Agentive phenomenal intentionality and the limits of introspection

Psyche

Volumn 13, Issue 1, 2007, Pages 1-29

  Horgan, Terry ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF ARIZONA   (United States)

Author keywords

Agent exclusion problem; Agentive experience; Introspection; Phenomenal intentionality

Indexed keywords

EID: 34247186445     PISSN: None     EISSN: 1039723X     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: None     Document Type: Article

References (20)

1. th Edition (Wadsworth, 2002), pp. 492-99.
2. Chisholm, R. (1995). Agents, causes, and events: The problem of free will. In T. O'Connor (ed.), Agents, Causes, and Events: Essays on Indeterminism and Free Will. Oxford University Press.
3. Cohen, S. (1987). Knowledge, context, and social standards. Synthese 73, 3-26.
4. DeRose, K. (1995). Solving the skeptical paradox. Philosophical Review 104, 1-52.
5. Graham, G., Morgan, T., and Tienson, J. (2007). Consciousness and intentionality. In S. Schneider and M. Velmans (eds.), The Blackwell Companion to Consciousness. Blackwell.
6. Graham, G., Horgan, T., and Tienson, J. (In press a). Phenomenology, intentionality, and the unity of mind. In A. Beckermann and B. McLaughlin (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Mind. Oxford University Press.
7. Henderson, D. and Morgan, T. (2000). What is a priori and what is it good for?. Southern Journal of Philosophy 38, Spindel Conference Supplement on the Role of the Empirical and the A Priori in Philosophy, 51-86.
8. Henderson, D. and Horgan, T. (2002). "The a priori isn't all that it's cracked up to be, but it is something. Philosophical Topics 29, 219-50. Issue honoring Alvin Goldman.
9. Horgan, T. (1979). "Could," possible worlds, and moral responsibility. Southern Journal of Philosophy 17, 345-58.
10. Horgan. T. (forthcoming a). Causal compatibilism about agentive phenomenology. To appear in T. Horgan, M. Sabates, and D. Sosa (eds.), Supervenience in Mind (MIT Press), a festschrift for Jaegwon Kim.
11. Horgan, T. (forthcoming b). Mental causation and the agent-exclusion problem.
12. Horgan, T. and Graham, G. (1994). Southern fundamentalism and the end of philosophy, Philosophical Issues 5, 219-47.
13. Reprinted in M. DePaul and W. Ramsey (eds.), Rethinking Intuition: The Psychology of Intuition and Its Role in Philosophy, Rowman and Littlefield, 1998.
14. Horgan, T. and Tienson, J. (2002). The intentionality of phenomenology and the phenomenology of intentionality. In D. Chalmers (ed.), Philosophy of Mind: Classical and Contemporary Readings. Oxford, 520-33.
15. Horgan, T. and Tienson, J. (2005). The phenomenology of embodied agency. In M. Saagua and F. de Ferro (eds.), A Explicacao da Interpretacao Humana: The Explanation of Human Interpretation. Proceedings of the Conference Mind and Action III-May 2001. Lisbon: Edicoes Colibri, 415-23.
16. Horgan, T., Tienson, J., and Graham, G. (2003). The phenomenology of first-person agency. In S. Walter and H. D. Heckmann (eds.), Physicalism and Mental Causation: The Metaphysics of Mind and Action. Imprint Academic, 323-40.
17. Horgan, T., Tienson, J., and Graham, G. (2004). Phenomenal intentionality and the brain in a vat. In R. Schantz (ed.), The Externalist Challenge. Walter de Gruyter, 297-317
18. Horgan, T., Tienson, J., and Graham, G. (2006). Internal-world skepticism and the self-presentational nature of phenomenal consciousness. In U. Kriegel andK. Williford (eds.), Self-Representational Approaches to Consciousness. MIT Press, 41-61.
19. Lewis, D. (1996). Elusive knowledge, Australasian Journal of Philosophy 74, 549-67.
20. Stephens, G. L. and Graham, G. (2000). When Self-Consciousness Breaks: Alien Voices and Inserted Thoughts. MIT Press.