Towards convergence in the application of the rules on free movement and on competition?

Common Market Law Review

Volumn 38, Issue 3, 2001, Pages 613-649

  Mortelmans, Kamiel ^a  

^a UTRECHT UNIVERSITY   (Netherlands)

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EID: 26444454041     PISSN: 01650750     EISSN: 18758320     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1023/A:1010636727520     Document Type: Article

References (166)

1. 1. Communication made pursuant to Art. 19(3) of Council Regulation No 17, O.J. 1999, C 363/2, No. 10.
2. 2. Case C-415/93, Bosman, [1995] ECR I-4921, at para 106.
3. 3. The only case to date is that of Campalimaud. In this case, a Spanish bank acquired two Portuguese banks. The Portuguese Government opposed this acquisition on the basis of the need for the protection of national and strategic interests. To the extent that this exception was based on Art. 21 of de Merger Regulation the Commission considered that this Article was not applicable because the Portuguese Government had not announced its intention to oppose and because the measure was disproportionate. Competition Policy Letter, 1999, No. 3, Oct., p. 48. See too, Mohamed, “National interests limiting E.U. cross border banking mergers”, 21 ECLR (2000), 248.
4. 4. Gyselen, “The emerging interface between competition policy and environmental policy in the EC” in Cameron and May (Eds.), Trade and Environment (London, 1994), p. 242. See also Case C-379/98, PreussenElektra, judgment of 13 March 2001, nyr, at para 63.
5. 5. Case 8/74, Dassonville, [1974] ECR 837; Case 229/83, Leclerc, [1985] ECR 1; Case 387/93, Banchero, [1995] ECR I-4666.
6. 6. Bosman, cited supra note 2. Joined Cases C-51/96 en C-191/97, Deliége, [2000] ECR I-2549; Case C-176/96, Lethonen, [2000] ECR I-2681.
7. 7. In Case C-411/98, Ferlini, [2000] ECR I-8081, on the public health policy in Luxembourg, no questions were asked on the competition rules (Art. 81 EC), despite the fact that the plaintiff had invoked these provisions. The national court restricted its questions to the free movement aspects. Conversely in Joined Cases C-430 & 431/93, Van Schijndel, [1995] ECR I-4705 the Hoge Raad of the Netherlands did not submit questions on the provisions on free movement and confined the substantive part of its request to the competition rules.
8. rd ed. (L.W. Gormley) (London, 1998), p. 1083.
9. 9. The regulatory powers of the Community in the field of public health (Art. 152 EC) were extended by the Treaty of Amsterdam as a result of the BSE crisis.
10. 10. As a result of the attribution of regulatory powers in these policy areas, conflicts concerning the choice of the correct legal base occur regularly: internal market (Art. 95 EC) or the particular policy area. These conflicts can lead to very fundamental judgments of the ECJ, as is made clear by Case C-376/98, Federal Republic of Germany v. Council and European Parliament, [2000] ECR I-8419. See Editorial Comment, “Taking (the limits of) competences seriously”, 37 CML Rev. (2000), 1301.
11. 11. Case 5/77, Tedeschi, [1977] ECR 1555. In this Judgment the Court held that Art. 30 EC can only be invoked in the absence of Community measures governing the subject matter at hand.
12. 12. Dougan, “Minimum harmonization and the Internal Market”, 37 CML Rev. (2000), 853.
13. 13. This concerns the Treaty provisions on cultural and education policy (see Arts. 149 and 151 EC). This does not prevent the Community, however, from adopting directives or regulations on the export of works of art or on the freedom of establishment of teachers. These measures are based on the provisions on commercial policy and internal market respectively.
14. 14. Germany v. Council and EP, cited supra note 10.
15. 15. See e.g. Case C-158/96, Kohll, [1998] ECR I-1931. Case C-9/99, Echirolles Distribution, [2000] ECR I-8207.
16. 16. See e.g. Resolution of the Council of 7 Oct. 1997 on environmental agreements, O.J. 1997, C 321/6. For this subject, see Jans, European Environmental Law, 2nd ed. (Groningen, 2000), p. 288.
17. 17. For a discussion of a number of national decisions on sports, see, Brinckman and Vollebregt, “The marketing of sport and its relation to EC competition law”, 19 ECLR 1998, 281. Van den Brink, “E.C. competition law and the Regulation football”, (2000) ECLR, 359 and 420.
18. 18. For this matter, see Ehlermann, “The Modernization of EC Antitrust Law: A legal and cultural revolution”, 37 CML Rev. (2000), 537.
19. 19. As was explicitly stated by the Court in Echirolles Distribution, cited supra note 15, at para 24. This case concerned the interpretation of Arts. 28, 30 and 81 EC in relation to the French fixed prices for books. The Court applied its established case law on this point (Leclerc, cited supra note 5) to the case in hand.
20. 20. Everling, “Zu den Querschnittsklauseln im EG-Vertrag” in M élanges en hommage à Ferdinand Schockweiler (Baden-Baden, 1999), p. 131.
21. 21. In the conclusions of the European Council in Nice, Dec. 2000, the European Council invites the Council and the Commission to continue their discussions in the framework of the guidelines and provisions of Art. 16 EC.
22. 22. On this point, see Behrens, “Die Konvergenz der wirtschaftlichen Freiheiten im europäischen Gemeinschaftsrecht”, 27 EuR (1992), 145. Mortelmans, “Excepties bij non-tarifaire belemmeringen: assimilatie in het nieuwe EG-verdrag?” (1997) SEW, 182. Oliver, “Goods and Services: two freedoms compared” in M élanges en hommage à Michel Wael-broeck (Brussels, 1999), p. 1377. Jarass, “Elemente einer Dogmatik der Grundfreiheiten”, 30 EuR (1995), 202 and 35 EuR (2000), 705; Roth, “Diskriminierende Regelungen des Waren-verkehrs und Rechtfertigung durch die ‘zwingenden Erfordernisse’ des Allgemeininteresses”, (2000) WRP, 979.
23. 23. Roth, op. cit. supra note 22, p. 983.
24. 24. Case 120/78, Rewe (Cassis de Dijon), [1979] ECR 649.
25. 25. E.g. Case C-2/90, Commission v. Belgium (Walloon Waste), [1992] ECR I-4431. For a more detailed analysis, see Roth, op. cit. supra note 22; Barnard, “Fitting the remaining pieces into the goods and persons jigsaw?” 26 EL Rev. (2001), 54. See also PreussenElektra cited supra note 4.
26. 26. Joined Cases C-267/91 en C-268/91, Keck & Mithouard, [1993] ECR I-6097. Case C-384/93, Alpine Investements, [1995] ECR I- 1141. Bosman, cited supra note 2. Case C-189/95, Franzé n, [1997] ECR I-5909. See, on this subject, Da Cruz Vilaca, “An exercise on the application of Keck and Mithouard in the field of free provision of services” in M élanges Waelbroeck, op. cit. supra note 22, p. 797. O’Keeffe and Bavasso, “Four freedoms, one market and national competence: In search of a dividing line” in Liber Amicorum in Honour of Lord Slynn of Hadley (The Hague, 2000), p. 548.
27. 27. Case C-55/94, Gebhard, [1995] ECR I-4165.
28. 28. Case C-3/95, Broede, [1996] ECR I-6511.
29. 29. E.g. Case C-35/98, Verkooijen, [2000] ECR I-4071. Whereas this case concerned the free movement of capital, the Court in answering the questions submitted refers to its case law on the free movement of services and freedom of establishment. Case C-250/95, Futura, [1997] ECR I-2471. This case concerns the freedom to provide services. In its Judgment the Court refers to its case law on freedom of establishment and the free movement of workers and goods in order to support its interpretation.
30. 30. Case C-2/91, Meng, [1993] ECR I-5751. See also PreussenElektra, cited supra note 4 at para 65.
31. 31. Ibid. at p. 5768–5770.
32. 32. The matter was also not touched upon in Case C-35/96, Commission v. Italy, [1998] ECR I-3851, despite the fact that in that case the new norm had been violated.
33. 33. Schmid, “Diagonal competence conflicts between European competition law and national regulation – a conflict of laws reconstruction of the dispute on book price fixing”, (2000) European Review of Private Law, 155.
34. 34. Gyselen, op. cit. supra note 4.
35. 35. P. VerLoren van Themaat, “Gaat de Luxemburgse rechtspraak over de vier vrijheden en die over het mededingingsbeleid uiteenlopen?” (1998) SEW, 398.
36. 36. Stuyck, “Libre circulation et concurrence: les deux piliers du Marché commun” in M élanges Waelbroeck, op. cit. supra note 22, p. 1478.
37. 37. O’Keeffe and Bavasso, op. cit supra note 26.
38. 38. Ibid, p. 544.
39. 39. Ibid, p. 554.
40. 40. Ibid, p. 554–555. On the distinction between the rule-like test and the standard-like test, Wils, “The search for the rule in Art. 30 EEC”, 18 EL Rev. (1993), 475.
41. 41. Case C-412/93, Leclerc-TF1, [1995] ECR I-179, at para 38.
42. 42. Joined Cases C-215/96 en C-216/96, Bagnasco, [1999] ECR I-135.
43. 43. Case C-363/93, Lancry, [1994] ECR I-3956.
44. 44. O’Keeffe and Bavasso, op. cit supra note 26, p. 555–556.
45. 45. Gyselen, op. cit. supra note 4, p. 242.
46. 46. Gyselen, op. cit. supra note 4, p. 245–246.
47. 47. A.G. Mayras in Case 2/74, Reyners, [1974] ECR 631.
48. 48. A.G. Tesauro in Case C-364/92, SAT, [1994] ECR 50, para 9. A.G. Cosmas in Case C-343/95, Diego Cali, [1997] ECR I-1547, para 37 and A.G. Jacobs in Case C-41/90, H öfner, [1991] ECR I-1979, para 22.
49. 49. In the words of Röpke, “Economic order and international law”, (1954) RCADI, 224, this concerns “the genuinely liberal principle of government and economy, of sovereignty and economic exploitation, of Imperium and Dominium, or of political power and economic power”.
50. 50. Meng, supra note 30, at 5770.
51. 51. Joined Cases 54/64 en 58/64, Grundig & Consten v. Commission, [1966] ECR 229.
52. 52. Dassonville, cited supra note 5, at para 5.
53. 53. However, it should be pointed out in respect of the rules on competition that, following the establishment of the Common Market, the allocative function is becoming more prevalent. See further section 4.4. infra.
54. 54. See, too, A.G. Van Gerven in his Opinion in Case C-145/88, Torfaen, [1989] ECR 3851, para 22; Stuyck, op. cit supra note 36, p. 1479; VerLoren van Themaat, op. cit supra note 35, p. 398.
55. 55. See, too, Stuyck, op. cit supra note 36, p. 1480 en 1487.
56. 56. See Case 13/77, INNO, [1977] ECR 2215.
57. 57. E.g. Dassonville and Leclerc, cited supra note 5.
58. 58. E.g. Case C-70/95, Sodemare, [1997] ECR I-3395, Banchero, cited supra note 5.
59. 59. This may also be relevant in the context of the free movement of goods, e.g. drugs. See Case 50/80, Horvath, [1981] ECR 385.
60. 60. Case 36/74, Walrave & Koch, [1974] ECR 1405 and Case 13/76, Dona, [1976] ECR 1333.
61. 61. Höfner, cited supra note 48.
62. 62. Keck & Mithouard, cited supra note 26. See paras. 12 and 13.
63. 63. In a case concerning national legislation on the advertising of alcoholic beverages, the Court had the opportunity to expand its ruling in Keck on the free movement of goods to the free movement of services. It refined its case law on Keck relating to selling arrangements and advertising, but it did not apply this refinement to the interpretation of Art. 49 EC. See Case C-405/98, Gourmet, Judgment of 8 March 2001, nyr.
64. 64. Torfaen, cited supra note 54, para 23. A.G. Van Gerven referred in this context to Case 8/72, VCH, [1972] ECR 977.
65. 65. Opinion in Torfaen, cited supra note 54.
66. 66. O’Keeffe and Bavasso, op. cit supra note 26, p. 554.
67. 67. Mortelmans, “Article 30 of the EEC Treaty and legislation relating to market circumstances: time to consider a new definition”, 28 CML Rev. (1991), 127. In the same sense Oliver, op. cit. supra note 22, p. 97. But see Wils, op. cit supra note 40, p. 487.
68. 68. See O.J. 2000, C 365 E/284.
69. 69. Colinet and Maresceau, “Interprétation et application du droit communautaire dans le domaine des réglementations de prix des produits agricoles: de l’arrêt Dechmann à l’arrêt Kefer-Delmelle”, 16 CDE (1980), 509.
70. 70. Jarvis, The Application of EC Law by National Courts, the Free Movement of Goods (Oxford, 1998), p. 195 et seq. Arnull, “What shall we do on Sunday?” 16 EL Rev. (1991), 112.
71. 71. Banchero, cited supra note 5.
72. 72. Case C-323/93, Crespelle, [1994] ECR I-5077; Franzé n, cited supra note 26. Case C-157/94, Commission v. Netherlands, [1997] ECR I-5677. On this apparent contradiction, see Buendia Sierra, Exclusive Rights and State Monopolies under EC Law (Oxford, 1999), p. 212–216.
73. 73. Faull and Nikpay, The EC Law of Competition (Oxford, 2000), p. 90–96.
74. 74. Case 26/76, Metro I, [1977] ECR, 1875; Case 161/84, Pronuptia, [1986], ECR 353.
75. 75. Case C-250/92, Gottrup-Klim, [1994] ECR I-5641.
76. 76. Deliége, cited supra note 6.
77. 77. Opinion in Lethonen, cited supra note 6, paras. 108–109.
78. 78. Case T-144/99, European Patent Office (EPO), Judgment of the CFI of 28 March 2001, nyr, at para 56 and 66. See Case 33/74, Van Binsbergen, [1974] ECR 1299. Case 71/76, Thieffry, [1977] 765. Case C-55/94, Gebhard, [1995] I-4165.
79. 79. Joined Cases C-115/97, C-116/97 en C-117/97, Brentjens, [1999] ECR I-6025. Joined Cases C-180/98-C-184/98, Pavlov, [2000] ECR I-6451. Case C-222/98, Vander Woude, [2000] ECR I-7111.
80. 80. Walrave & Koch, cited supra note 60. Most recently Case C-281/98, Angonese, [2000] ECR I-4139. See annotation by Lane and Shuibhne, 37 CML Rev. (2000), 1237. This case law also applies to equal payment, see Case 43/75, Defrenne, [1976] ECR 455.
81. 81. Epiney, Umgekehrte Diskriminierungen (Cologne, 1995). She discusses the situation in, inter alia, Germany.
82. 82. Höfner, cited supra note 48.
83. 83. Most recently in Case C-448/98, Guimont, Judgment of 5 Dec. 2000, nyr, and PreussenElektra, cited supra note 4.
84. 84. Gaja, “Les discriminations à rebours: un revirement souhaitable” in Mélanges Wael-broeck, op. cit. supra note 22, p. 993. Tagaras, “Régles communautaires de libre circulation, discriminations à rebours et situations dites ‘purement internes”’ in M élanges Waelbroeck, op. cit. supra note 22, p. 1499.
85. 85. Joined Cases C-485/93 en C-486/93, Simitzi and Kos, (1995) ECR I-2655. Joined Cases C-363/93 and 407–411/93, Lancry, cited supra note 43.
86. 86. Mortelmans, “The Common Market, the Internal Market and the Single Market: What’s in a market?” 35 CML Rev. (1998), 101. Weatherill, “The Common Market: mission accomplished?” Functions and future of European Law, (London, 1999) p. 33.
87. 87. Joined Cases 56/64 and 58/64, Consten & Grundig, [1966] ECR 229.
88. 88. Case 14/68, Walt Wilhelm, [1969] ECR 1.
89. 89. Although, evidently, agreements on the division of the market and quota will continue to exist: see e.g. the cement cartel, Joined Cases T-25/95 and others, [2000] ECR II-491.
90. 90. Schaub, “EC Competition System – proposals for reform” in Hawk (Ed.), Annual Proceedings of the Fordham Corporate Law Institute 1998, (New York, 1999). See, too, Wesseling, “The Commission White Paper on Modernisation of E.C. Antitrust Law”, 20 ECLR (1999), 427.
91. 91. COM(2000) 582 final. O.J. 2000, C 365 E/284.
92. 92. Maher, “Alignment of Competition laws in the European Community”, (1996) YEL, 223; Drahos, Convergence of Competition Laws and Policies in the European Community. Germany, Austria and the Netherlands (The Hague, 2001).
93. 93. Larouche, The bases of EC Telecommunications law ofter liberalization (Oxford, 2000).
94. 94. See inter alia Joined Cases C-147/97 en C-148/97, Deutsche Post, [2000] ECR I-825. See, too, Case C-379/98, PreussenElektra, cited supra note 4.
95. 95. Regulation 2790/99, O.J. 1999, L 336/21.
96. 96. O.J. 2001, C 3/2.
97. 97. Barnard, op. cit. supra note 25, p. 36.
98. 98. VerLoren van Themaat, op. cit supra note 35, p. 399.
99. 99. In Keck the issue was a prohibition of (re)selling at a loss. See, too Case, 63/94, Belgapom, [1995] ECR I-2467. On the relationship between the two cases VerLoren van Themaat, op. cit supra note 35, p. 400.
100. 100. Case 246/86, Belasco, [1989] ECR 2217.
101. 101. Case 178/84, Commission v. Federal Republic of Germany (’Reinheitsgebot’), [1987] ECR 1227. Gebhard, cited supra note 27.
102. 102. Metro, cited supra note 74.
103. 103. Communication of the Commission of 9 Dec. 1997, O.J. 1997, C 372/4.
104. 104. Joined Cases 177/82 and 178/82, Van den Haar, [1984] ECR 1797. For more recent case law, see Oliver, op. cit. supra note 22, p. 1398; Jarvis, op. cit supra note 70, p. 104; Barnard, op. cit. supra note 25, p. 43.
105. 105. Leclerc-TF1, cited supra note 41. According O’Keeffe and Bavasso, op. cit supra note 26, p. 553 by referring to a de minimis test it seems that A.G. Jacobs intended to introduce an evaluation similar to that of the “rule of reason” in competition law. This may be so, but in contrast with his colleagues Cosmas and Alber in Deliége and Lehtonen, A.G. Jacobs does not refer to the Gottrup case (see supra section 4.2).
106. 106. Barents, “Measures of Equivalent Effect. Some Recent Developments”, 18 CML Rev. (1981), 287.
107. 107. Case C-379/92, Peralta, [1994] ECR I-3453; Case C-190/98, Graf, [2000] ECR I-413. See Barnard, op. cit. supra note 25, p. 43. In Case C-67/97, Bluhme, [1998] ECR I-8033 the Court considered that the measure concerned did have such a direct effect so that there was no question of a hypothetical situation.
108. 108. Van den Haar, cited supra note 104. Cf. PreussenElektra, cited supra note 4, at para 64 on the relationship between Art. 81 EC and Art. 87 EC on state aids.
109. 109. See Stuyck, op. cit supra note 36, p. 1485.
110. 110. Bosman, cited supra note 2. Ferlini, cited supra note 7.
111. 111. Angonese, cited supra note 80. See annotation by Lane and Shuibhne, 37 CML Rev. (2000), 1237.
112. 112. Ganten, Die Drittwirkung der Grundfreiheiten: die EG-Grundfreiheiten als Grenze der Handlungs- und Vertragsfreiheit im Verhältnis zwischen Privaten (Berlin, 2000).
113. 113. Brentjens and Pavlov, cited supra note 79.
114. rd ed. (London, 1996), p. 87.
115. 115. Case C-265/95, Commission v. France, [1997] ECR I-6959.
116. 116. Case 7/61, Commission v. Italy, [1961] ECR 317.
117. 117. See para 15.
118. 118. Walloon Waste, cited supra note 25. Case C-120/95, Decker, [1998] ECR I-1831. Angonese, cited supra note 80. PreussenElektra, supra note 4.
119. 119. See in greater detail on this subject Roth, op. cit. supra note 22. For an earlier analysis along the same lines, see Mortelmans, op. cit. supra note 22, 182–190.
120. 120. Cf. Case 72/83, Campus Oil, [1984] ECR 2727.
121. 121. Faull and Nikpay, op. cit supra note 73, p. 103.
122. 122. Gasse, Die Bedeutung der Querschnittsklauseln fϋr die Anwendung des Gemeinschaft-srechts (Frankfurt am Main, 2000) See also PreussenElektra, supra note 4, at para 76.
123. 123. Campus Oil, cited supra note 120. See annotation by Mortelmans, 22 CML Rev. (1985), 687. See too Case C-347/88, Commission v. Greece (Greek Oil Case), [1990] ECR I-4747. See annotation by Hancher, 28 CML Rev (1991), 989.
124. 124. Commission v. The Netherlands, cited supra note 72. See annotation by Slot, 25 CML Rev. (1998), 1192.
125. 125. See too Stuyck, op. cit supra note 36, p. 1492.
126. 126. Commission v. Italy, cited supra note 116.
127. 127. Case C-238/82, Duphar, [1984] ECR 523.
128. 128. For a criticism see Oliver, op. cit. supra note 114, p. 161.
129. 129. Kohll, cited supra note 15, at para 41.
130. 130. Leclerc, cited supra note 5.
131. 131. Joined Cases 43/82 en 63/82, VBVB/VBBB, [1984] ECR 19. On these cases involving a cartel in the Dutch language region, see Zandvliet, “Fixed book prices in the Netherlands and European Union: a challenge for Community competition law”, (1997) The Columbia Journal of European Law, 413.
132. 132. O.J. 1982, L 54/36 para 60.
133. 133. Case C-360/92 P, Netbook agreement, [1995] ECR I-23.
134. 134. The so-called Sammelrevers O.J. 1996, C 54/2 See, too, IP/00/651, 22 June 2000, O.J. 2000, C 162/25. The European Commission announced that it came to the preliminary conclusion that the new German language system of fixed book prices does not have an appreciable effect on trade between the Member States, and, therefore, does not fall under Art. 81(1) EC. However, interested third parties now have the possibility to submit their observations to the Commission.
135. 135. Echirolles Distribution, cited supra note 15.
136. 136. Commission Decision on package trips to the World Football Championships in 1990, O.J. 1992, L 326/31. For the World Championships in 1998, see Weatherill, “0033149875354. Fining the organizers of the 1998 Football World Cup”, 21 ECLR (2000), 275. See also the decision of the Commission that the UEFA’s rules 2000 on the broadcasting of football matches fall outside the scope of European competition rules. According to Competition Commissioner Monti, the present decision reflects the Commission’s respect of the special characteristics of sport and its cultural and social function in Europe. See IP/01/583, 20 April 2001. And see the exchange of letters between the Commission and FIFA/UEFA on FIFA Regulations on international football transfers, IP/01/314, 5 March 2001.
137. 137. See the Commission’s Report to the European Council on sport, COM (1999) 644 final. See, too, Pons, Sport and European Competition Law– Fordham Corporate Law Institute, 1999, (New York, 2001).
138. 138. Ferlini, cited supra note 7. See also Sodemare, cited supra note 58.
139. 139. O.J. 2000, L 187/47.
140. 140. O.J. 2001, C 3/2.
141. 141. Jans, op cit. supra note 16, p. 277.
142. 142. See Gyselen, op. cit. supra note 4, p. 246. See too, Schmid, op. cit supra note 33, p. 116.
143. 143. Bosman, cited supra note 2, at para 86.
144. 144. Angonese, cited supra note 80.
145. 145. Mortelmans, case note on Bosman, (1996) SEW, 144. In the same sense, see Streinz and Leible, “Die unmittelbare Drittwirkung der Grundfreiheiten”, 11 EuZW (2000), 463.
146. 146. But even if this barrier was taken, it usually will not be possible to fulfil the requirement that a minimum degree of competition must remain intact. Government intervention usually leads to certain arrangements being declared generally binding for outsiders, so that to that extent, no competition will be left within its own territory. See, on this point, A.G. Lenz in Case 311/85, Vlaamse reisbureaus, [1987] ECR 3816, para 40.
147. 147. Meng, supra note 30 at 5769. The same point was made by A.G. Jacobs in Pavlov, cited supra note 79, at para 163.
148. 148. Meng, supra note 30 at 5768.
149. 149. Opinion at para 163.
150. 150. At paras. 98–100.
151. 151. See, on this point, Loozen, “Pavlov en van der Woude: meer dan een Pavlov-reactie?” (2000) NTER, 301.
152. 152. Case C-209/98, FFAD/Københavns Kommune, [2000] ECR I-3743. See, too, in this connection, Case C-203/96, Dusseldorp, [1998] ECR I-4075.
153. 153. Joined Cases C-51/96 en Deliége, cited supra note 6, at paras. 67–68.
154. 154. La Crespelle, cited supra note 72.
155. 155. Slot, case note to the Electricity Cases, 35 CML Rev. (1998), 1199
156. 156. But from a law and economics perspective it may be argued that a competition of policies is useful. See, in this respect, Van den Bergh, Towards an Institutional Legal Framework for Regulatory Competition in Europe (Kyklos, 2000), p. 435.
157. 157. Gyselen, op. cit. supra note 4, p. 245–246.
158. 158. VerLoren van Themaat, op. cit supra note 35, p. 402.
159. 159. For instance Case C-35/96, Commission v. Italy, [1998] ECR I-3851.
160. 160. On this case law, Faull and Nikpay, op. cit supra note 73, p. 274–276.
161. 161. Commission v. France, cited supra note 115. But see PreussenElektra, supra note 4, at paras. 63-64.
162. 162. PreussenElektra, cited supra note 4, at para 231.
163. 163. See Zandvliet, op. cit. supra note 131.
164. 164. See van de Gronden and Mortelmans (Eds), Mededinging en niet-economische belangen (Deventer, 2001).
165. 165. Doc COM (2000) 580 final. O.J. 2001, C 17/5.
166. 166. At para 29.