Trading one-wayness against chosen-ciphertext security in factoring-based encryption

Lecture Notes in Computer Science (including subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics)

Volumn 4284 LNCS, Issue , 2006, Pages 252-266

  Paillier, Pascal ^a   Villar, Jorge L ^b  

^a GEMALTO   (France)

^b UNIVERSITAT POLITÈCNICA DE CATALUNYA   (Spain)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

CHOSEN CIPHERTEXT ATTACK; CHOSEN CIPHERTEXT SECURITY; CRYPTOSYSTEMS; IMPOSSIBILITY RESULTS; KEY GENERATION; NON-MALLEABLE; PUBLIC KEYS; RANDOM ORACLE; RANDOM STRING; SECURITY NOTION; THE STANDARD MODEL;

CRYPTOGRAPHY;

NETWORK SECURITY;

EID: 77649259271     PISSN: 03029743     EISSN: 16113349     Source Type: Book Series    
DOI: 10.1007/11935230_17     Document Type: Conference Paper

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