Knightian games and robustness to ambiguity

Journal of Economic Theory

Volumn 146, Issue 1, 2011, Pages 248-274

  Stauber, Ronald ^a  

^a AUSTRALIAN NATIONAL UNIVERSITY   (Australia)

Author keywords

Ambiguity; Bayesian games; Knightian uncertainty; Robustness

Indexed keywords

EID: 78751575491     PISSN: 00220531     EISSN: 10957235     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2010.08.008     Document Type: Article

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