Impossibility proofs for RSA signatures in the standard model

Lecture Notes in Computer Science (including subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics)

Volumn 4377 LNCS, Issue , 2007, Pages 31-48

  Paillier, Pascal ^a  

^a GEMPLUS   (France)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EQUIVALENCE CLASSES; HASH FUNCTIONS; NETWORK SECURITY;

IMPOSSIBILITY RESULTS; KEY GENERATION; NATURAL PROPERTIES; NON-MALLEABILITY; RANDOM ORACLES; SIGNATURE PADDINGS; SIGNATURE SCHEME; THE STANDARD MODEL;

AUTHENTICATION;

EID: 78650717533     PISSN: 03029743     EISSN: 16113349     Source Type: Book Series    
DOI: 10.1007/11967668_3     Document Type: Conference Paper

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