45. Exec. Order No. 12,866, § 6(b)(1), 3 C.F.R. at 646.
46. See id. § 3(f)(2)-(4), 3 C.F.R. at 642. Sally Katzen, Administrator of OIRA under President Clinton from 1993 to 1998, states that the catch-all provisions of E.O. 12,866 were designed to explicitly allow for OIRA review of controversial regulations while at the same time freeing agencies of OIRA review of every rule, as had been the case under E.O. 12,291. Telephone Interview with Sally Katzen, former Adm'r, OIRA (Sept. 2, 2010) [hereinafter Katzen Interview] (on file with the Harvard Law School Library).
47. See Exec. Order No. 12,866, § 3(b), 3 C.F.R. at 641.
48. Exec. Order No. 12,866, § 3(f)(1)-(4), 3 C.F.R. at 641-42.
49. Id. § 6(a)(3)(A), 3 C.F.R. at 645.
50. Id. § 6(a)(3)(B)-(F), 3 C.F.R. at 645-46.
51. President Bush continued to implement E.O. 12,866, though he modified it with his own E.O. 13,422.
52. See, e.g., Nina A. Mendelson, Disclosing "Political" Oversight of Agency Decision Making, 108 MICH. L. REV. 1127, 1146 (2010). Though its impact has been disputed, E.O. 13,422 - enacted after the Democrats took control of Congress in 2006 - attempted to make significant changes to centralized review, largely with the goal of increasing presidential control of the administrative state.
53. See Michael Hissam, Essay, The Impact of Executive Order 13,422 on Presidential Oversight of Agency Administration, 76 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1292, 1296-1300 (2008). President Obama, however, rescinded E.O. 13,422 shortly after taking office, and issued a memorandum calling for a new executive order to govern the relationship between OIRA and the executive agencies and to set forth the criteria for agency rulemaking.
54. See Mark Seidenfeld, Why Agencies Act: A Reassessment of the Ossification Critique of Judicial Review, 70 OHIO ST. L.J. 251, 299 n.171 (2009). As of the date of this writing, such an executive order has not yet been issued.
55. See Mendelson, supra, at 1146-47. President Obama's brief January 18, 2011 order does not alter this Note's analysis.
56. See Exec. Order No. 13,563, 76 Fed. Reg. 3821 (Jan. 21, 2011).
57. See, e.g., Thomas O. McGarity, Some Thoughts on "Deossifying" the Rulemaking Process
58. DUKE L.J. 1385, 1405-07 (1992); Morrison, supra note 31, at 1062-71.
59. Cf. Kenneth A. Shepsle, Congress Is a "They," Not an "It": Legislative Intent as Oxymoron, 12 INT'L REV. L. & ECON. 239 (1992).
60. See, e.g., Kagan, supra note 6, at 2287.
61. See, e.g., Daniel A. Farber, Rethinking the Role of Cost-Benefit Analysis, 76 U. CHI. L. REV. 1355, 1360-67 (2009) (book review).
62. See Arbuckle, supra note 12, at 15.
63. See, e.g., Pildes & Sunstein, supra note 10, at 5.
64. See Donald R. Arbuckle, Collaborative Governance Meets Presidential Regulatory Review, 2009 J. DISP. RESOL. 343, 343 n.1.
65. Arbuckle, supra note 12, at 15.
66. Telephone Interview with Donald R. Arbuckle, Clinical Professor of Pub. Affairs, Univ. of Tex. at Dall. (Sept. 2, 2010) [hereinafter Arbuckle Interview] (on file with the Harvard Law School Library).
67. Id.
68. See James F. Blumstein, Essay, Regulatory Review by the Executive Office of the President: An Overview and Policy Analysis of Current Issues, 51 DUKE L.J. 851, 887-89 (2001).
69. Cf. Arbuckle, supra note 49, at 350-51.
70. See Christopher C. DeMuth & Douglas H. Ginsburg, Rationalism in Regulation, 108 MICH. L. REV. 877, 904-05 (2010) (book review).
71. See, e.g., id. at 904-06.
72. See Bagley & Revesz, supra note 6, at 1261-62 & nn.3-4.
73. Arbuckle Interview, supra note 51.
74. Cf. Blumstein, supra note 53, at 888-89.
75. Cf. Bagley & Revesz, supra note 6, at 1277-78.
76. Arbuckle Interview, supra note 51.
77. Id.; see also Croley, supra note 7, at 846-47.
78. Arbuckle Interview, supra note 51.
79. Id.; see also Kagan, supra note 6, at 2278 & nn.130-31.
80. Arbuckle Interview, supra note 51.
81. Id.
82. Arbuckle, supra note 12, at 15.
83. See Exec. Order No. 12,866, § 3(f), 3 C.F.R. 638, 641-42 (1993), reprinted as amended in 5 U.S.C. § 601 (2006).
84. See BREYER ET AL., supra note 4, at 499-502;
85. cf. Nat'l Petroleum Refiners Ass'n v. FTC, 482 F.2d 672, 690-91 (D.C. Cir. 1973) (Wright, J.).
86. See BREYER ET AL., supra note 4, at 489-92, 518.
87. See, e.g., id. at 499-502. More recently, United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218 (2001), limited the class of agency interpretations of law eligible for Chevron deference, making § 553 rulemaking more attractive for agencies.
88. 500 U.S. 173 (1991).
89. See Statutory Prohibition on Use of Appropriated Funds in Programs Where Abortion Is a Method of Family Planning; Standard of Compliance for Family Planning Services Projects, 53 Fed. Reg. 2922, 2939-40 (Feb. 2, 1988).
90. Katzen Interview, supra note 37.
91. See, e.g., Cary Coglianese, The Rhetoric and Reality of Regulatory Reform, 25 YALE J. ON REG. 85, 88 n.25 (2008).
92. Katzen Interview, supra note 37.
93. Arbuckle Interview, supra note 51.
94. See generally BREYER ET AL., supra note 4, at 347-404.
95. 463 U.S. 29 (1983).
96. See Ethyl Corp. v. EPA, 541 F.2d 1, 68-69 (D.C. Cir. 1976) (en banc) (Leventhal, J., concurring).
97. But see id. at 66-68 (Bazelon, C.J., concurring).
98. Arbuckle Interview, supra note 51.
99. Katzen Interview, supra note 37.
100. Id. For the Post story, see Carole Sugarman, Meat Labels to Carry Safety Instructions, WASH. POST, May 6, 1993, at A1.
101. 5 U.S.C. §§ 801-808 (2006).
102. Id. § 801(b)(1).
103. For a useful discussion, see Note, The Mysteries of the Congressional Review Act, 122 HARV. L. REV. 2162 (2009).
104. See 5 U.S.C. § 801(a)(3). Under the Administrative Procedure Act, Pub. L. No. 79-404, 60 Stat. 237 (1946) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 5 U.S.C.), the rules of federal administrative agencies become effective no fewer than thirty days after publication.
105. 5 U.S.C. § 553(d). The Congressional Review Act does not modify this baseline, except with respect to what that Act terms "major" rules.
106. See id. § 801(a)(4). "Major" rules are effectively the same as those agency actions that E.O. 12,866 characterizes as economically significant regulatory actions.
107. See Note, supra note 86, at 2166 n.28. 88
108. See 5 U.S.C. § 802.
109. Katzen Interview, supra note 37.
110. Id.
111. But cf. Bagley & Revesz, supra note 6, at 1262.
112. See Stephenson, supra note 13, at 529-30.
113. See, e.g., DeMuth & Ginsburg, supra note 55, at 907-08 & nn.77-78.
114. OIRA makes this information available on its website summarizing regulatory data.
115. See Historical Reports, OFF. INFO. & REG. AFF., http://www.reginfo. gov/public/do/eoHistoricReport (last visited Jan. 8, 2011).
116. See FAQ, OFF. INFO. & REG. AFF., http://www.reginfo.gov/public/jsp/ Utilities/faq.jsp (last visited Jan. 8, 2011).
117. See Jacob E. Gersen & Anne Joseph O'Connell, Hiding in Plain Sight? Timing and Transparency in the Administrative State, 76 U. CHI. L. REV. 1157, 1177 & n.64 (2009).
118. This comparison was done by using the search function of the regulatory review site, which contains information on Unified Agendas going back to 1995. One can search for a rule by RIN or by the use of search terms.
119. See Search of Agenda/Regulatory Plan, OFF. INFO. & REG. AFF., http://www.reginfo.gov/public/do/eAgendaSimpleSearch (last visited Jan. 8, 2011).
120. Such action could, of course, simply represent a disagreement on valuation, or otherwise on the rule's significance. Alternatively, OIRA could reclassify rules as economically significant for more straightforwardly political reasons; however, as then-Professor Kagan noted, there are easier ways for the President to influence agency rulemaking.
121. See generally Kagan, supra note 6.
122. See, e.g., David B. Spence & Lekha Gopalakrishnan, Bargaining Theory and Regulatory Reform: The Political Logic of Inefficient Regulation, 53 VAND. L. REV. 599, 616 (2000).
123. This Note's sample size is admittedly small, and these agencies may not be perfectly representative. Furthermore, this Note's methodology is subject to the obvious limitation that it will not account for the strategic behavior that OIRA did not catch. As a result, the analysis may be underinclusive and OIRA avoidance may be a more pervasive problem than the data illustrate.
124. See Bagley & Revesz, supra note 6, at 1269-70.
125. See Katzen, supra note 8, at 1500.
126. These totals were calculated by determining how many significant regulatory actions OIRA reviewed each year and then summing the totals during the period surveyed.
127. See Historical Reports, OFF. INFO. & REG. AFF., http://www.reginfo. gov/public/do/eoHistoricReport (select "Environmental Protection Agency" in "Economically Significant Reviews Completed" tab; then select year in "Select Calendar Year" tab; then follow "Submit" hyperlink) (last visited Jan. 8, 2011).
128. Since OIRA uses the same RIN for a given regulatory action - even if that regulatory action is reviewed by OIRA multiple times - a number of the RINs surveyed appeared multiple times within the EPA data set. For example, OIRA reviewed an EPA rule with the RIN 2060- AG52 - a rule dealing with emissions standards for the manufacturing of lumber and plywood - three times between 2001 and 2004. For purposes of calculating potential OIRA avoidance, it is important to use the number of unique RINs - not the total number of significant regulatory actions reviewed - to analyze whether and when OIRA avoidance may have taken place, since using all significant regulatory actions reviewed would result in inflated figures with respect to both the numerator and the denominator.
129. Ten additional rules that were initially not classified as economically significant had their classification changed to correct an underestimation of economic significance. However, these rules were subject to OIRA review under the other provisions of E.O. 12,866. Thus, they were not counted for purposes of determining the percentages relevant to OIRA avoidance.
130. These rules were, classified by RIN, Rules 2040-AD02; 2060-AG67; 2060-AG63; 2060-AG52; and 2070-AD38.
131. See Anne Joseph O'Connell, Political Cycles of Rulemaking: An Empirical Portrait of the Modern Administrative State, 94 VA. L. REV. 889, 894 n.11 (2008).
132. Cf. Jack M. Beermann & William P. Marshall, The Constitutional Law of Presidential Transitions, 84 N.C. L. REV. 1253, 1262-70 (2006).
133. But cf. Arbuckle, supra note 49, at 347 & nn.21-22.
134. For example, Rule 2060-AN98, which dealt with the implementation of EPA's Clean Air Mercury Rule, was initially classified in the Fall 2006 Unified Agenda as major and economically significant.
135. See Clean Air Mercury Rule: Federal Plan, 71 Fed. Reg. 73,887 (Dec. 11, 2006). By the time OIRA review was completed in Spring 2009, the rule was no longer classified as economically significant or major.
136. See RIN 2060-AN98, OFF. INFO. & REG. AFF., http://www.reginfo. gov/public/do/eAgendaViewRule?pubId=200904&RIN=2060-AN98 (last visited Jan. 8, 2011).
137. Cf. Kagan, supra note 6, at 2290-99.
138. Cf. Dave Owen, Probabilities, Planning Failures, and Environmental Law, 84 TUL. L. REV. 265, 292 n.155 (2009).
139. These totals were calculated by determining the number of rules the Department of Commerce submitted on behalf of NOAA to OIRA for review each year.
140. See Richard J. Fink, The National Wildlife Refuges: Theory, Practice, and Prospect, 18 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 1, 38-39 (1994).
141. These were RINs 1004-AD90, 1010-AD29, 1010-AD30, and 1029-AC56.
142. For example, in 2005, the only significant regulations of DOI's that OIRA reviewed were the FWS regulations issued that year.
143. Compare Reduction in Oil and Gas Royalty Rates in the Outer Continental Shelf Under the Deep Water Royalty Relief Act, 70 Fed. Reg. 64,836 (Oct. 31, 2005) (RIN 1010-AD29 in the Fall 2005 Unified Agenda), with RIN 1010-AD29, OFF. INFO. & REG. AFF., http://www.reginfo.gov/ public/do/eAgendaViewRule?pubId= 200710&RIN=1010-AD29 (last visited Jan. 8, 2011) (RIN 1010-AD29 in the Fall 2007 Unified Agenda).
144. Compare Oil Shale Leasing and Operations, 71 Fed. Reg. 72,822 (Dec. 11, 2006) (RIN 1004- AD90 in the Fall 2006 Unified Agenda), with RIN 1004-AD90, OFF. INFO. & REG. AFF., http://www.reginfo.gov/public/do/eAgendaViewRule?pubId= 200804&RIN=1004-AD90 (last visited Jan. 8, 2011) (RIN 1004-AD90 in the Spring 2008 Unified Agenda).
145. Compare Alternate Energy-Related Uses on the Outer Continental Shelf, 70 Fed. Reg. 64836 (Oct. 31, 2005) (RIN 1010-AD30 in the Fall 2005 Unified Agenda), with RIN 1010-AD30, OFF. INFO. & REG. AFF., http://www.reginfo.gov/public/ do/eAgendaViewRule?pubId=200810&RIN= 1010-AD30 (last visited Jan. 8, 2011) (RIN 1010-AD30 in the Fall 2008 Unified Agenda).
146. Compare Abandoned Mine Land, 72 Fed. Reg. 22,765 (Apr. 30, 2007) (RIN 1029-AC56 in the Spring 2007 Unified Agenda), with RIN 1029-AC56, OFF. INFO. & REG. AFF., http://www. reginfo.gov/public/do/eAgendaViewRule?pubId= 200810&RIN=1029-AC56 (last visited Jan. 8, 2011) (RIN 1029-AC56 in the Fall 2008 Unified Agenda).
147. See generally Magill, supra note 13; Stephenson, supra note 13.
148. See Stephenson, supra note 13, at 529-32.
149. Id. at 529-30.
150. Cf. Thomas O. McGarity, The Expanded Debate over the Future of the Regulatory State, 63 U. CHI. L. REV. 1463, 1483-1527 (1996).
151. See DeMuth & Ginsburg, supra note 55, at 904-05.
152. See generally Bagley & Revesz, supra note 6.
153. Arbuckle Interview, supra note 51.
154. See Exec. Order No. 12,866, § 3(f)(4), 3 C.F.R. 638, 642 (1993), reprinted as amended in 5 U.S.C. § 601 (2006).
155. See Michael A. Livermore, Cause or Cure? Cost-Benefit Analysis and Regulatory Gridlock, 17 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 107, 119 (2008).
156. Id.