Limits of legitimacy and the primacy of politics in financial governance

Review of International Political Economy

Volumn 18, Issue 1, 2011, Pages 52-74

  M̈ugge, Daniel ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF AMSTERDAM   (Netherlands)

Author keywords

Delegation; European union; Financial markets; Global financial governance; Lamfalussy; Legitimacy

Indexed keywords

EID: 79751522528     PISSN: 09692290     EISSN: 14664526     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1080/09692290903025162     Document Type: Article

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