Public Goods and the Commons: A Common Framework

Journal of Public Economic Theory

Volumn 13, Issue 1, 2011, Pages 47-69

  Vicary, Simon ^a  

^a NEWCASTLE UNIVERSITY   (United Kingdom)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 78650981511     PISSN: 10973923     EISSN: 14679779     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1111/j.1467-9779.2010.01492.x     Document Type: Article

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