Introspection and the phenomenology of free will: Problems and prospects

Journal of Consciousness Studies

Volumn 18, Issue 1, 2011, Pages 180-205

  Horgan, Terry ^a   Timmons, Mark ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF ARIZONA   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 79251481155     PISSN: 13558250     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: None     Document Type: Article

References (22)

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