Strengthening labor standards enforcement through partnerships with workers' organizations

Politics and Society

Volumn 38, Issue 4, 2010, Pages 552-585

  Fine, Janice ^a   Gordon, Jennifer ^b  

^a RUTGERS UNIVERSITY   (United States)

^b FORDHAM UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

Community; Enforcement; FLSA; Immigrant; Labor standards

Indexed keywords

EID: 78650247934     PISSN: 00323292     EISSN: 15527514     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1177/0032329210381240     Document Type: Article

References (137)

1. Our definition of low-wage workers is drawn from Lawrence Mishel, Sylvia Alegretto, and Jared Bernstein of the Economic Policy Institute. Low-wage workers earn less than the hourly wage that would lift a family of four above the poverty threshold, which was $9.60 an hour in 2005, given full-time, full-year work. Lawrence Mishel, Jared Bernstein, and Sylvia Alegretto, The State of Working America 2006/2007 (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, ILR Press, 2007).
2. Annette Bernhardt, Ruth Milkman, Nik Theodore, Douglas Heckathorn, Mirabai Auer, James DeFilippis, Ana Luz Gonzalez, Victor Narro, Jason Perelshteyn, Diana Polson, and Michael Spiller, Broken Laws, Unprotected Workers: Violations of Employment and Labor Laws in America's Cities (New York, NY: Center for Urban Economic Development, National Employment Law Project; and Los Angeles, CA: UCLA Institute for Research on Labor and Employment, 2009), 2.
3. U.S. Department of Labor, Wage and Hour Division, 1999-2000 Report on Initiatives (Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Labor, 2001), 7-9.
4. The traditional understanding of tripartism is labor, business, and government working together. Here we are referring to a specific proposal for a republican form of tripartism put forward by Ian Ayres and John Braithwaite in Responsive Regulation. Their idea of tri-partism is a process in which relevant public interest groups (PIGs) become what they refer to as "fully fledged third player[s]" in the game of regulation. Tripartism allows PIGs to participate in three ways: (1) it grants them and their members access to all the information that the regulator has, (2) it gives the PIG a seat at the negotiating table with the firm and agency when deals are done, and (3) PIGs are granted the same standing to sue or prosecute under the regulatory statute as the regulator. Ian Ayres and John Braithwaite, Responsive Regulation: Transcending the Deregulation Debate (New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 1992), 56-60.
5. This language of an overall system was suggested in a very helpful conversation with Michael Piore, October 2009.
6. As was the case with pensions and other welfare-state policies, state laws preceded the federal. State factory laws were enacted as early as the 1860s. State minimum-wage laws began with Massachusetts in 1912 and were enacted in many other states the following year, preceding the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA) by several years. FLSA does not preempt state wage and hour laws, but as a practical matter state provisions often mirror those contained in FLSA, and many state laws adopt the federal minimum as the floor for the wages of covered employees. John R. Commons and John B. Andrews, Principles of Labor Legislation, 4th ed. (New York, NY: August M. Kelley, 1936/1967), 450-451
7. Willis J. Nordlund, The Quest for a Living Wage: The History of the Federal Minimum Wage Program (Westport, CT: Greenwood, 1997), 1-29.
8. Nordlund, The Quest for a Living Wage; and U.S. Department of Labor, Wage and Hour Division, Minimum Wage and Overtime Hours under the Fair Labor Standards Act (Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Labor, 2003).
9. Annette Bernhardt and Siobhán McGrath, "Trends in Wage and Hour Enforcement by the U.S. Department of Labor, 1975-2004," Economic Policy Brief (New York, NY: Brennan Center for Justice at NYU School of Law, 2005), 2.
10. Nordlund, The Quest for a Living Wage, 119, 186.
11. Based on a national survey conducted by Fine, we estimate the total number of state wage and hour inspectors at approximately 700. Information provided by the U.S. Department of Labor in response to a Freedom of Information Act request indicates that the total number of federal inspectors in 2008 was 709. This means that in the United States today, there are approximately 1,409 federal and state wage and hour inspectors combined for 7,601,160 establishments employing 119,917,165 workers. See U.S. Census Bureau, County Business Patterns 2006 (Washington, DC: U.S. Census Bureau, 2008).
12. Howard Wial's analysis of 1997 Economic Census data in "Minimum-Wage Enforcement and the Low-Wage Labor Market" (Working Paper for MIT Task Force on Reconstructing America's Labor Market Institutions Conference, Cambridge, MA, 1999), 10-11.
13. Another consideration when thinking about the coverage challenges faced by the Wage and Hour Division (WHD) is that FLSA is far from the only law it is mandated to enforce.
14. Jennifer Gordon, Suburban Sweatshops: The Fight for Immigrant Rights (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, Belknap Press, 2005), chap. 1.
15. Annette Bernhardt, Heather Boushey, Laura Dresser, and Chris Tilly, eds., The Gloves-Off Economy: Workplace Standards at the Bottom of America's Labor Market (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, ILR Press, 2008), 1-2.
16. U.S. Census Bureau, "Establishments, Employees, and Payroll by Employment-Size Class: 1990-2005," Table 736, and "Employer Firms, Establishments, Employment and Annual Payroll by Enterprise Size: 1990-2005," Table 738, in County Business Patterns 2004 (Washington, DC: U.S. Census Bureau, 2006).
17. David Weil and Amanda Pyles, "Why Complain? Complaints, Compliance, and the Problem of Enforcement in the U.S. Workplace," Comparative Labor Law and Policy Journal 27, no. 1 (Fall 2005): 67.
18. David Weil, personal communication of national and regional list of industries to Fine, March 2009.
19. Weil and Pyles graciously provided us with the North American Industry Classification System (NAICS) codes they used to calculate the industries with the high estimated prevalence of minimum-wage and overtime violations. We cross-referenced their NAICS codes with the 2004 County Business Patterns report to come up with a breakdown of establishment size by industry.
20. U.S. Census Bureau, "Establishments, Employees and Payroll by Major Group for the United States: 2004/2003," Table 1, in County Business Patterns 2004, 1-4.
21. For an overview of some of the special issues that smaller businesses introduce for labor inspectors, see Andrew Schrank and Michael Piore, Norms, Regulations, and Labour Standards in Central America, Serie Estudios y Perspectivas, no. 77 (Mexico City, Mexico: United Nations, 2007), 32-33, http://www.eclac.cl/publicaciones/xml/3/28113/ Serie%2077.pdf.
22. Meidinger suggests that, rather than isolating the individual regulatory agency, we think of groups involved in regulatory policy and practice as a regulatory community. Errol Mei- dinger, "Regulatory Culture: A Theoretical Outline," Law & Policy 9, no. 4 (1987): 364-65.
23. Catherine Ruckelshaus, "Labor's Wage War," Fordham Urban Law Journal 3, no. 2 (2008): 373-407.
24. Peter J. Buckley and Jonathan Michie, eds., Firms, Organizations and Contracts: A Reader in Industrial Organization, with a foreword by Ronald Coase (New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 1996).
25. U.S. Government Accountability Office, Employee Misclassification: Improved Coordination, Outreach and Targeting Could Better Ensure Detection and Prevention, Report to Congressional Requesters (Washington, DC: GAO, August 2009).
26. Ruckelshaus, "Labor's Wage War," 380-82.
27. U.S. Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics, "Labor Force Characteristics of Foreign- Born Workers Summary," news release, March 26, 2009, http://www.bls.gov/news.release/ forbrn.nr0.htm.
28. Randy Capps, Michael Fix, Jeffrey S. Passel, Jason Ost, and Dan Perez-Lopez, "A Profile of the Low-Wage Immigrant Workforce," in Immigrant Families and Workers: Facts and Perspectives (Washington, DC: Urban Institute, Immigration Studies Program, 2003), 1.
29. Randy Capps, Karina Fortuny, and Michael Fix, Trends in the Low-Wage Immigrant Labor Force, 2000-2005 (Washington, DC: Urban Institute, 2007), 7
30. Weil and Pyles, 72.
31. The first phase of wage and hour enforcement was entirely complaint-driven; indeed, the earliest factory laws passed beginning in the 1850s to combat immigrant worker mistreatment in sweatshops did not establish any investigative force at all. Commons and Andrews, Principles of Labor Legislation, 450-51. On the first few years of FLSA enforcement, see Nordlund, The Quest for a Living Wage, 63-66.
32. Nordlund, The Quest for a Living Wage, 67, 118.
33. Weil and Pyles, Why Complain?
34. U.S. Department of Labor, Report, 11.
35. David Weil, "Public Enforcement/Private Monitoring: Evaluating a New Approach to Regulating the Minimum Wage," Industrial and Labor Relations Review 58, no. 2 (2005): 238-57.
36. David Weil and Carlos Mallo, "Regulating Labour Standards via Supply Chains: Combining Public/Private Interventions to Improve Workplace Compliance," British Jour- nal of Industrial Relations 45, no. 4 (2007): 791-814.
37. U.S. Department of Labor, Report, 19-20.
38. Rae Glass (U.S. Department of Labor, Wage and Hour Division), in discussion with Fine, February 2009.
39. Carmine Ruberto (Director of Labor Standards Enforcement, New York Department of Labor), in discussion with author, September 2009.
40. Fine and Burgoon, "The Missing Dimension."
41. We collectively refer to social scientists in the field of regulatory theory and legal scholars in the new governance field as "new regulatory" scholars. Such scholars have critiqued the command-and-control model of regulation as ill suited to addressing complex societal problems. In its place, they propose more decentralized, flexible, and collaborative approaches that usually involve both public and private actors.
42. Nordlund, The Quest for a Living Wage, 151.
43. According to a 2008 GAO report, from 1997 to 2007 the agency established seventy-eight formal partnerships. U.S. GAO testimony before the Committee on Education and Labor, House of Rep- resentatives; Anne Marie Lasowski, Fair Labor Standards Act: Better Use of Available Resources and Consistent Reporting Could Improve Compliance (Washington, DC: GAO, 2008).
44. Ayres and Braithwaite, Responsive Regulation, 106.
45. Cynthia Estlund, Regoverning the Workplace: From Self-regulation to Co-regulation (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, forthcoming).
46. David Weil, "Assessing OSHA Performance: New Evidence from the Construction Industry," Journal of Policy Analysis & Management 20, no. 4 (2001): 651-74.
47. Orly Lobel, "Interlocking Regulatory and Industrial Relations: The Governance of Workplace Safety," Administrative Law Review 57 (2005): 1104-15.
48. As Estlund writes, An effective system of self-regulation relies on an effective system of public regulation to catch the laggards, the defectors, and the cheaters. Ideally, '[n]on- compliance comes to be seen (accurately) as a slippery slope that will inexorably lead to a sticky end.' But without a serious escalation in labor standards enforcement-one that increases both the probability that violations will be detected and penalties for serious violations-an effort to apply the tenets of Responsive Regulation might end up mask- ing what amounts to a process of deregulation. Estlund, Regoverning the Workplace, 76, quoting John Braithwaite, Regulatory Capitalism: How It Works, Ideas for Making It Work Better (Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar, 2008), 92.
49. David Weil, "Crafting a Progressive Workplace Regulatory Policy: Why Enforcement Matters," Comparative Labor Law and Policy Journal 28 (2007): 132-33.
50. Weil, "Assessing OSHA Performance."
51. Weil and Pyles, "Why Complain?"
52. Weil, "A Strategic Approach to Labour Inspection," International Labour Review 147, no. 4 (2008): 363.
53. Weil, "Why Enforcement Matters," 139.
54. Weil, "Strategic Approach," 372.
55. Weil and Pyles, "Why Complain?" 86-92.
56. David Weil, "Individual Rights and Collective Agents: The Role of Old and New Workplace Institutions in the Regulation of Labor Markets," in Emerging Labor Market Institutions for the Twenty-First Century, ed. Rich- ard B. Freeman, Joni Hersch, and Lawrence Mishel (Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 2005).
57. Advocates have proposed additional legal strategies and reforms that would strengthen the hand of workers' organizations in addressing violations of immigrants' workplace rights. See, e.g., Kim Bobo, Wage Theft in America: Why Millions of Working Americans Are Not Getting Paid-And What We Can Do about It (New York, NY: New Press, 2009), chaps. 9-10.
58. Rebecca Smith and Catherine Ruckelshaus, "Solutions, Not Scapegoats: Abating Sweatshop Conditions for All Low-wage Workers as a Centerpiece of Immigration Reform," NYU Journal of Legislation and Public Policy 10 (2007): 555, 584-87.
59. Nonetheless, it is important to note that the Department of Labor (DOL) is not currently engaged with employers in many low-wage sectors, whether because the firms are too small or fly-by-night or because they are not organized in associations through which DOL can easily relate to them. How the DOL might reach out to such employers, and/or how they might be organized to make their involvement in a tripartite system more practicable, is an important question, but beyond the scope of this article. We believe that partnerships with workers organizations are important to consider across industries, even in settings where employers are not (yet) in a relationship with the DOL.
60. For historical analyses of FLSA, see Nordlund, The Quest for a Living Wage, chap. 3.
61. Ruth O'Brien, "A Sweat Shop of the Whole Nation: The Fair Labor Standard [sic] Act and the Failure of Regulatory Unionism," Studies in American Political Development 15, no. 1 (2001): 33-52.
62. Sean Farhang and Ira Katznelson, "The Southern Imposition: Congress and Labor in the New Deal and Fair Deal," Studies in American Political Development 19, no. 1 (2005):13-15 and 21-23.
63. O'Brien, "Sweat Shop," 35.
64. Mettler has argued that drafters in the Roosevelt administration excluded from the bill many categories of workers who did not engage in interstate commerce or in the production of goods for interstate commerce, driven largely by the concern that the Supreme Court would otherwise invalidate the law by applying a restrictive interpretation of the Commerce Clause. Suzanne B. Mettler, "Federalism, Gender, & the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938," Polity 26, no. 4 (1994): 643-45.
65. Farhang and Katznelson, "The Southern Imposition," 9-15.
66. Sidney Hillman, president of the Amalgamated Clothing Workers (ACW), on the other hand, strongly supported the unfair trade provisions and union regulatory role; this view was informed by his experience in the 1920s with "regulatory unionism," in which unions worked to stabilize industries and minimize unfair competition by imposing uniform standards of wages and working conditions.
67. O'Brien, "Sweat Shop," 35.
68. American Federation of Labor, "Report of Proceedings, Fifty-ninth Annual Convention, Cincinnati, Ohio, October 2-13, 1939," p. 179.
69. Louise Sadowsky Brock, "Overcoming Collective Action Problems: Enforcement of Worker Rights," University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform 30, no. 4 (1997): 797, quoting Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, ch. 676, § 16(b), 52 Stat. 1060, 1069 (codified at 29 U.S.C. § 216(b) [1994 & Supp. I 1995]).
70. Marc Linder, "Class Struggle at the Door: The Origins of the Portal to Portal Act of 1947," Buffalo Law Review 39 (1991): 167-72.
71. Joshua Cohen and Joel Rogers, "Secondary Associations and Democratic Governance," in Associations and Democracy, ed. Erik Olin Wright (New York, NY: Verso, 1995), 45.
72. Philippe C. Schmitter, "The Irony of Modern Democracy and Efforts to Improve Its Practice," Politics & Society 20, no. 4 (1992): 507-12.
73. Claus Offe, "The Attribution of Public Status to Interest Groups: Observations on the West German Case," in Organizing Interests in Western Europe: Pluralism, Corporatism, and the Transformation of Politics, ed. Suzanne Berger, 123-58 (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1981).
74. Philippe C. Schmitter, "Interest Intermediation and Regime Governability in Contemporary Western Europe and North America," in Berger, Organizing Interests, 285-327.
75. Cohen and Rogers, "Secondary Associations," 45.
76. Weil and Pyles, "Why Complain?" 86-92.
77. Outside of the wage and hour context, formal collaborative programs exist in arenas such as safety and health, where in so-called "state plan" states, OSHA delegates its authority to enforce health and safety standards to state governments that propose standards and strategies "at least as effective" as OSHA's. 29 U.S.C. § 667(c)(2) (2004). Several of these states require certain types of businesses to develop health and safety committees at each worksite. See 29
78. U.S.C. § 667(c)(4), (6) (2004); and U.S. Department of Labor, "State Occupational Safety and Health Plans, http://www.osha.gov/dcsp/osp/index.html (accessed March 16, 2010).
79. Peter Romer-Friedman, "Eliot Spitzer Meets Mother Jones: How State Attorneys General Can Enforce State Wage and Hour Laws," Columbia Journal of Law & Social Problems 39, no. 4 (2006): 495-553.
80. Matthew T. Bodie, "The Potential for State Labor Law: The New York Greengrocer Code of Conduct," Hofstra Labor & Employment Law Journal 21, no. 1 (2003): 183-207.
81. Estlund, Regoverning the Workplace, chap. 5.
82. The DOL might need to address the notice and balanced membership requirements of the Federal Advisory Committee Act (FACA). 41 C.F.R §102-3.60(b)(3) (2001). But FACA does not seem to have been an obstacle to WHD's efforts to partner with employers (or other groups) in the past. FACA also has exemptions. Its mandates do not apply when the government seeks advice from participants "on an individual basis and not from the group as a whole." 41 C.F.R. §102-3.40(e) (2001). It also appears not to apply when the government asks not for advice but for the assistance of third parties to enforce the law. 41 C.F.R. §102-3.40(k) (2001).
83. As Ayres and Braithwaite argue, "Where there is no power base and no information base for the weaker party, tripartism will not work." Ayres and Braithwaite, Responsive Regulation, 59.
84. David Weil, "Regulatory Jujitsu: Using Industry Structure to Protect Low-Wage Workers" (PowerPoint presentation at Rutgers University School of Management and Labor Relations, New Brunswick, NJ, January 29, 2008).
85. Ayres and Braithwaite, Responsive Regulation, 20.
86. We find support for this assertion in Roberto Pires's observation of labor inspection regimes in several Brazilian states. Roberto Pires, "Promoting Sustainable Compliance: Styles of Labour Inspection and Compliance Outcomes in Brazil," International Labour Review 147 (2008): 2-3.
87. Richard Slawson (Executive Secretary, AFL-CIO), in discussion with Fine, July 2009.
88. Both programs were facilitated by a 1989 amendment of California's Labor Code to authorize the establishment of Labor Compliance Programs (LCPs) to enforce prevailing wage requirements on public works construction projects. Office of the Director, "Labor Com- pliance Programs, Introduction," California Department of Industrial Relations, http:// www.dir.ca.gov/LCP.asp (accessed March 16, 2010).
89. Los Angeles Unified School District (LAUSD), Facilities Services Division, "Joint Com- pliance Monitoring Program Los Angeles Unified School District & All Work Preservation Groups: Rules of Engagement (Fiscal Year 2009-2010)," http://www.laschools.org/ contractor/lc/documents/download/work-preservation/Rules_of_Engagement.p df.
90. Slawson, discussion.
91. John Reamer (Director, Los Angeles Bureau of Contract Administration), in discussion with Fine, July 2009.
92. Mark Hovatter (Director of Contracts, LAUSD), in discussion with Fine, November 2009.
93. Chris Jenson (Intergovernmental Agency Liason Officer, Los Angeles Bureau of Contract
94. Administration), in discussion with Fine, December 2009.
95. Reamer, discussion.
96. Jenson, discussion.
97. We were not able to get data on the LAUSD program, but the LABPW provided data for the years 1999 to 2008. Dale Kanagawa, private correspondence to Fine, July 29, 2009.
98. For details on penalties for noncompliance, see Facilities Services Division, "Frequently Asked Questions," http://www.laschools.org/contractor/lc/faqs/ (accessed March 18, 2010).
99. City of Los Angeles, Labor Compliance Manual, November 30, 2006, http://bca.lacity.org/site/pdf/labor/labor_compliance_manual.pdf (accessed March 18, 2010).
100. Reamer, discussion.
101. Lilia Garcia (Executive Director, Maintenance Cooperation Trust Fund [MCTF]), in discussion with Fine, July 2009.
102. Henry Huerta (inspector, Division of Labor Standards Enforcement [DLSE], Janitorial Enforcement Team [JET]), in discussion with author, July 2009.
103. California Labor Code, sec. 2810(a) (2003).
104. Henry Huerta, discussion.
105. Participating union employers contribute 2 to 5 cents/hour per worker to fund MCTF, which is structured as a Taft-Hartley Trust Fund. For background on MCTF, see Lilia Garcia, "The Maintenance Cooperation Trust Fund: Combating Worker Exploitation and Unfair Competition through Collective Action with Responsible Employers," in Unhealthy Work: Causes, Consequences, Cures, ed. Peter L. Schnall, Marnie Dobson, and Ellen Rosskam (Amityville, NY: Baywood, 2009); 267-83.
106. Ruckelshaus, "Labor's Wage War," 390-94, 404-7.
107. Leonel Sanchez, "Watchdog Group Helps Keep Janitorial Contractors Clean," San Diego Union-Tribune, January 28, 2004.
108. Internal MCTF documents in authors' possession, including San Diego Albertson's Janitorial web, diagramming relationships between Albertson's, Capital Cleaning Contractors (CCC), and CCC's six subcontractors; wage reconstruction of Albertson's San Diego; examples of wage audits and affidavit outlines.
109. Garcia, discussion.
110. Huerta, discussion.
111. Frank Capetillo (JET), in discussion with Fine, November 2009.
112. Garcia, discussion.
113. MCTF, "Excell Cleaning and Building Services and Mo's Restaurant and Cleaning Ser- vices Sued," news release, December 20, 2007.
114. California Department of Industrial Relations, "California Labor Commissioner Files Complaint against Janitorial Services Contractor," news release, March 3, 2008. 106. MCTF, "California State Labor Commission Sues Cleaning Companies for Over $7 mil- lion," news release, January 12, 2009.
115. Garcia, discussion; Huerta, discussion.
116. Dean Fryer (Spokesman, Department of Industrial Relations), discussion with author, November 24, 2009.
117. The six groups are Make the Road New York, the Workplace Project, Centro del Derecho, Chinese Staff and Workers Association, RWDSU, and UFCW Local #1500. 111. Drawn from the draft Memorandum of Understanding and other draft documents provided by Terri Gerstein, New York State Department of Labor.
118. Brennan Center for Justice and Others, Protecting New York's Workers: How the State Department of Labor Can Improve Wage-and-Hour Enforcement (New York, NY: Brennan Center for Justice, 2006).
119. Terri Gerstein (Deputy Commissioner, New York Department of Labor), in discussion with Fine, October 2009.
120. Gerstein, in discussion with Fine, May 2009.
121. Deborah Axt (Director, Legal Program, Make the Road New York), in discussion with the authors, July 2009.
122. Gerstein, discussion, May 2009. 18. In reference to Patricia Smith and Lorelei Boylan's nominations to solicitor general and Wage and Hour Division administrator, respectively, Americans for Limited Government argued that "Smith's nomination is troubling for among other reasons because of an initiative she devised in her current position, the 'Wage Watch.'... This initiative could very likely be a model used by Smith and Boyland [sic] on a national level if both are confirmed. If so, it could turn tens of thousands of 'community organizers' into raving vigilantes nationwide." Americans for Limited Government, "Who Are M. Patricia Smith and Lorelei Boylan?" Nominee Alert, May 2009.
123. Judith Tendler, "Small Firms, the Informal Sector, and the Devil's Deal," Bulletin (Institute of Development Studies) 33, no. 3 (2002): 1-13.
124. Michael J. Piore and Andrew Schrank, "Toward Managed Flexibility: The Revival of Labor Inspection in the Latin World" (Working Paper, November 2007), 8-11, 15-20.
125. "Delegation of Governmental Power to Private Groups," Columbia Law Review 32, no. 1 (1932): 80-93.
126. Louis L. Jaffe, "Lawmaking by Private Groups," Harvard Law Review 51, no. 2 (1937): 201-253
127. "Delegation of Governmental Power." Laws of the State of New York, 89th sess., chap. 469 (1866).
128. ASPCA v. City of NY, 199 N.Y.S. 728 (N.Y. App. Div. 1923) (fines paid to the American Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals [ASPCA] did not violate the state constitution because the money was being used for a valuable public purpose).
129. Hand v. Stray Haven Humane Society and SPCA, 799 N.Y.S.2d 628 (N.Y. App. Div. 2005) (affirming that New York law authorized peace officers to enter private property to investigate reported animal abuse).
130. Reed L. Frischknecht, "The Democratization of Administration: The Farmer Committee System," American Political Science Review 47, no. 3 (1953): 711-19.
131. The ASPCA was originally authorized to keep the fees it collected through licensing and investigation. Note, "Delegation of Governmental Power to Private Groups," 92. 126.
132. Janice Fine, Worker Centers: Organizing Communities at the Edge of the Dream (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2006).
133. Gordon, Suburban Sweatshops.
134. On fostering innovation through processes of interpretation, see Richard K. Lester and Michael J. Piore, Innovation: The Missing Dimension (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2004).
135. In "Taming Prometheus: Talk of Safety and Culture," Susan S. Silbey argues that "research on safety in complex systems should explore just those features of complex systems that are elided in the talk of safety culture: normative heterogeneity and cultural conflict, competing sets of interests within organizations, and inequalities in power and authority." Annual Review of Sociology 35 (2009): 343.
136. Piore and Schrank, "Toward Managed Flexibility".
137. Eugene Bardach and Robert A. Kagan, Going by the Book: The Problem of Regulatory Unreasonableness, a Twentieth Century Fund Report (Philadelphia, PA: Temple University Press, 1982).