The European union's economic constitution under the lisbon treaty: Soul-searching shifts the focus to procedure

European Law Review

Volumn 35, Issue 4, 2010, Pages 516-541

  Semmelmann, Constanze ^a,b  

^a UNIVERSITY OF ST GALLEN   (Switzerland)

^b UNIVERSITY OF OXFORD   (United Kingdom)

Author keywords

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EID: 79851478495     PISSN: 03075400     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: None     Document Type: Review

References (169)

1. Directive 2006/123 on services on the internal market [2006] OJ L376/36.
2. See, e.g. Protocol 30 on the application of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union to Poland and to the United Kingdom [2007] OJ C306/l56.
3. Report to the President of the European Commission by Mario Monti "A new strategy for the single market", presented on May 9,2010, available at hztp://ec.europa.eu/bepa/pdf/monti-reportJI nal-10-05-2010-en.pdf [ June 22, 2010] (hereinafter "Monti Report"), at pp.20, 24, 68. The report reflects the result of comprehensive formal and informal consultations carried out by the author upon request of the President of the European Commission, p. 7. Monti distinguishes between 1) some radical critics who see the internal market as a source of tensions, dislocations and fears, 2) a majority of Member States and stakeholders considered as conditional supporters, and 3) a small core of unwavering supporters of the internal market, p.20.
4. The term "economic constitution" is frequently linked to the Freiburg ordoliberal school of the early 20th centwy whose members and followers relied on this term. The meaning attached to the concept by the ordoliberal school builds upon the idea of a state based on the rule of law in which enforceable legal rules limit both economic and political power. The legal framework known as an economic constitution imbeds the analysis of economic phenomena in a politico-legal context. The economic constitution according to its historical concept was regarded as a "comprehensive decision (Gesamtentscheidung) concerning the nature (Art) and form of the process of socio-economic cooperation" (F. BOhm, Wettbewerb und Monopolkampf Eine Untersuchung zur Frage des wirtschaftlichen Kampfrechts undzur Frage der rechtlichen Struktur der geltenden Wirtschaftsordnung (1933)). The constitutional framework of the economy as understood by the ordoliberal Freiburg School was closely linked to an economic order that was based on classic liberalism and a private-law society and thus sceptical of government intervention. Ordoliberals were highly concerned with the vulnerability of the democratic state to rent-seeking by interest groups; this scepticism extended to the accumulation of private economic power that was liable to undermine economic and political freedom. Hence, economic rights and freedoms enjoyed equal status compared to traditional political rights and freedoms and aimed at limiting direct public intervention. For literature about the ordoliberal school in the English language
5. see D. Gerber, "Constitutionalizing the Economy" (1994)42 A.J. Comp. L. 25, 44 et seq.
6. W. Sauter, "The Economic Constitution of the European Union" (1998) 2 Cot. J. Eur. L. 27. The concept of an economic constitution in the context of European integration and the claims that it prescribes a market economy including competition law were introduced by prominent ordoliberal lawyers and economists such as H. v. d. Groeben, E.-J. Mestmäcker, J. Basedow, E.-U. Petersmann, M. Streit and W. Mussler.
7. W. Sauter, "The Economic Constitution of the European Union" (1998) 2 Cot. J. Eur. L. 27, 29;
8. M. Poiares Maduro, We the Court, The European Court of Justice and the European Economic Constitution. A Critical Reading ofArticle 30 of the EC Treaty (Oxford: Hart, 1998), p.7;
9. A. Peters, Theorie der Elemente der Verfassung Europas (Duncker & Humblot, 2001), p. 24;
10. A. Hatje, "The Economic Constitution within the Internal Market", in A. v. Bogdandy and J. Bast (eds), Principles of European Constitutional Law, 2nd edn (Oxford: Hart/Beck, 2010), p.589.
11. This applies regardless of whether one considers the Treaties as the constitutional charter (Parti Ecologiste Les Verts v Parliament (294/83) [1986] E.C.R. 1339; [1987] 2 C.M.L.R. 343 at [23] or whether one adopts a material
12. [1987] 2 C.M.L.R. 343 at [23] or whether one adopts a material understanding of constitutionalisation, cf., e.g. J.H.H. Weiler, "The Reformation of European Constitutionalism" (1997) 35 J.C.M.S. 97;
13. A. Arnull, "Me and my shadow: the European Court of Justice and the disintegration of EU law" (2008) 31 Fordham Int'l L.J. 1174, 1177;
14. A. Peters, Theorie der Elemente der Verfassung Europas, 2001, p.51;
15. Sauter, "The Economic Constitution of the European Union" (1998) 2 Cot. J. Eur. L. 27, 29 et seq.
16. L Azoulai, "The Court of Justice and the social market economy: The emergence of an ideal and the conditions for its realization" (2008)45 C.M.L. Rev. 1335, 1336-1337.
17. C. Joerges and F. Rödl, "Informal Politics, Formalised Law and the 'Social Deficit' of European Integration: Reflections after the Judgments of the ECJ in Viking and Laval" (2009) 15 E.L.J. 1, 2.
18. The term "market" goals seems less ambiguous and less controversial than the broader term "economic" goals. In particular in the context of certain fundamental rights, the latter appears more appropriate.
19. The discussion on the services of general economic interest, the EU's "state action doctrine" and equality law do not form part of the present article. On the broad notion of a European social policy, its ambiguity and its elements, see G. Majone, "The European Community Between Social Policy and Social Regulation" (1993)31 J.C.M.S. 153.
20. "The terminology and the concept is borrowed from B. de Witte, "Non-market values in internal market legislation" in N. Shuibhne (ed.), Regulating the internal market (Edward Elgar, 2006), p. who uses the term "non-market" values instead of "non-economic" values for values and goals that might have economically beneficial effects, but whose driving concern is not the economic cost/benefit analysis.
21. Alluding to E. Streit and W. Mussler, "The Economic Constitution of the European Community: from Rome to Maastricht" (1995)1 E.LJ. 5.
22. See, e.g. F. Snyder, New Directions in European Community Law (London: 1990), pp. et seq.;
23. C. Barnard, "EC 'Social Policy" in P. Craig and G. de Bürca (eds), The Evolution of EU Law (Oxford University Press, 1999), pp. 16;
24. P. Syrpis, "The Integrationist Rationale for European Social Policy" in J. Shaw (ed.), Social Law and Policy in an Evolving European Union (Oxford: Hart, 2000), pp. 7-31;
25. F. Rödl, "The Labour Constitution", in Bogdandy and Bast (eds), Principles of European Constitutional Law, 2010, p.623;
26. Monti Report, http://ec.europa .eu/bepa/pdf/montireportJmnaljO-05-2010- en.pdf June 22, 2010], pp. et seq.
27. Ohlin Report (1957), Report of a Group of Experts, Social Aspects of European Economic Co-operation, Geneva.
28. French original version of Spaak Report available at: Comité Intergouvernemental créé par Ia Conference de Messine, Rapport des Chefs de Délégation aux Ministres des Affaires Etrangéres (Universidad de Zaragoza, 2003),http://www.unizar.es/euroconstitucion/library/ historic%20documents/Rome/preparation/Spaak%20report%20fr.pdf[ July 2, 2010]. Unofficial English translation available at: Information Service High Authority of The European Community for Coal and Steel Luxembourg, Intergovernmental Committee on European Integration. The Brussels Report on the General Common Market (abridged, English translation of document commonly called the Spaak Report) [ 1956] (University of Pittsburgh, 2004), Archive of European Integration, http://aei.pitt.edu/995 / July 2,2010].
29. See for details S. Giubboni, Social Rights and Market Freedoms in the European Constitution. A Labour Law Perspective (Cambridge University Press, 2006);
30. C. Barnard, "EC 'Social Policy" in P. Craig and G. de Bi (eds), The Evolution of EU Law, 1999, pp.479-516;
31. D. Schiek, Europaisches Arbeitsrecht, 3rd edn (Nomos, 2007) with a comprehensive historical part.
32. E.J. Mestmãcker, "On the Legitimacy of European Law" (1994) RabelsZeitschrift 615.
33. See for detailed discussions on several non-market goals: S. de Vries, Tensions within the Internal Market-The Functioning of the Internal Market and the Development of Horizontal and Flanking Policies (Europa Law Publishing, 2006)
34. B. de Witte, "Non-market values in internal market legislation" in Shuibhne (ed.), Regulating the internal market, 2006, p.61;
35. C. Townley, Article 81 EC and Public Policy (Oxford: Hart, 2009);
36. G. Monti, "Article 81 EC and Public Policy" (2002) 39 C.M.L. Rev. 1057.
37. See for details Sauter, "The Economic Constitution of the European Union" (1998) 2 Cot. J. Eur. L. 27.
38. See further M. Poiares Maduro, "Striking the Elusive Balance Between Economic Freedom and Social Rights in the EU" in Philip Aiston (ed.), The EU and Human Rights (Oxford University Press, 1999), pp.449 et seq.
39. M. Dawson, "The ambiguity of social European in the open method of co-ordination" (2009) 24 E.L. Rev. 55, 58 et seq.
40. Cf. art.153(3)TFEU(ex 137(3) EC) relating to the implementation of a Directive by management and labour and arts 154 and 155 (ex 138 and 139 EC) governing the social dialogue.
41. Wouters v Algemene Raad van de Nederlandse Orde van Advocaten (C-309/99) [2002] E.C.R. 1-1577; [2002] 4 C.M.L.R. 27; Criminal Proceedings against Arduino (C-35/99) [2002] E.C.R. 1-1529; [2002] 4 C.M.L.R. 25.
42. Ambulanz Glöckner v Landkreis Sudwestpfalz(C-475/00) [2001] E.C.R. 1-8089; [2002] 4 C.M.L.R. 21.
43. Albany International BV v Stichting Bedriifspensioenfonds Textielindustrie (C-67/96) [1999] E.C.R. 1-5751; [2000] 4 C.M.L.R. 446.
44. Meca-Medina (C-5 19/04P) [2006] E.C.R. 1-6996.
45. See, e.g. art.153(2) TFEU (ex 137(2) EC).
46. C. Scott, "Governing Without Law or Governing Without Government? Newish Governance and the Legitimacy of the EU" (2009) 15 E.L.J. 160, 162.
47. For arguments in favour of an open economic constitution, see P Verloren van Themaat, "Die Aufgabenverteilung zwischen dem Gesetzgeber und dem EuGH bei der Gestaltung der WirtschafIsverfassung der EG" in E.J. Mestmäcker et al. (eds), Eine Ordnungspolitikfzir Europa (Nomos, 1987), pp. et seq.;
48. A. Hatje, "The Economic Constitution within the Internal Market, in A. v. Bogdandy and J. Bast (eds), Principles of European Constitutional Law, 2nd revised edn, (Oxford: Hart, 2010), p.590;
49. C. Nowak, "Binnenmarkt und Wirtschaftsverfassung" (2009) Europarecht Beihefi 1, 129, 143 et seq.;
50. M. Poiares Maduro, We the Court, The European Court of Justice and the European Economic Constitution. A Critical Reading of Article 30 of the EC Treaty, 1998, p.151;
51. J. Drexl, "Competition Law as a Part of the European Constitution", in A. v. Bogdandy and J. Bast (eds), Principles of European Constitutional Law, 2nd edn, 2010, p. at 696;
52. M. Ruffert in C. Calliess and M. Ruffert, EU EGV, 3rd edn (Beck, 2007), art.2, para.10.
53. Internationl Transport Workers 'Federation v Viking Line ABP (C-438/05) [2007] E.C.R. 1-10779;
54. [2008] 1 C.M.L.R. 51; Laval un Partneri Ltdv Svens/ca Byggnadsarbetareforbundet (C-34 1/05) [2007] E.C.R. 1-11767;
55. [2008] 2 C.M.L.R. 9; cf. also Defrenne vSA BelgedeNavigationAerienne (SABENA) (43/75) [1976] E.C.R. 455;
56. [1976] 2 C.M.L.R. 98 at [10] in the context of the direct effect of the current art.157 TFEU (ex-art.141 EC).
57. Viking Line (C-438/05) [2007] E.C.R. 1-10779 at [78] [79] and Laval (C-34 1/05) [2007] E.C.R. 1-11767 at [103] [104]
58. Monti Report, http://ec.europa.eu/bepa/pdf/monti-reportJInal-1O-05-2010- en.pdf [Accessed June 22, 2010], p.26.
59. In his report, Monti points to a serious problem caused by the "anti-labour bias of tax competition", Monti Report, http.i/ec.eumpa.eu/bepa/pdf/monti-reportjmnal-1O-05-2010-en.pdf [Accessed June 22,2010], pp.26,79. Accordingly, the budgetary means to enact redistribution policies may be eroded by some forms of tax competition which place mobile tax bases at an advantageous position to the disadvantage of less mobile tax bases like labour income.
60. The Monti Report identifies a number of concerns such as social concerns which may threaten the acceptance of the internal market. In this context he expressly distinguishes between four categories of Member States: Monti mentions, first, the continental social-market economy countries which assign greater attention to social concerns in relation to the effects of the market processes and which are no longer the driving forces of market integration. This role has been taken over by the second group, consisting of the Anglo-Saxon countries which are strongly in favour of market opening and changes in the structure of industry towards services. The New Member States represent the third group which tends to give priority to the market, competition and growth over heavy social protection. The fourth category includes the Nordic countries which combine market opening and competition, on the one hand, and social protection based more on safety nets for individual workers than on the preservation of specific jobs made obsolete by technological and economic change, on the other, what has become known as "flexi-curity", see http.//ec .europa.eu/bepa/pdf/monti-reportJlnal-1O-05-2010-en.pdf [Accessed June 22, 2010], pp. 28-30.
61. cf. e.g. C. Joerges and F. Rodl, "Social Market Economy" as Europe c social model'?, EUI Working Paper 2004/08.
62. H. Zacher in J. Isensee and P. Kirchhoff (eds), Handbuch des Staatsrechts der Bundesrepublik Deutschland, II, 3rd edn (C.F. MUller, 2003), s.28, paras 57-62;
63. Joerges and Rodl, "Social Market Economy" as Europe s social model?, EUI Working Paper 2004/08, p. 6.
64. M. Ruffert in C. Calliess and M. Ruffert (eds), Verfassung der Europdischen Union (Beck, 2006), arts 1-3, para.37 as to the concept of the social market economy in the Constitutional Treaty.
65. Azoulai "The Court of Justice and the social market economy" (2008) 45 C.M.L. Rev. 1335, 1337;
66. Joerges and Rödl, "Social Market Economy" as Europe s social model?, EUI Working Paper 2004/08, p.20.
67. See as to the Constitutional Treaty, J. Baquero Cruz, "The socio-economic model of the European Union" in G. Amato, H. Bribosia and B. de Wine (eds), Genesis and destiny of the European Constitution (Brussels: Bruylant, 2007), p. 119;
68. Nowak, "Binnenmarkt und Wirtschaftsverfassung" (2009) Europarecht Beihefi 1, 184;
69. J. Schwarze, "Das wirtschaftsverfassungsrechtliche Konzept des Verfassungsentwurfes des Europaischen Konvents" (2004) EUZW 135, 136.
70. Monti Report, http://ec.europa.eulbepa!pdf/monti-report-final-10-05-2010- en.pdf [Accesed June 22, 2010], p.33. In his recommendations, he places emphasis on the improvement of transnational labour mobility and flanking measures, pp.56-59 rather than focusing on market-correcting measures.
71. Azoulai, "The Court of Justice and the social market economy" (2008)45 C.M.L. Rev. 1335, 1337.
72. Artical 51 TEU.
73. Similary see N. Kroes, "Competition Policy: Achievements in 2006
74. Work Program in 2007
75. Priorities for 2008
76. European Parliament Economic and Monetary Affairs Committee", Speech /07/425, Brussels, June 26, 2007, hitp://leumpa.eu/rapid/pressReieasesAction. do?reference=SPEECH/07/1425&format=HTML&aged=0&language= EN&guiLanguage=en [Accessed June 22, 2010];
77. Whish, Competition Law, 6th edn (OUP 2009), p.51.
78. See, e.g. Metro SB-Grossmarkte GmbH & Co KG v Commission (C-26/76) [1977] E.C.R. 1875; [1978] 2 C.M.L.R.[20]
79. see also the opinion of A.G. Roemer and the judgment in Etablissements Consten Sari and Grundig v Commission (56 & 58/64) [1966] E.C.R. 299; [1966] C.M.L.R. 418 on the impact of vertical restraints on competition.
80. For a discussion on this point see the conference contributions L. Idot et at., "La place du droit de Ia concurrence dans le future ordre juridique communautaire" (2008) Concurrences 79;
81. see also S. Wemicke, "Der Vertrag von Lissabon und das Wettbewerbsprinzip - status quo ante, Neugewichtung oder Unwucht?" in I. Pernice (ed.), Kolioquium 10. Geburisrag W Halistein institut (Nomos, 2008), p. 88;
82. Drexl, "Competition Law as a Part of the European Constitution", in Principles of European Constitutional Law, 2010, p.659.
83. For a comparison, see F. Snyder, "Ideologies of Competition in European Community Law" (1989) 52 Modern Law Review 149;
84. O. Odudu, The Boundaries of EC Competition Law. The Scope ofArticle 81 EC (Oxford University Press, 2006), pp.9-22;
85. C. Semmelmann, Social policy goals in the interpretation ofArticle 81 EC (Nomos, 2008), pp.46-61.
86. The freedom-based concepts consider competition and freedom to compete as a value in itself (that is intended nonetheless to produce wealth), cf. E.-J. Mestm and H. Schweitzer, Europäisches Wettbewerbsrecht (Beck, 2004), s.2, paras 93-94;
87. see also G. Monti, EC Competition Law (Cambridge University Press, 2007), pp.20-51 on the core values of EU competition law, including the freedom-based approach; cf. ECJ cases on arts 81 and 82 EC such as GlaxoSmithKline Services Unlimited v Commission (C-SO 1/06 P) [ 4 C.M.L.R. 2 at [ or British Airways Plc v Commission of the European Communities (C-95/04 P) [ E.C.R. 1-2331; [ 4 C.M.L.R. 22 at [ It remains to be seen to what extent the economic fundamental rights included in the Charter will affect the evolution of the goals of EU competition law.
88. cf, e.g. R. Whish, Competition Law, 6th edn (Oxford University Press, 2008);
89. B. Sufrmn and A. Jones, EC Competition Law, 3rd edn (Oxford University Press, 2007), p. 8;
90. O. Odudu, The boundaries of EC competition law: the scope ofArticle 81 (Oxford University Press, 2006);
91. P. Akman, "Searching for the Long-Lost Soul of Article 82 EC" (2009) 29 Oxf. J.L.S. 267-303;
92. GlaxoSmithKline Services Unlimited v Commission (T-168/Ol) [2010] E.C.R. 11-2969; [63] 5 C.M.L.R. 29 at [118] et seq. (approach not affirmed in the appeals judgment in GlaxoSmithKline Services Unlimitedv Commission (C-SO 1/06 P) [2010] 4 C.M.L.R. 2 at [63] Guidelines on the application of Article 81(3) of the Treaty [2004] OJ Cl 01, para. 13; DO Competition, Staff Discussion Paper on the application ofArticle 82 of the Treaty to exclusionary abuses, paras 4 and 54; in the same direction European Commission, Guidance on its enforcement priorities in applying Article 82 EC to abusive exclusionary conduct by dominant undertakings (December 3, 2008).
93. For very insightful comparisons of freedom-based approach and utilitarian approaches, see A. van Aaken, How to do Constitutional Law and Economics. A Methodological Proposal, University of St Gallen Working Law and Economic Paper 2008/04, p.5;
94. O. Andriychuk, "Dialectical Antitrust: An Alternative Insight into the Methodology of the EC Competition Law Analysis in a Period of Economic Downturn" (2010) 31 Eur. Comp. L. Rev. 155;
95. H. Schweitzer, "The role of consumer welfare in EU competition law", in J. Drexl et. al. (eds), Festschri/ifi)r Hanns Ullrich zum 70. Geburtstag, 2009;
96. L. Lovdahl-Gormsen, "Consumer Welfare and Economic Freedom in EC Abuse Cases: Parallels and Divergences with the Structuralist Tradition in the US" (2008)4 Eur. Comp. L. Rev. 221-241;
97. H. Schweitzer, "The History, Interpretation and Underlying Principles of Sec. 2 Sherman Act and Art. 82 EC" in C.D. Ehlerman/M. Marquis (eds), A reformed approach to Article 82 EC, European Competition Law Annual, 2007, (Oxford: Hart, 2008), pp. 19-164;
98. Drexl, "Competition Law as a Part of the European Constitution", in A. v. Bogdandy and J. Bast (eds), Principles of European Constit utional Law, 2nd edn, 2010, p.659;
99. on the evolution of EU competition policy, A. Weitbrecht, "From Freiburg to Chicago and Beyond" (2008) 29 Eur. Comp. L. Rev. 81.
100. For a summary of the debate, see Wernicke, "Der Vertrag von Lissabon und das Wettbewerbsprinzip" in Pernice (ed.), Kolloquium 10. Geburtstag W Halistein Institut, 2008, pp. 88 et seq.
101. Articles 2 and 4(1) EC; art. 119(1) TFEU; Monti Report, http://ec.europa.eu/bepa/pdf/monti-reportJmnal-10-05-20 [Accessed June 22, 2010], pp. 2, 107;
102. M.E. Stucke, "Reconsidering competition and the goals of competition law", contribution to the 5th ASCOLA Conference, May 27-29, 2010 in Bonn, p.44,
103. on file with the author; L. Parret, "Shouldn't we know what we are protecting? Yes, we should!", contribution to the 5th ASCOLA Conference, May 27-29, 2010 in Bonn, p.3,
104. on file with the author; see also C.D. Ehlermann/L. Laudati, European Competition Annual. Objectives of compel ition policy (Oxford: Hart, 1998), introduction.
105. For one of the latest cases reflecting the struggle for a coherent EU competition policy, cf. the ECJ's appeals judgment in GlaxoSmithKline (C-SO 1/06 P) [ 4 C.M.L.R. 2, in particular at [63]
106. See, e.g. the codified or non-codified limitations to the free movement provisions or art. 101(3) TFEU (ex-art.8 1(3) TEC). The case of Albany International B V v Stichling Bedr(/fspensionenfonds Textielindustrie (C-67/96) [1999]E.C.R. 1-5751;
107. [2004] 4 C.M.L.R. 446, which puts forward an ipso facto exemption for certain collective bargaining agreements from art.lOl TFEU has a narrow field of application and cannot be transferred to situations which are not characterized by the aim to avoid a direct contradiction within the Treaty, see further C. Semmelmann, Social policy goals in the interpretation ofArticle 81 EC, 2008, pp. 1 et seq;
108. similarly see A.G. Trstenjak in Commission v Germany (C-271/08) Opinion of April 14,2010 at [54]-[68]
109. EU Charter of Fundamental Rights [2007] OJ C303.
110. cf. preamble to EU Charter of Fundamental Rights.
111. M. Poiares Maduro, "The Double Constitutional Life of the Charter of Fundamental Rights" in T. Hervey and J. Kenner, Economic and social rights under the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights (Oxford: Hart, 2006), pp.269, 282.
112. Poiares Maduro, "The Double Constitutional Life of the Charter of Fundamental Rights" in Hervey and Kenner, Economic and social rights under the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights, 2006, p. 286.
113. See on the distinct trajectory fundamental social rights B. de Witte, "The Trajectory of Fundamental Social Rights in the European Union" in de Bürca and B. de Wifte (eds), Social Rights in Europe (Oxford University Press, 2005), pp. 53 et seq.
114. See further, e.g. N.N. Shuibhne, "The reality of rights, from rhetoric to opt-out" (2009) 34 E.L. Rev. 815.
115. See Protocol 30 on the application of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union to Poland and to the United Kingdom [ OJ C306/156 art.l(2). This Protocol will be extended to the Czech Republic in the framework of the next accession treaty
116. See e.g. with regard to the UK opt-out, D. Chalmers, "EU won't rule by Charter" on BBC News, available at http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/8369636. srm [Accessed January 31, 20101.
117. D. Chalmers, "EU won't rule by Charter" on BBC News, available at hitp://news.bbc.co.ukJl/hi/8369636.stm [Accessed January 31, 2010].
118. See further N.N. Shuibhne, "Margins of appreciation, national values, fundamental rights and EC free movement law" (2009) 34 E.L. Rev. 242.
119. Elliniki Radiophonia Tiléorassi AE v Dimotiki Etairia Pliroforissis (C-260/89) [ E.C.R. 1-2925; [1994] 4 C.M.L.R. 540.
120. Hubert Wachauf v Bundesamt für Erndhrung undForstwirlschaft (5/88) [1991] E.C.R. 2609; [ 1 C.M.L.R. 328
121. Artical 6(1) and (2) TEU; art.51(2) Charter of Fundamental Rights.
122. Articles 27, 30,31,32,33 Charter of Fundamental Rights.
123. Azoulai "The Court of Justice and the social market economy" (2008)45 C.M.L. Rev. 1335, 1340.
124. Azoulai "The Court of Justice and the social market economy" (2008)45 C.M.L. Rev. 1335, 1340.
125. Viking Line (C-438/05) [2007] E.C.R. 1-10779 at [40 Laval (C-34l/05) [2007 E.C.R. 1-11767 at [87 R. (on application of Watts) v Bedford Primary Care Trust (C-372/04) [2006 E.C.R. 1-4325; [2006 3 C.M.L.R. 5 at 92Tas-Hagen v Raadskamer WUBO van de Pensioen- en Uilkeringsraad(C-1 92/05) [2006 E.C.R. 1-10451; [2007 C.M.L.R. 23 at [21][22 ]- Decker v Caisse de Maladie des Employes Prives (C- 120/95) [1998] E.C.R. 1-1831; 1998 2 C.M.L.R. 879 at [23 Kohl! v Union des Caisses de Maladie (C- 158/96) [1998 E.C.R. 1-1931; [18] C.M.L.R. 928 at [19]
126. Azoulai "The Court of Justice and the social market economy" (2008)45 C.M.L. Rev. 1335, 1342.
127. eg. EU Charter of Fundamental Rights art.28 (right of collective bargaining and action).
128. e.g. EU Charter of Fundamental Rights art.24(2) first option (rights of the child); art.29 (right of access to placement service).
129. e.g. EU Charter of Fundamental Rights art.27 (information and consultation within the undertaking); art.3 1 (fair just working conditions).
130. See for a brief discussion in English, B. de Witte, "The Trajectory of Fundamental Social Rights in the European Union" in de Bürca and de Witte (eds), Social Rights in Europe, 2005, p.155
131. Artical 51(1) of the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights.
132. Artical 52(5) of the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights.
133. Artical 52(5) of the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights.
134. Lueth BVerfGE 7 German Federal Constitutional Court at 198 on the justification for the indirect horizontal effect of fundamental rights.
135. The horizontal direct effect is understood as the scope ratione personae of the respective provisions.
136. See most recently, A.G. Bot in Kücükdeveci v Swedex GmbH & Co KG (C-555/07) January 19, 2010 at [90] concerning age discrimination.
137. Commission v France (C-265/95) [1997] E.C.R. 1-6959;
138. Eugen Schmidberger Internationale Transporte Planzuge vAustria (C-i 12/00) [2003] E.C.R. 1-5659; [2002] 2 C.M.L.R. 34.
139. Wa/rave vAssociation Union Cycliste Internationale (36/74) [1974] E.C.R. 1405; [1975] 1 C.M.L.R. 320;
140. Doná Mantem (13/76) [1976] E.C.R. 1333; [1976] 2 C.M.L.R. 578;
141. Union Royale Beige des Societes de Football Association (ASBL) v Bos,nan (415/93) [1995] E.C.R. 1-4921; [1996] C.M.L.R. 645;
142. Deliége v Ligue Francophone de Judo et Disciplines Associees ASBL (C-S 1/96 & 191/97) [2000] E.C.R. 1-2549; [2002] 2 C.M.L.R. 65;
143. Lehtonen Federation Royale Beige des Socieles de Basket-Bali ASBL (FRBSB) (C- 176/96) [2000] E.C.R. 1-2861; [2000] 3 C.M.L.R. 409.
144. Angonese v Cassa di Risparmio di Bo/zano SpA (28 1/98) [2000] E.C.R. 1-4 139; [2000] 2 C.M.L.R. 1120.
145. Viking Line (C-438/05) [2007] E.C.R. 1-10779 at [33] and the case law cited; A.G. Maduro in International Transport Workers 'Federation v Viking Line ABP (C-438/05) [207] E.C.R. 1-10779.
146. Viking Line (C-438/05) [2007] E.C.R. 1-10779 at [34] and [37]
147. Viking Line (C-438/05) [2007] E.C.R. 1-10779 at[64] [65]
148. R. Gilmour and L. Jensen, "Reinventing Government Accountability: Public Functions, Privatisation and the Meaning of 'State Action"(1998) 58 PublicAdministrarionReview247-258;
149. J. Baquero Cruz, Between Competition and Free Movement (Oxford: Hart, 2002), pp. 1 et seq.;
150. C. Baudenbacher, "Funktionszuwachs des Staates als Wirtschaftsrechtliches Problem" (1985) Schweizer AktiengesellschafI, pp.57 et seq.;
151. R. Streinz and S. Leible, "Die unmittelbare Drittwirkung der Grundfreiheiten" (2000) Eu ZW 459 et seq.;
152. K. Mortelmans, "Towards Convergence in the Application of the Rules on Free Movement and Competition?" (2001)38 C.M.L. Rev. 613 et seq.
153. Viking Line (C-438/05) [2007] E.C.R. 1-10779 at [65] mentions the autonomous power of trade unions pursuant their trade unions' rights.
154. See the submissions made by the Member States and the parties to the national proceedings in Lava! and Viking before the ECJ, presented in B. Bercusson, "Judgment Day" (2007) 13 E.L.J. 279, 287 et seq.
155. See A.G. Maduro in International Transport Workers 'Federation v Viking Line ABP (C-438/05) [2007] E.C.R. 1-10779 at [47] [70]
156. Defrence (43/75) [1976] E.C.R. 455 at [40] as for the direct effect of the former art.l41 EC.
157. B. de Witte, "The Trajectory of Fundamental Social Rights in the European Union" in de Bürca and de Witte (eds), Social Rights in Europe, 2005, p.153.
158. M. Borowsky in J. Meyer, Charta der Grundrechie, 2nd edn (Nomos, 2006), p.542
159. A.G. Bot in Kücukdeveci (C-555107) January 19,2010 at [70] [79] [90] who derives the argument in favour of direct effect of the prohibition of age discrimination from the hierarchy of norms and in particular from the finding a directive cannot reduce the scope of a general principle of EC law.
160. Kucukdeveci (C-555107) January 19, 2010 at [55]
161. R. Gilmour and L. Jensen, "Reinventing Government Accountability: Public Functions, Privatisation and the Meaning of 'State Action" (1998)58 Public Administration Review 247-258;
162. J. Baquero Cruz, Between Competition Free Movement (Oxford: Hart, 2002), pp. 21 et seq.;
163. C. Baudenbacher, "Funktionszuwachs des Staates als Wirtschaftsrechtliches Problem" (1985) Schweizer Aktiengesellschaft, pp.57 et seq.;
164. R. Streinz and S. Leible, "Die unmittelbare Drittwirkung der Grund&eiheiten" (2000) Eu ZW 459 et seq.;
165. K. Mortelmans, "Towards Convergence the Application of the Rules on Free Movement and Competition?" (2001) 38 C.M.L. Rev. 613 et seq.
166. See the submissions made by the Member States and the parties to the national proceedings in Lava! and Viking before the ECJ, presented in B. Bercusson, "Judgment Day", (2007) 13 E.L.J., 279, 287 et seq.
167. J. Krzeminska-Vamvaka, Horizontal effect offundamental rights and freedoms-much ado about nothing? German, Polish and EU theories compared after Viking Line, Jean-Monnet Working Paper 11/09, p.4;
168. in the same direction and pointing to the fact that the nexus between economic integration and non-discrimination on grounds of nationality has become weaker and weaker, in particular where the free movement of persons is concerned, S. Prechal and S. de Vries, "Seamless web of judicial protection in the internal market?" (2009) 34 E.L. Rev. 1, 7.
169. See, e.g. Shuibhne, "Margins of appreciation, National values, fundamental rights and EC free movement law" (2009) 34 E.L. Rev. 242, 235-237, who discusses the possibility of conceiving of certain free movement provisions fundamental rights; similarly S. Prechal and S. de Vries, "Seamless web ofjudicial protection in the internal market?" (2009) 34 E.L. Rev. 1, 7.